Kingdom Act of [date], containing rules regarding the establishment of the Caribbean body for reform and development (Kingdom Act Caribbean body for reform and development)
We Willem-Alexander, by the grace of God, King of the Netherlands, Prince of Orange-Nassau, etc. etc. etc.
All who will see or hear it read, salute! do to know:
Thus We have taken into consideration that the governments of the Netherlands and Curaçao consider it desirable, with a view to the well-being of the population of Curaçao, to cooperate in implementing reforms of an administrative nature, realizing sustainable and sustainable public finances and strengthening of the resilience of the economy in Curaçao;
that in connection with absorbing the economic contraction as a result of the COVID-19 crisis, it is desirable that the Netherlands make temporary liquidity support available to Curaçao;
that the governments of the Netherlands and Curaçao have agreed for this purpose that in a law under Article 38, second paragraph, of the Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands a
an administrative body with independent tasks and powers is established to provide support in this regard;
Thus it is that We, having heard the Advisory Division of the Council of State of the Kingdom, and in consultation with the States General, have approved and understood the provisions of the Statute for the Kingdom, as We approve. and mean by this:
CHAPTER 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 1 (definitions)
In this Act and the provisions based thereon, unless determined otherwise, the following terms have the following meanings: board: the board of the Caribbean body for reform and development, as referred to in Article 8;
COHO: the Caribbean body for reform and development referred to in Article 2;
Board of financial supervision Curaçao and Sint Maarten: the Board of financial supervision, referred to in Article 2, first paragraph, of the Financial Supervision Act Curaçao and Sint Maarten; country package: a country package as referred to in Article 5, paragraph 1;
Our Minister: Our Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations;
government body: an administrative body or other body that is vested with public authority by or pursuant to the Constitution of Curaçao or mutual regulation within the meaning of Article 38 of the Statute;
public company: an enterprise with legal personality under private law, not being a partnership with legal personality, in which a legal person under public law, whether or not together with one or more other legal persons under public law, is able to determine the policy, within the meaning of Article 25g, second paragraph, of the Competition Act, or an enterprise in the form of a partnership, in which a legal entity under public law participates;
action plan: an action plan as referred to in Article 22;
projects, programs and measures: the projects, programs and measures referred to in Article 4, first paragraph, under a and b;
Statute: Statute for the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
CHAPTER 2 THE CARIBBEAN REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT BODY
§ 2.1 Institution and tasks
Article 2 (Caribbean Body for Reform and Development) 1. There is a Caribbean Body for Reform and Development.
2. The COHO is located in The Hague.
3. The COHO has legal personality under Dutch law.
4. Articles 8-16; 18-35; and 41 of the Independent Administrative Bodies Framework Act apply mutatis mutandis to the COHO.
Article 3 (purpose)
For the benefit of the well-being of the population of Curaçao, the COHO aims to promote in Curaçao that reforms of an administrative nature are implemented, sustainably sustainable public finances are realized and the resilience of the economy is strengthened, including the embedding of the rule of law for this. is needed.
Article 4 (tasks)
1. Within the framework of the objective referred to in Article 3, the COHO has the following task:
a. the support and supervision of the development and implementation of projects, programs and measures by government bodies and public companies of Curaçao with regard to the subjects described in a national package;
b. initiating, promoting and implementing projects and programs related to the topics defined in a country package;
c. the provision in Curaçao of subsidies to citizens and private legal persons, including public companies, on request, or participating in the share capital in private law legal persons, including public companies; d. establishing stricter financial supervision, if appropriate, in Curaçao.
2. In the performance of the tasks referred to in the first paragraph, the COHO cannot exercise any powers that are vested in a government body on the basis of the land law of Curaçao.
Article 5 (land parcels)
1. A country spakket is a coherent package of reforms and investments aimed at achieving the objective referred to in Article 3, and in any case relates to the following subjects:
a.the government;
b. the finances
c. economic reforms;
d. the care;
e. social security;
f. the education;
g. strengthening the rule of law; and
h. the infrastructure.
2.the subjects, as referred to in the first paragraph, and the projects, programs and measures, as referred to in Article 4, first paragraph, under a and b, are elaborated in outline in a national package, stating the strategic policy objectives to be achieved with them. .
3. A country package is concluded as a mutual arrangement between the Netherlands and Curaçao on the basis of Article 38, first paragraph, of the Charter.
4. By or pursuant to a country package it may be stipulated that the development and implementation of projects, programs and measures will take place without the support and supervision of the COHO.
Article 6 (implementation agenda)
The COHO and the Minister of General Affairs of Curaçao are further elaborating a country package in an implementation agenda. An implementation agenda contains in any case the projects, programs and measures that are required to achieve the strategic policy goals, stated in a country package, stating priorities, performance indicators, critical success factors and financing methodology.
Article 7 (cooperation)
1. In order to carry out its tasks, the COHO may cooperate with institutions and bodies of institutions of the European Union and other international law organizations and with institutions and bodies of institutions of the Netherlands and other countries within the Kingdom with a development, financing , supervisory or general management task. Where appropriate, the COHO will draw up a collaboration protocol with the relevant institution or organization.
2. In agreement with Our Minister, the COHO will establish a cooperation protocol together with the Financial Supervision Council in the interest of the efficient and effective exercise of the powers referred to in sections 4.6 and 4.7.
§ 2.2 Design and composition
Article 8 (composition, appointment and decision-making) 1. The COHO has a board.
2. The board consists of three members, including the chairman.
3. The chairman represents the COHO in and out of court.
4. Appointment of the members takes place on the basis of the expertise required for the performance of the tasks of the COHO and on the basis of social knowledge and experience, on the understanding that at least one of the members has demonstrable affinity with the Caribbean. part of the kingdom.
5. The members are appointed by Our Minister for a period of three years and can be reappointed once for the same period. Our Minister consults with Our Minister of General Affairs of Curaçao about the interpretation of the appointment criteria referred to in the fourth paragraph.
6. The board decides by a majority of votes. If the votes are tied, the vote of the chairman is decisive.
7. The members of the board perform their duties without instructions or consultation.
Article 9 (incompatibilities)
Without prejudice to Articles 9 and 13, paragraph 1, of the Autonomous Administrative Bodies Framework Act, a member of the board cannot also be: a. Governor;
b. minister or state secretary;
c. King’s Commissioner or Commissioner;
d. member of the States General or of the States of Aruba, Curaçao or Sint Maarten;
e. mayor or alderman or island governor or island commissioner;
f. member of the Advisory Board of Aruba, Curaçao or Sint Maarten;
g. member of or state councilor of the Council of State of the Kingdom;
h. member of the General Audit Chamber of a country within the Kingdom;
i. ombudsman or deputy ombudsman of a country within the Kingdom;
j. member of the Aruba Financial Supervision Board or of the Curaçao and Sint Maarten Financial Supervision Board;
k. the Kingdom Representative of the public entities Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba;
l. member of the Law Enforcement Council; or
m. civil servant at a ministry or a subordinate institution, service or company of Aruba, Curaçao, Sint Maarten or the Netherlands.
Article 10 (board regulations)
1. The board adopts administrative regulations.
2. The administrative regulations will be published in the Government Gazette and the Curaçao National Gazette.
Article 11 (policy rules)
Without prejudice to Article 21, second paragraph, of the Independent Administrative Bodies Framework Act, policy rules with regard to the performance of its duties by the COHO are published in the Curaçao Government Gazette.
§ 2.3 Official service
Article 12 (the official service)
1. The board is supported by an official service.
2. The official service is headed by a general secretary.
Article 13 (incompatibilities)
1. The algNeither a secretary nor one of the employees of the civil service is a member of the board.
2. Neither the general secretary nor any of the employees of the civil service performs ancillary positions that are undesirable with a view to the proper performance of his position or to maintain his independence or confidence in it.
3. The general secretary or the employee of the civil service shall report the intention to accept an ancillary position other than by virtue of his position to the board.
§ 2.4 Admission
Article 14 (admission)
The members of the board and the general secretary and the employees of the official service that supports the board, their spouses or registered partners and minor children, insofar as they run a common household with them, are legally admitted to Curaçao. No further conditions are imposed on the members, the general secretary and the employees of the COHO as well as their spouses or registered partners and minor children for the exercise of a profession or the performance of work.
§ 2.5 Financing COHO
Article 15 (remuneration and other administrative expenses)
The remuneration of the members of the board, the remuneration of the general secretary and the employees of the civil service, as well as the funding of other administrative expenses, are charged to the budget of Our Minister.
§ 2.6 Annual report and implementation report
Article 16 (annual report)
1. In the application of article 18, second paragraph, of the Framework Act on independent administrative bodies, the annual report is also sent to the board and to the Parliament of Curaçao.
2. Before the annual report is sent, the COHO will give Our Minister of General Affairs of Curaçao the opportunity to express his views. A view and a response from the COHO are included in an appendix to the annual report.
3. Our Minister shall send the annual report to Our Ministers concerned.
Article 17 (implementation report)
1. The COHO will provide Our Minister every six months, and if necessary in the interim at the request of Our Minister, with an implementation report on the implementation of the obligations imposed on Curaçao by or pursuant to this Act.
2. Before an implementation report is provided, the COHO will give Our Minister of General Affairs of Curaçao the opportunity to express his views. A view and a response from the COHO are included in an appendix to the implementation report.
CHAPTER 3 RESOURCES AND AID
Article 18 (resources available to the COHO)
1. Our Minister makes financial resources available that the COHO:
can deploy in Curaçao for the performance of his duties, as referred to in Article 4, under a, b and c; and
b. can provide liquidity support to Curaçao to cover necessary expenses on the regular service included in its budget.
2. Our Minister may, after consultation with Our Ministers concerned, with a view to the implementation of a national package, determine in a substantiated manner how the financial resources referred to in the first paragraph should be spent by the COHO.
3. Our Minister will periodically conclude an agreement with Our Minister of General Affairs of Curaçao about the amount and nature of the financial resources referred to in the first paragraph. 4. If the COHO establishes in the annual report or an implementation report that Curaçao is making insufficient effort to fulfill the obligations imposed on Curaçao by or pursuant to this Act, Our Minister may, in agreement with the Council of Ministers of the Netherlands, suspend or discontinue all or part of the provision of financial resources to the COHO with regard to Curaçao.
5. Contrary to the provisions of the fourth paragraph, Our Minister may, in agreement with the Council of Ministers of the Netherlands, decide to make all or part of the financial resources available to the COHO with regard to to suspend or discontinue, if a compelling interest requires this. 6. Before Our Minister takes a decision as referred to in the fourth and fifth paragraphs, he shall give Our Minister of General Affairs of Curaçao the opportunity to express his views. If an opinion has been put forward, the reasons for the decision refer to what has been discussed in the opinion.
Article 19 (appointment of experts)
1. Our Ministers concerned, in agreement with Our Minister, at the request of the COHO, appoint one or more experts under their jurisdiction to the COHO, with due observance of the instructions given by or on behalf of the COHO, in the performance of its duties. assist.
2. The experts appointed on the basis of the first paragraph are covered insofar asthey assist the COHO in the performance of its duties under the responsibility of the COHO.
CHAPTER 4 POWERS
§ 4.1 General
Article 20 (provision of data and information and provision of cooperation) At the request of the COHO, every government body and public company of Curaçao shall provide the data and information that the COHO needs for the performance of the tasks referred to in Article 4, paragraph 1, under a, b and d, and will provide any cooperation that COHO reasonably requests in connection with this.
§ 4.2 Projects, programs and measures of government bodies and public companies
Article 21 (support for projects, programs and measures)
For the performance of the task referred to in Article 4, first paragraph, under a, the COHO can: a. Provide financial resources directly or indirectly;
b. make expertise and implementation capacity available; and
c. auditing governments and public companies.
Article 22 (action plan)
1. The COHO may, with due observance of the outlines described in a national package, after consultation with the government bodies and public companies concerned by it, draw up an action plan for the development and implementation of a project, program or measure.
2. Insofar as relevant, an action plan contains at least:
a description of the nature of the support referred to in Article 21;
b. a description of the goals to be achieved, products to be delivered and associated action points;
c. a budget and a proposal to cover the intended financial resources; d. the timeline;
e. an overview of the required expertise and implementation capacity;
f. an overview of required regulatory actions
g. an agreement about reporting lines;
h. a division of responsibilities.
3. The COHO shall immediately send an action plan to the government bodies and other parties concerned, as well as to Our Minister and to Our Ministers concerned.
Article 23 (designation)
Our Minister may, within the outlines described for this purpose in a national package, after consultation with Our Ministers concerned by the COHO, give instructions regarding an action plan for the development and implementation of a project, program or measure by government bodies.
Article 24 (suspension of aid)
1. The COHO may suspend all or part of the support referred to in Article 21 if the relevant government body or public company, in the opinion of the COHO: a. Does not implement a project, program or measure on time;
b. does not implement a project, program or measure in the manner agreed in the country packages or detailed in an action plan; or
c. fails to provide the data and information or to cooperate as referred to in Article 20.
2. Before the COHO takes a decision to suspend all or part of the aid, it shall give the relevant government body or public company the opportunity to express its views.
3. The COHO will not implement the decision to suspend the grant in whole or in part until after a period stated in the decision has expired, within which the relevant government body or public company has been able to fulfill its obligation.
4. The relevant government body or public company and Our Minister shall be notified in writing of a decision to suspend the whole or in part and of the intention to take such a decision. If the relevant government body or public company has expressed an opinion, this will be stated in the decision.
Article 25 (provision)
If the decision to suspend all or part of the support referred to in Article 24 has not resulted in the relevant government body or public undertaking implementing the project or measure in the manner laid down in the national package or an action plan or the requested cooperates as yet, the COHO may advise the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom through the intervention of Our Minister to make a provision under the Charter.
§ 4.3 Projects and programs
Article 26 (project implementation)
For the performance of its task, as referred to in Article 4, first paragraph, under b, the COHO may, insofar as reasonably possible after consultation with Our Ministers of Curaçao concerned by it: a. Develop and manage projects and programs;
b. to commission the supply of goods or services; and
c. participate in share capital.
Article 27 (consent)
In the performance of its task referred to in Article 4, paragraph 1, under b, the COHO requires the prior consent of Our Minister, after consultation with Our Minister of Finance, for: a. Establishing or participating in a legal entity;
b. provide itn to a legal entity under private law of equity capital, loans with substantial equity characteristics or guarantees with regard to the amount of equity capital.
Article 28 (designation)
Our Minister may, within the outlines described in a national package, after consultation with Our Ministers concerned, give the COHO instructions regarding the initiation, promotion and implementation of projects.
§ 4.4 Grants and participating interests
Article 29 (grants and participations)
1. By regulation of Our Minister, rules may be laid down with regard to the provision of subsidies and the participation in share capital as referred to in Article 4, first paragraph, under c, with regard to at least:
a.the details of the activities;
b. the amount or the manner in which the amount is determined;
c. the conditions;
d. the obligations;
e. the accountability;
f. the payment; and
g. a subsidy ceiling.
2. Insofar as not provided for by regulation of Our Minister, the COHO may lay down policy rules with regard to the provision of subsidies and participation in the share capital on, among other things, the subjects referred to in the first paragraph, under a to g . If, after adoption of the policy rules, rules are set in this regard by ministerial regulation, the policy rules will be brought into line with them or withdrawn. 3. Title 4.2 of the General Administrative Law Act applies mutatis mutandis to the granting of subsidies.
4. The regulations of our Minister, referred to in the first paragraph, and the policy rules, referred to in the second paragraph, will be published in the Government Gazette and the Curaçao National Gazette.
Article 30 (definitions)
In this Act and the provisions based on it, the following terms have the following meanings:
decision: a written decision of an administrative body containing a legal act under public law that is not of general application, including the rejection of the application thereof;
interested party: the person whose interest is directly involved in a decision; application: a request from an interested party to make a decision.
Article 31 (decision period)
1. The COHO will make a decision on an application for a subsidy decision within eight weeks.
2. If a decision cannot be made within the term stipulated in the first paragraph, the COHO will inform the applicant of this and specify the shortest possible term within which the decision can be expected.
3. Failure to make a decision within the period stated in the first paragraph or the period communicated by the COHO on the basis of the second paragraph is equated with a negative decision.
Article 32 (deadlines in connection with Saturdays, Sundays and public holidays)
1. A period set in this Act that ends on a Saturday, Sunday or a generally recognized public holiday will be extended up to and including the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday or public holiday.
2. The public holidays referred to in Article 3 of the General Time Limits Act and Article 3 of the General Time Limits Ordinance of Curaçao apply as generally recognized public holidays.
Article 33 (legal protection)
1. An interested party can appeal directly to the Court of First Instance of the Common Court of Justice of Aruba, Curaçao, Sint Maarten and the Court of First Instance against a decision to grant a subsidy and a decision to determine the subsidy. from Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba.
2. An appeal may be lodged against the decision of the Court of First Instance referred to in the first paragraph with the Common Court of Justice of Aruba, Curaçao, Sint Maarten and Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba.
3. If the Court of First Instance, in the appeal, is of the opinion that the decision referred to in subsection 1 is contrary to the law or is not reasonably justified when weighing up all the interests involved, it will declare the appeal to be well-founded. .
4. Chapters III, IV and V of the National Ordinance Administrative Jurisprudence of Curaçao apply mutatis mutandis.
§ 4.5 Transfer of participating interests
Article 34
A participation of the COHO in the share capital of legal entities under private law, including public companies, will not be transferred to a third party until Curaçao has been given the opportunity to take over the participation.
§ 4.6 Enhanced financial supervision
Article 35 (institution of stricter financial supervision)
1. If the COHO is of the opinion that Curaçao is making insufficient effort to comply with the obligations imposed on Curaçao by or pursuant to this Act or the Financial Supervision Act of Curaçao and Sint Maarten, this may be done, in accordance with the Council of Ministers of Curaçao. after having heard the Kingdom and the Financial Supervision Council, determine that stricter financial supervision be institutedon some or all of Curaçao’s expenses This stricter financial supervision is exercised by the Financial Supervision Council.
2. Contrary to the provisions of subsection 1, Our Minister may, in agreement with the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom and after the COHO and the Financial Supervision Council have been consulted, determine that stricter financial supervision will be instituted for some or all of the expenditure. Curaçao, if required by a compelling interest.
3. Before stricter financial supervision as referred to in the first paragraph is instituted, the COHO will give the board of Curaçao the opportunity to express its views. If an opinion has been put forward, the reasons for the decision refer to what has been discussed in the opinion.
4. The COHO shall immediately notify Our Minister of General Affairs of Curaçao in writing of the institution of stricter financial supervision, respectively, through the intervention of Our Minister. As soon as Our Minister of General Affairs has received this notification, Curaçao will submit the expenditure subject to supervision to the Financial Supervision Council for approval.
Article 36 (withholding approval)
1. If the Financial Supervision Council, after imposing stricter financial supervision, as referred to in Article 35, first and second paragraph, finds that an expenditure is contrary to the law or the general financial interest, it may withhold approval for this expenditure. .
2. Approval will not be withheld until after Our Minister of General Affairs of Curaçao has been given the opportunity to consult. If a consultation has taken place, the reasons for the decision refer to what was discussed in the consultation.
Article 37 (policy framework)
If stricter financial supervision is instituted as referred to in Article 35, first and second paragraph, the Financial Supervision Council shall, in agreement with the COHO, establish a policy framework for the effective and efficient application of this supervision. This policy framework will be communicated to Our Minister of General Affairs of Curaçao as soon as possible.
Article 38 (time limits)
1. If the Financial Supervision Council has not withheld approval for this within fourteen days after a country has submitted an expenditure, the requested approval will be given by operation of law.
2. The taking of the decision referred to in Article 36, first paragraph, can be postponed once for a maximum of fourteen days. If the Board postpones the taking of this decision, it will in any case notify Our Minister of General Affairs of Curaçao before the expiry of the term referred to in the first paragraph.
Article 39 (urgent urgency)
After the stricter financial supervision referred to in Article 35, first and second paragraph, has been instituted, Curaçao can, in cases of urgent urgency, make an expenditure before this publication has been approved by the Financial Supervision Council. Our Minister of General Affairs Curaçao shall immediately inform the Board of this decision.
Article 40 (suspension of aid)
1. The COHO may suspend all or part of the support referred to in Article 21 if:
a. Curaçao, after the stricter financial supervision referred to in Article 35, first and second paragraph, has been instituted, makes a financial expenditure before it has been approved by the Financial Supervision Council; or
b. the Financial Supervision Council ruled that Curaçao incorrectly applied Article 39. 2. Before the COHO takes a decision to suspend the grant in whole or in part, it shall give Our Minister of General Affairs of Curaçao the opportunity to express his views.
3. Our Minister of General Affairs of Curaçao and Our Minister shall be notified in writing of a decision to suspend the whole or in part and of the intention to take such a decision.
Article 41 (termination of supervision)
1. If the Board of Financial Supervision, on the basis of an implementation report, is of the opinion that the financial expenditure of Curaçao on which supervision has been instituted during a quarter is lawful and efficient, this may advise the COHO or Our Minister to terminate the supervision.
2. If the COHO or Our Minister, respectively, terminates the supervision referred to in Article 35, first and second paragraph, it shall immediately notify Our Minister of General Affairs of Curaçao as well as Our Minister or the COHO thereof in writing.
Article 42 (crown appeal)
1. Our Minister of General Affairs of Curaçao can appeal to Us against the decision referred to in Article 35, first and second paragraph, for fourteen days after the decision has been sent. The Council of State of the Kingdom is charged with preparing the draft decree on the matterake the decision on the appeal. Our decision will be published in the Official Journal of Curaçao and notified to Our Minister of General Affairs of Curaçao and the Parliament.
2. During the preparation of the draft decision referred to in subsection 1, the Council of State of the Kingdom may call on interested parties, witnesses, experts and interpreters to be heard during the investigation. The Council shall in any case give Our Minister of General Affairs of Curaçao the opportunity to be heard.
3. Articles 6: 5, 6: 6, 6:14, 6:15, 6:17, 6:21, 8:24, 8:25, 8:27 to 8:29, 8:31, 8:32, 8:33 to 8:36, first paragraph, 8:39, 8:50, 8:61 and 8:62 of the General Administrative Law Act apply mutatis mutandis.
4. The draft decision on the decision on the appeal referred to in the first paragraph is not public.
5. Section 27d of the Council of State Act applies mutatis mutandis. The hearing is public.
6. The appeal does not suspend the effect of the decision against which it is directed.
7. Our decision does not deviate from the draft, insofar as the advice of the Board is based solely on grounds of lawfulness, and for the rest only if compelling grounds relating to the supervision regulated in this Act give cause to do so. If
Our decision deviates from the draft, it will be published in the Official Gazette with a report from Our Minister. In any case, this report contains the arguments on the basis of which it is proposed to deviate from the design, as well as the design itself.
8. If Our decision seeks to annul the decision in whole or in part, as referred to in Article 33, first paragraph, the COHO will again provide for the case with due observance of Our decision. If desired, We can provide the case.
9. Decisions on the basis of article 35, first and second paragraph, are not subject to appeal to the administrative court on the basis of the National Ordinance Administrative Jurisprudence of Curaçao or the General Administrative Law Act. This also applies to Our decision referred to in the first paragraph.
§ 4.7 Loans
Article 43 (loans)
1. The COHO assesses whether Curaçao’s intention to attract a loan is in line with the provisions of this Act and by or pursuant to the national package. For the sake of this assessment, the Financial Supervision Council will immediately send an advice as referred to in Article 16 of the Financial Supervision Act to the COHO.
2. If the COHO finds that the intention of Curaçao to attract a loan does not fit within the provisions referred to in the first paragraph, this loan cannot be attracted through the current registration of the Dutch State, as referred to in Article 16, seventh. member of the Financial Supervision Act.
3. Before the COHO gives an opinion as referred to in the second paragraph, it shall give Our Minister of Finance of Curaçao the opportunity to express his view.
4. Our Minister of General Affairs of Curaçao, the Financial Supervision Board, Our Minister and Our Minister of Finance shall be notified in writing of an opinion as referred to in the second paragraph and of the intention to issue such an opinion.
CHAPTER 5 FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 44 (evaluation provision)
1. Within three years after the entry into force of this Kingdom Act, Our Minister shall send the representative bodies of the Netherlands and Curaçao a report on the effectiveness and the effects of this Act in practice. With a view to this report, Our Minister shall, in agreement with the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom, set up an evaluation committee no later than six months before the expiry of this term.
2. The evaluation committee consists of three independent members who are appointed on the basis of expertise and according to the following procedure:
the chairman in accordance with Our Minister of General Affairs of Curaçao;
b. one member in accordance with Our Minister of General Affairs of Curaçao;
c. one member, to be designated by Our Minister.
3. The evaluation committee can request support in carrying out its activities.
4. The evaluation committee will report to the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom no later than four months after it has been established, through the intervention of Our Minister. The report contains reasoned judgments and recommendations.
Article 45 (entry into force, expiry and termination)
1. This Act shall enter into force on the first day of the month following that in which it is published.
2. This Act will lapse six years after the date of entry into force. At the request of the Netherlands or Curaçao and in accordance with Curaçao or the Netherlands, it may be extended by Royal Decree each time for two years. The royal decree will be published in the Official Gazette no later than two months before the expiry of this period
paganly published the Official Journal of Curaçao.
3. In the Netherlands it may be declared by law and in Curaçao by national ordinance that the mutual arrangement contained in this law must be terminated earlier than the date referred to in the second paragraph. This termination takes place in accordance with Curaçao and the Netherlands respectively.
Article 46 (interim amendment)
This law can be amended by mutual agreement in the interim by law on the basis of Article 38, second paragraph, of the Statute.
Article 47 (official title)
This Act is cited as: Kingdom Act Caribbean Body for Reform and Development.
Burden and order that this will be placed in the Official Gazette and in the Official Journal of Curaçao and that all ministries, authorities, councils and officials concerned by this will adhere to the accurate implementation.
The State Secretary for the Interior and Kingdom Relations,
NOTE OF EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM
I GENERAL
1 Introduction
§ 1.1 General scope and purpose
This bill of law aims to establish the Caribbean body for reform and development (hereinafter: the COHO), including the determination of its structure, organization, tasks and powers. In addition, rules are set about the relationship of the COHO to the State, the country of Curaçao and the Financial Supervision Council (hereinafter also referred to as: Cft). The COHO aims to support Curaçao in implementing reforms of an administrative nature, realizing sustainable and sustainable public finances and strengthening the resilience of the economy. The COHO does not take over any legislative and administrative powers from the government, ministers and the States of Curaçao (Article 4, second paragraph), but can attach consequences to the non-compliance or insufficient compliance by Curaçao with the obligations imposed on the basis of this proposal. rest on the land. In view of Curaçao’s constitutional autonomy within the Kingdom, more in particular the constitutional position of Parliament and the government, it is important to define these obligations as accurately as possible. An important role in this respect is reserved for the national package, a mutual arrangement based on Article 38, first paragraph, of the Statute for the Kingdom of the Netherlands (hereinafter also referred to as: the Statute). In this national package, the Netherlands and Curaçao outline the subjects, projects, programs and measures with regard to which the COHO can perform its tasks. The more transparent and clearer these main points are described in the national package, the better the implementation of a project or measure is guaranteed by the COHO in a constitutional sense. Furthermore, the COHO must always bear in mind the above stated objective of its institution when exercising its tasks and powers.
§ 1.2 Background and context
The spread of the infectious disease COVID-19 – which in March 2020 by the
The World Health Organization was labeled a pandemic – also affected the Caribbean part of the Kingdom, including Curaçao, in the first quarter of 2020. The Corona crisis that arose as a result of this pandemic has very profound consequences for Curaçao, which affect almost all aspects of society. Curaçao was hit hard not only in the medical and social field, but also in the economic and financial field, with the government’s income from the main economic activity, tourism, almost completely disappearing. As a result, Curaçao is now threatened to such an extent in (the continuity of) its functioning that the country is not able to keep the economy and thus society running without support.
The fact that the Corona crisis could hit and disrupt Curaçao so hard cannot be separated from the observation that Curaçao has not been able to achieve a resilient economy sufficiently in recent decades. Between 2010 and 2019, the economy of Curaçao hardly grew. Curaçao thus lagged behind the development of the world economy, Latin America and the Caribbean region. In the meantime, the debt ratio has risen sharply. In addition to incidental and external causes, the lagging economic performance is of a structural nature. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has noted for years that the rigid labor market and unfavorable business climate are an obstacle to economic growth and that the high public debt and the costs of the public sector, and in particular personnel costs, are an excessive financial burden.
There is also insufficient connection between education and the labor market, increasing unemployment, high and rising healthcare costs and risks in the financial sector. In addition, it should be kept in mindIt must be assumed that Curaçao has a starting position from the perspective of the relationship within the Kingdom that now enables the country to finance loans on the international financial markets under relatively very favorable conditions.
The Corona crisis has left a big hole in the already fragile weakened economy; forecasts take into account a 15 to 30 percent contraction of the economy and a debt ratio that will rise well above the level deemed desirable and sustainable for small island states. Without reforms, the economy will, at best, return to the slow growth path of recent decades after the Corona crisis. More realistic, however, is the expectation that there will be a slower growth path, due to the accumulated debt burden, higher unemployment and reduced international demand for tourism. Economic, financial, social and institutional reforms are therefore necessary to make the economy and society resilient and resilient. The labor market must be reformed to provide opportunities for the large and growing group of jobseekers. The degree to which unemployment will rise further as a result of the Corona crisis will depend, among other things, on the duration of the crisis and on the effectiveness of the measures taken to maintain employment and strengthen economic resilience.
A flexible labor market contributes to more employment. An attractive business climate attracts investors, contributes to employment development and strengthens Curaçao’s international competitive position. A properly functioning capital market makes it easier for capital to find its way to profitable investments. It has long been known that structural reforms are necessary in these areas, but implementation has so far lagged behind. However, the socio-economic and financial situation in which Curaçao ended up as a result of the Corona crisis leaves no room for further postponement of these structural reforms. In April and May 2020, the Netherlands temporarily offered Curaçao with so-called “soft” loans (loans at 0% interest and with a term of two years without repayments). This means that during the first months of the Corona crisis, Curaçao had sufficient liquidity to be able to perform necessary government tasks and to provide support to that part of the population that is most affected and where the need is greatest. At the same time, the Netherlands has also provided support to the most vulnerable households in a humanitarian way through the Red Cross and local organizations.
Providing these loans has enabled Curaçao to continue to perform the necessary government tasks. This includes guaranteeing public order and safety, but also maintaining vital processes such as electricity and water supplies, internet and data services, etc. possibly provide for the bare necessities of life. In fact, this means that with these loans, a state bankruptcy of Curaçao has been prevented in the very short term.
From July 2020, additional liquidity support will also be subject to conditions aimed at, among other things, structural reforms in order to sustainably strengthen Curaçao’s resilience. The experiences since the constitutional changes within the Kingdom in 2010 show that Curaçao has insufficient financial strength and capacity to implement the necessary reforms independently. In addition to the fact that the existing problems have become larger and more visible than they already were due to the Corona crisis, the problems have also become particularly dire and urgent as a result. This makes the need for an immediate and structurally different approach to this essential problem, and it also justifies it.
The COHO is an essential part of this immediate and structurally different approach. The institution’s aim is therefore to be able to manage the use of the liquidity support and the implementation of the conditions attached to it, directly or indirectly.
The Netherlands will make a lot of tax money available in the coming years and therefore wants to be able to steer on results and a sustainable future for Curaçao. In order to ensure that the intended objectives are achieved with this money, the COHO is assigned a number of tasks and powers that will focus, among other things, on investment, remediation and reorganization. The COHO will thus promote in the short and long term that Curaçao will implement reforms, realize sustainable public finances and that by means of investments in the private and semi-public sector, both at the request of citizens and companies, among others, and on the initiative ofn the COHO itself, the resilience of the economy is strengthened. In this way, the welfare of the population of Curaçao can be sustainably improved.As has already been discussed above, this objective and performance of tasks must be related in a constitutionally acceptable manner to the constitutional position of Curaçao and its national organs within the Kingdom. For that reason, there is no question of taking over legislative and administrative powers by the COHO and the COHO can only initiate reforms, projects, programs and measures, with which Curaçao has first agreed in broad terms in advance.
2. The COHO
§ 2.1 Administrative body with independent tasks and powers and with its own legal personality
The COHO is institutionally designed as an administrative body with independent tasks and powers and with its own legal personality. The COHO is not an independent administrative body within the meaning of the Independent Administrative Bodies Framework Act (hereinafter also referred to as: ZBOs Framework Act). However, in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the proposal, various articles from the ZBO Framework Act are declared to apply mutatis mutandis to the COHO.
The choice for an independently acting administrative body that at the same time cannot be regarded in a formal sense as an independent administrative body within the meaning of the ZBOs Framework Act is prompted by a series of arguments. The independent nature of the tasks and powers that the proposal allocates to the COHO can first of all be explained by the need for independent judgment based on specific expertise. The exercise of these duties and powers requires expertise in specific areas such as economic development and financial management. With a view to the efficiency of this exercise, it is considered desirable to build an institutional distance between the Dutch board and COHO. An independent position is expected to contribute in the second place to the creation of support for the COHO and its activities among the residents, government bodies and (government) companies in Curaçao. The independent character of the COHO can therefore also be explained in the light of the special (Caribbean) context in which it will operate.
The independence of its tasks and powers means that the COHO is not hierarchically subordinate to the minister responsible for the system of the Act, the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (hereinafter also referred to as: the minister), or the Dutch government. It has the necessary discretion in the performance of its duties and powers. As long as the COHO remains within the frameworks set in this Kingdom Act and in a national package in this exercise, it can, for example, decide itself to start up a particular economic project or to shape a reform agreed as a condition in a particular way. Finally, reference can also be made to the guarantees of independence that apply to the COHO through the corresponding application of various articles from the ZBOs Framework Act. For example, members of the COHO can only be dismissed for reasons laid down in the ZBOs Framework Act (Article 12, second paragraph, ZBOs Framework Act), the official service of the COHO is under its authority and account is only given to the COHO for its activities (Article 16 ZBO Framework Act).
At the same time, it is not desirable for the COHO to be completely independent of the
Dutch administration can operate. There is a need for the exercise of democratic control by the States General over the administration conducted. This possibility of control is all the more important now that not only the organization of the COHO is fully funded with Dutch tax money, but also financial and other resources that the COHO will provide in the performance of its tasks, at least in the first instance, entirely. are raised by the Dutch citizen. The Dutch parliament must therefore be able to hold the ministers involved in the system of the Kingdom Act to account. Also for practical reasons there is a need for a connection between the Dutch administration, in particular the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, and the COHO. The latter will operate in a special and politically sensitive context. And with its work, the COHO ends up in fields where numerous collaborative relationships and processes have already been started between Dutch departments and the government of Curaçao over the years. Some form of direction, coordination and say is therefore essential.
Powers and procedural safeguards have been added in various places in the proposal, which substantiate and mark the associated political responsibility. To beginnen can be pointed to the various control options that have been incorporated into the Kingdom Act over the link of the ZBOs Framework Act. This applies, for example, to the power of the minister to appoint the members of the COHO (Article 12, paragraph 1, ZBOs Framework Act) and the possibility to supervise the COHO (Articles 22 and 23 ZBOs Framework Act). The articles mentioned here are also fully applicable within the framework of this bill. In addition, the Kingdom Act has created the power for the minister to issue instructions to the COHO in special cases (Articles 23 and 28) or to lay down rules by ministerial regulation (Article 29). In some cases it has been stipulated that decision-making by the COHO must be made in agreement with other bodies (Articles 6, 7 and 35, first paragraph).
In addition to the dimension of the Dutch democratic constitutional state, the specific legal form of the COHO and the nature of its tasks and powers are, as stated, also explained by the dimension of the Curaçao democratic constitutional state. The COHO performs its tasks in Curaçao or at least with a view to the well-being of the Curaçao population. Support from both this population and its administration is therefore very important. This interest also has a more institutional component. In view of the sustainable embedding of the reforms and investments, it is crucial that the COHO works closely with the local government. After all, it is this administration – depending on the precise reform to be interpreted broadly, i.e. including the States of Curaçao – that develops and implements the reforms (Article 4, first paragraph, under a) and has a public interest in a resilient economy. The proposal therefore provides for opportunities to hear both sides of the argument and obligations for consultation in various places. Furthermore, in connection with the above in article 8, fourth paragraph, it has been determined that at least one of the members of the board of the COHO has demonstrable affinity with the Caribbean part of the Kingdom. This guarantees that the COHO can operate with a feeling for the culture of Curaçao and the specific issues facing the country. Finally, it does not hurt to emphasize once again that the COHO cannot exercise powers that are vested in the government bodies of the country on the basis of the land law of Curaçao. The bill does not therefore affect the constitutional position of these bodies, the States first, at least not in a formal sense. This starting point is included as a provision in Article 4, second paragraph.
The COHO has its own legal personality. As such, it can participate in its own right in the private legal transactions of Curaçao and have its own capital. This choice can again be explained by the nature of the activities of the COHO in combination with the special context in which it will operate. Although the COHO as a Dutch legal entity has its registered office in The Hague, it will primarily develop its activities in Curaçao. The registered office address is independent of the possibility that the COHO has a Curaçao branch office. With its own legal personality granted, the COHO can purchase goods in Curaçao and conclude contracts, with regard to employment contracts, for example, also with residents of Curaçao itself. An appointment in general civil service is then less obvious. The nature of the COHO’s activities also explains why it has opted for its own legal personality. The COHO will be involved in, among other things, the management and implementation of economic projects and programs with private parties. To this end, it is instrumental that it can, for example, participate in share capital and provide capital.
§ 2.2 Regulation by Kingdom Act
The establishment of the COHO is regulated by a Kingdom Act on the basis of Article 38, second paragraph, of the Charter. The choice of a Kingdom Act with this legal basis, also known as a consensus Kingdom Act, is based on various considerations. The consensus nature of the scheme can be explained by the fact that the tasks and powers of the COHO cover areas that belong to the affairs of Curaçao, such as the economy, the labor market, healthcare and the rule of law. Article 38 of the Statute provides Curaçao with the opportunity to cooperate on such matters through the establishment of a mutual arrangement. In principle, this can be done via a form-free mutual arrangement based on the first paragraph of Article 38 of the Statute or via a Kingdom Act or a general administrative order based on the second paragraph of the Statute.
In this case, the form of a Kingdom Act is indicated. This form stems from the nature of the tasks and powers of the COHO. The public authority with which the COHO is vested does not only extend to the government of Curaçao, but can also be used to determine the legal position of citizens and legal entities under private law, for example through subsidies. It is therefore necessary to involve the elected representatives of Curaçao, the Parliament, in the decision-making process, something that does not or does not automatically take place in the case of a form-free mutual arrangement or order in council. Incidentally, this involvement of Parliament is also desirable in the light of the tasks and powers of the COHO, in which the legal position of citizens and legal entities under private law is not directly at stake. For example, the COHO is given the authority to institute stricter financial supervision where appropriate. This has implications for Parliament’s budget right.
§ 2.3 Organization and tasks of the COHO
The (work) field of the COHO is framed by Article 3 in which it is stipulated that the COHO aims to promote the implementation of administrative reforms, sustainably sustainable public finances and the benefit of the welfare of the population of Curaçao. The resilience of the economy is strengthened, including the rule of law embedding that is necessary for this. Subsequently, this is further elaborated in Article 4, where the COHO is assigned a number of specific tasks. This is explained in more detail in section 3.4.
The COHO consists of three members, including a chair. The members are appointed for a period of three years and can be reappointed once for the same period. Members are appointed and dismissed by the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. With regard to the appointment of a member, the minister must first consult with the Minister of General Affairs of Curaçao about the requirements for a position. Incidentally, the Minister of the Interior and
Kingdom Relations expects the latter to consult the Minister of General Affairs of Curaçao about a proposed appointment, with a view to creating support for this. The members are expected to have broad expertise based on their social knowledge and experience that is necessary for the performance of the tasks of the COHO. As discussed above, at least one of the members must also have demonstrable affinity with the Caribbean part of the Kingdom. This affinity can be evidenced by a person’s roots in this part of the Kingdom, Curaçao in particular, or by the fact that someone has lived and worked here for an extended period of time.
The COHO is supported by an official service, headed by a general secretary. They are not members of the COHO. With a view to the performance of its tasks, the COHO can cooperate with institutions and bodies of institutions of the European Union and other international law organizations and with institutions and bodies of institutions of the Netherlands and other countries within the Kingdom with a development, financing, supervisory or general management task.
§ 2.4 Financial consequences
The COHO will need to have the necessary financial resources at its disposal for the next six years. This also in view of the fact that Curaçao in the development and implementation of the
reform programs is expected to be faced with a lack of resources (financial and material), capacity and sufficient (qualified) staff. The activities of the COHO will therefore have considerable financial consequences for central government.
The financial resources required for the COHO include:
1. The necessary (one-off) investments for the design and layout of the
COHO (including the expansion of the workforce of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and all other ministries that will have to provide (temporary) support to COHO in the context of the development and realization of the reform program), for the period 2020;
2. The annual costs involved in the operational set-up of the COHO (to finance the current service) such as personnel costs, accommodation and ICT costs.
(including the deployment of ministries), for the period 2021 to 2027);
3. The liquidity support that pertains to budget support and actually entails two flows, namely the compulsory expenditure of the current account as well as (new) expenditure as a result of the Corona crisis, such as the financing of wage subsidy schemes for the business sector, for the period 2021 t / m 2027;
4. The financing of activities, projects and investments to realize the reform program and the objectives set therein, for the period 2021 to 2027;
5. Capital for investments arising from this bill of law, for the period 2020 to 2027.3. Method
§ 3.1 Country package
As stated in § 1.2, further conditions will be imposed on the liquidity support from July 2020. These conditions have been outlined in a national package, in which structural reforms are central on the one hand and concrete measures are included to support the necessary reforms on the other. On the one hand, the COHO will supervise the implementation and development of this, and on the other hand, it will provide support in all necessary ways. In addition, COHO has the opportunity to independently initiate, promote and implement (new) economic projects in the context of these subjects, which arise from the country packages. In addition, coordination with the local government is desirable, in view of the alignment with the policy of the country. The national package forms an essential part in the performance of the tasks of the COHO as referred to in Article 4, first paragraph, under a and b, but is therefore not the basis for all tasks that the COHO can perform. Given the importance of the national package, it will be discussed below first, followed by further explanation for each task.
The targeted structural reforms and concrete measures included in the country package together aim to make the economy resilient and resilient, restore public finances, improve social security, care and education and strengthen the rule of law. This country package is concluded as a mutual arrangement between the Netherlands and Curaçao on the basis of Article 38, first paragraph, of the Charter.
The country package is a coherent program. Although prioritization in implementation is desirable or necessary and there are differences in the scope of the effects of measures, an integrated approach is necessary to be able to cope with the far-reaching consequences of the Corona crisis and the existing problems that have become more visible as a result. . Integrated implementation of the program is also important in order to achieve balanced socio-economic effects. For example, labor market reform should be viewed and implemented in conjunction with social security reform, improvements in education, tackling poverty and tackling the informal economy.
For many of the reforms referred to in the national package, it is clear why they are necessary and what the intended objectives are, but additional exploration or elaboration may be necessary to clarify the issues, directions for solutions, coherence and desired approach. . As a coordinating department, the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations will start mapping these investigations, together with Curaçao and relevant other departments in the Netherlands, in anticipation of the establishment of the COHO. Where possible, use is made of studies that have already been carried out. Once this has been established, the COHO will continue to pursue these activities, again together with Curaçao and the relevant departments in the Netherlands. This is done primarily by drawing up action plans. Via policy rules and other instruments included in the bill, the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and other relevant ministries can, possibly after a signal from the government of Curaçao, ensure that such action plans respect the frameworks set out in the national package and the implementation agenda. laid down. The country packages and implementation agenda will also guide successive governments in overall government policy. In this way, the actors involved can jointly arrive at a kind of implementation agenda that gives substance to the time frame indicated in the national package and the envisaged period of 5-7 years within which the programs must be realized. On the basis of this implementation agenda, it can also be considered whether it is necessary to make additional agreements in the national package at a later stage, for example around the provision of a next tranche of liquidity support or extension of the cooperation. Such agreements will always require agreement with Curaçao.
§ 3.2 Reform and invest
Economic, financial, social and institutional reforms are necessary to make countries resilient and resilient. The situation in which the countries have now found themselves no longer leaves room for further delay. Government costs must be reduced significantly so that the tax burden can be reduced in order to stimulate investment and domestic consumption. Labor markets must be reformed to provide opportunities for the large and growing group of outsiders on the labor market. A flexible labor market contributes to more employment. A well-functioning capital market makes it easier for capital to find its way to profitableinvestments. An attractive business climate attracts investors, contributes to employment development and strengthens the international competitive position of the countries. The necessary structural reforms are central to these country packages.
Complementary to the support and oversight role in the implementation of the reform programs, the COHO may independently initiate, promote and implement programs and projects, provide grants to citizens and companies including public companies or participate in corporate equity. Such investments serve to implement, strengthen and complement the reforms and measures and contribute to the overarching objectives of the country packages. Examples include investing in training of employees for labor migration, institutional strengthening, or the development of instruments aimed at protecting and / or promoting economic activity and thus contributing to an economic impulse.
§ 3.3.1 Government and finances
A. Financial management
In recent years, various authorities, and in particular the Cft, have pointed out the need for a sound (balanced) budget policy and improvements in budgetary and financial management, which unfortunately did not lead to improvements, if at all. As a result, Curaçao is insufficiently resistant to financial setbacks. In addition, to date there has been no unqualified auditor’s report on the annual accounts, resulting in great uncertainty about the reliability of the government accounts and the regularity of expenditure. There is also a considerable backlog with regard to the adoption of annual accounts for previous years. This also has repercussions on financial and economic policy as a whole. Curaçao has seen the debt ratio rise sharply in the past decade, to (far) above the level that is considered desirable or sustainable for small island states.
The reforms and measures with regard to financial management are aimed at further controlling and getting the financial management in order based on the need to be ‘in control’ as a government and to allow parliament to carry out its supervisory task.
B. Costs and effectiveness of the public sector
The costs of the public sector of Curaçao are high, also from a Caribbean perspective. This is largely determined by the high wage costs (public wage bill). The IMF notes that the public wage bill is high in relation to the Caribbean region. The measures aimed at lowering salaries and austerity of working conditions in the public sector aim to bring the public wage bill in line with the Caribbean average, taking into account country-specific factors. The quality of public services is often insufficient and the limited execution power. Examples of this can be found at the tax authorities (low compliance), licensing services (red tape) and site-granting services (incorrect pricing).
The reforms and measures related to the cost and effectiveness of the public sector aim to:
– increasing the efficiency of the public sector by lowering the public wage bill to (in line with the Caribbean average) and reducing the costs of the public sector in general;
– increasing the quality and effectiveness (including executive power) of the public sector.
C. Taxes
Curaçao is faced with insufficient compliance with tax obligations and legislation, implementation problems at the tax authorities and with an unequal distribution of incomes (insufficient redistribution).). For the development of Curaçao, the realization of a robust tax system is necessary, with appropriate economic incentives, in which the disruptive effect of taxes is limited, and which is feasible.
The reforms and measures related to taxation aim to:
– the redesign of a robust tax system with a broad basis, which contributes to a fair (er) distribution of income, stimulation of the economy and feasibility and accountability by the tax authorities; – the realization of an adequately structured tax authorities.
D. Financial sector
A stable financial sector that can properly fulfill its role in supporting the real economy is necessary. The financial sector is responsible for the provision of essential provisions such as savings, payments, insurance and credit. A malfunctioning financial sector, on the other hand, poses a great risk to the economy, public finances and taxpayers.
It is unclear how the financial sector is doing and whether it can properly fulfill its role in supporting the real economylen. Current problems with various financial institutions in Curaçao make it clear that the financial sector there is struggling with serious and structural problems. An investigation of the financial sector of Curaçao can make it clear whether it fulfills or can fulfill the role of supporting the real economy to a sufficient extent.
The possible reforms and measures relating to the financial sector aim to:
• the realization of a stable financial sector that can properly fulfill its role in supporting the real economy;
• the realization of an appropriate way of regulating the financial sector, with adequate supervision of compliance;
• the realization of a supervisor who takes timely and decisive action in case of problems at financial companies.
§ 3.3.2 Economic reforms (E)
The IMF, research reports from various institutes, the Cft, and civil society organizations in Curaçao have long pointed to the need for economic reforms. The rigid labor market, the unfavorable business climate and limited competition are structural obstacles to economic growth. As a result, there is high (youth) unemployment, declining incomes and purchasing power, social decline and increasing poverty. Social security systems contain neither the incentives necessary to encourage labor participation nor the security to manage social problems. In addition, social security systems will become (over time) unaffordable. These obstacles must be removed so that the economic potential can be better utilized and an adequate social safety net can be built and maintained.
The reforms and measures related to the economic reforms aim to:
– realizing a resilient, dynamic and resilient economy;
– the realization of a robust and affordable social security system that puts the incentives in the right place.
§ 3.3.3 Care and education
F. Care
The COVID-19 crisis has made the shortcomings and deficiencies in the health care system, which have existed for some time, painfully visible. In order to get out of the COVID-19 crisis properly, it is essential that the advice of the Outbreak Management Team (OMT) is implemented to keep COVID-19 manageable and that continuity of acute care – and therefore good hospital care – is guaranteed. This is also very important for the recovery of the tourist sector. A sustainable, affordable and accessible healthcare system thus contributes to strengthening economic resilience.
The hospitals in the countries within the Kingdom (and the Caribbean Netherlands) must work together to increase the supply, quality and efficiency of care. In order to (financially) continue this cooperation, a structural reform (savings and investments) of the health care system is then necessary.
The health care reforms and measures aim to:
– controlling and keeping COVID-19 manageable;
– guaranteeing the continuity of acute care;
– the efficient organization of healthcare and the realization of a robust and affordable healthcare system.
G. Education
Good education forms the basis for a good living environment with opportunities for everyone (so that people stay in Curaçao, return or move there) and thus contribute to socio-economic development, growth and diversification. However, the independence and self-reliance of many Curaçao school-leavers lags behind, while young people often opt for further study in the Netherlands or other countries. A relatively large number of students ultimately drop out of Dutch secondary education without a diploma. There is no consistent quality of school management and teachers and the connection between education and the labor market leaves much to be desired, so that the labor potential is not fully utilized. There appears to be outdated teaching methods, limited availability of modern teaching materials and little budget for reforms and training.
It is important that the government of Curaçao, as well as the other stakeholders, have a shared image of the problem and the approach aimed at it. Part of this approach must be: investment in the professionalization of school boards, school management, teachers and in teaching materials (and possibly also educational accommodation) and catching up on underlying legislation.
The reforms and measures with regard to education are aimed at: – achieving a basic quality of education;
– realizing a good connection between education and the labor market;
– the realization of good flow between systems of education (whether or not in the European Netherlands).
§ 3.3.4 Strengthening the rule of law (H)
A constitutional state norms behavior, legitimizes government action andguarantees (fundamental) rights and freedoms. A functioning rule of law is a precondition for economic development.
Reliable, learning and impartial governance stimulates social trust, which leads to fewer transaction costs, more investment, more innovation and less inefficient use of resources from the economy.
In relation to the size of the country, Curaçao has to contend with a relatively high level of cross-border crime, such as drug smuggling, human and human trafficking, arms trafficking and money laundering. In addition, the interdependence between the upper and the underworld poses a serious threat to the proper functioning of the democratic constitutional state, with all the consequences this entails for society, the investment climate and the prestige of the Kingdom in the world.
Although Curaçao itself is responsible for the rule of law and law enforcement services, Curaçao is (still) insufficiently equipped to independently cope with these international and local challenges. Organizations in the chain are often plagued by a lack of resources, capacity and sufficient (qualified) staff.
The reforms and measures related to the rule of law aim to: contribute to strengthening the rule of law, by at least focusing on strengthening border control, tackling financial and economic crime and improving the detention services.
§ 3.4 Duties and powers
The COHO has four tasks (Article 4, first paragraph). Various powers are linked to these tasks in Chapter 4 of the bill. In Article 4, paragraph 1, the following tasks of the COHO are listed:
a. The support and supervision of the development and implementation of projects and measures by government bodies and public companies of Curaçao with regard to the subjects determined in this law and in the national package;
b. To initiate, promote and implement economic projects related to the subjects defined in this Act and in the National Package;
c. The provision of subsidies on request in Curaçao to citizens and private legal persons, including public companies, or participation in the share capital in private law legal persons, including public companies;
d. Tighter financial supervision, if appropriate, in Curaçao.
The powers vested in the COHO are discussed below insofar as they relate to the support side of the tasks. The supervisory powers are discussed in more detail in section 3.7.
§ 3.4.1 Projects and measures of government bodies and public companies
The task as described under a must be read in the broadest sense of the word. This task concerns the support and supervision of the development and implementation of projects and measures by government bodies and public companies of Curaçao and thus the compliance with the imposed conditions that are set in the context of granting further, whether or not , tranched liquidity support. On this basis, the COHO is charged with supporting the local government – including all government bodies and public companies – in complying with and supervising the conditions.
In order to be able to perform this task adequately, the COHO has been assigned a number of powers. To support projects and measures, the COHO is authorized to provide financial resources directly or indirectly, to make expertise and implementation capacity available and to screen the government and public companies (Article 21). This implies that support can take place in various forms. In the first place, this includes the direct or indirect provision of financial resources to Curaçao. Direct provision refers to the provision of cash. Indirect provision relates, for example, to the provision of goods, equipment, etc.
The concept of support also includes the use of expertise. If the COHO itself has the necessary expertise, it can provide the requested support itself, but it is also possible for the COHO to hire the necessary expertise. This could include legislative capacity, for example. If Curaçao needs support in drafting legislation, the COHO can, if it has legislative lawyers, make this capacity available. If the COHO does not have legislative lawyers, it can, depending on the required expertise, request the Dutch minister to appoint experts (Article 19). These experts, insofar as they assist the COHO in the performance of its duties, come under his responsibility. It is also conceivable that the COHO has the necessary expertisehires externally.
In order to carry out its tasks, the COHO can also cooperate with institutions and bodies of institutions of the European Union and other international law organizations and with institutions and bodies of institutions of the Netherlands and other countries within the Kingdom with a development, financing , supervisory or general management task. This also includes possibilities for cooperation with (parts of) the Rijksdienst Caribisch
The Netherlands (RCN), Invest NL and the Netherlands Enterprise Agency (RVO). Where appropriate, the COHO will draw up a collaboration protocol with the relevant institution or organization.
Finally, the task as described above under a includes the authority to screen the government and public companies. This means that the strengths and weaknesses of the government and public companies, as well as risks to the budget, are made transparent in an objective manner so that they can then serve as a starting point for any improvements to be implemented. This was chosen because experience so far shows that the
“Governance” of the government and public companies is often not strong enough or insufficiently in order to fulfill the responsibilities of the government or
public enterprises or to implement necessary reform plans. For example, it is important that the government or a public company is able to develop and implement decisive, sound policy and to recognize risks associated with the government, public companies and its environment in a timely and effective manner. If the ‘governance’ of a government organization is not in order, this is relevant, among other things, for the financial management of the country. After all, good “governance” ensures reliable revenues
expenditure estimates and a sustainable dividend policy, which means that the risk that the country’s budget will not be realized can be contained. In recent years, much attention has been drawn to this subject by the Cft. However, this has had insufficient effect. That is reason to focus on strengthening governance and to carry out the necessary audits to this end.
§ 3.4.2 Projects and programs of the COHO
In addition to supporting and supervising the development and implementation of projects, programs and measures by government bodies and public companies, the COHO can itself initiate, promote and implement (new) projects and programs with regard to the subjects described in the national package. . These projects and programs will generally be of a private nature. The task referred to in Article 4, first paragraph, under b, is primarily intended to enable the COHO to enter the local market directly. In this respect, this task differs from the task referred to in Article 4, first paragraph, under a, in which the focus is on the development and implementation of projects, programs and measures by government bodies and public companies.
This does not mean that Article 4, first paragraph, under b, cannot be extended to
public companies or even the general government. It is conceivable that these companies and governments will enter into cooperation with the COHO in a more private-law capacity, making use of the instruments and powers included in paragraph 4.3 of the proposal. Incidentally, a project or program that is started under Article 4, first paragraph, under b, may require administrative measures, such as the granting of a permit. In such a case, the competent government body is obliged to cooperate with the implementation of the project or program (Article 20). For more information, see section 3.7.2 of these explanatory notes.
The basic principle for all projects and programs in the context of this task is that they can only be initiated, promoted or implemented after consultation with the minister of Curaçao responsible for an adjacent policy area. Such consultation may be necessary to ascertain whether a particular project or program requires administrative measures, as indicated above, but also to ascertain whether this is in line with the aim of this proposal and the outlines of a project or program in the country package have been agreed. As with the task referred to in Article 4, first paragraph, under a, in the case of a task under Article 4, first paragraph, under b, the condition is that a project or measure must be broadly traceable to agreements made about this in the national package. In connection with the principle of legality, it must be sufficiently predictable for the board of Curaçao to what extent it can be requested by the COHO to cooperate.
It is up to the Netherlands and Curaçao to jointly decide in the country package howDetailed or flexible are the main points, with due observance of which the COHO can initiate, promote and implement projects within the meaning of Article 4, first paragraph, under b. Where appropriate, it may be desirable to give the COHO a great deal of leeway in the national package with a view to the performance of its task, as referred to in Article 4, first paragraph, under b. In such cases, the desired flexibility with regard to a particular subject will have to be sufficiently apparent from the national package. In addition, the COHO will always want to ascertain whether its initiatives correspond with the ideas at the administrative and political level in Curaçao.
In cases involving the incorporation of or participation in a legal entity or the provision of equity capital, loans with essential characteristics of equity capital or guarantees with regard to the amount of equity capital, the prior consent of the Minister of the Interior is required. Affairs and Kingdom Relations and a requirement from the Minister of Finance. This was chosen on the basis of the idea that the COHO will exist for a defined, temporary period, and such participations will, in principle, fall under the relevant departments after the COHO has been dissolved. For more information on the issue of participating interests, see the article-by-article commentary on article 34.
§ 3.4.3 Grants and participating interests
Economic recovery can not only be boosted from the top down by the government, but also depends on initiatives emerging from society and the market. The third task of the COHO therefore concerns the provision of subsidies on request to citizens and legal entities under private law in Curaçao, including public companies, or participating in the share capital of companies. This is also in line with the goal of the COHO, which explicitly performs its activities for the benefit of the population of Curaçao.
In addition to citizens, grants can be granted to legal entities under private law. Examples include companies, but also NGOs, (local) foundations and associations. Furthermore, Article 4, first paragraph, under c, provides that the provision explicitly also applies to public companies.
The proposal does not specify what the grants and participations in the share capital may relate to, but the basic principle is that these grants and participations are viewed in the light of the objective of the COHO, as set out in Article 3. In the proposal it has been stated that the Minister can lay down further rules with regard to the provision of subsidies and participation in share capital. The list of subjects included in article 29 in that context is not exhaustive, but must outline a framework within which subsidies or participation in the share capital can take place. In addition, the COHO may also set its own policy rules with a view to carrying out this task, at least insofar as the subject in question is not regulated by regulation of the minister. Furthermore, title 4.2 of the General Administrative Law Act has been declared applicable mutatis mutandis to the granting of subsidies by the COHO. This provides an administrative framework for the intended granting of subsidies, so that there is clarity about the rights and obligations and about the procedural approach. An important starting point here is the subsidy concept from Article 4:21, first paragraph, of the General Administrative Law Act. It is explained here that the term subsidy is understood to mean the claim to financial resources provided by an administrative body with a view to certain activities of the applicant, other than as payment for goods or services supplied to the administrative body.
If the applicant makes it clear that the proposed activities fit within the framework of the scheme or policy rules, the subsidy will be awarded for carrying out those activities within a certain period. At the end of that period, the subsidy recipient must demonstrate that the activities have been carried out and that the estimated costs have been incurred. Subsequently, the subsidy is determined. Obligations can be attached to a subsidy. Insofar as the subsidy is paid by means of advances, these can under certain circumstances be reclaimed at a later date, including if it later appears that the intended activities have not been carried out in accordance with the provisions of the decision. Despite the fact that the above is based on the two-step granting of the subsidy and the determination of the subsidy, it is certainly also possible to determine by regulation or policy rule that both decisions are granted in one. This possibility will mainly arise when it concerns applications by citizens who consider low subsidy amounts.
As mentioned above, the COHO has ook the opportunity to participate in the share capital of companies. Through participation in the share capital of companies and public companies, the COHO is given the opportunity to have a more direct influence on the company or public company in question to a certain extent.
§ 3.4.4 Enhanced financial supervision
The fourth task of the COHO involves the institution of stricter financial supervision of expenditures of Curaçao, which are made by ministers and other government bodies. This task has a different character from the previous three tasks, in the sense that it only comes into the picture if Curaçao does not fulfill its obligations in the context of, in particular, the task referred to in Article 4, first paragraph, under a. or insufficient compliance. It is therefore discussed below in section 3.8.
§ 3.5 Independent assessment of COHO
Section 2.1 explains why the COHO has been designed as an administrative body with independent tasks and powers. In any case, it is important that the COHO can independently assess to a large extent what is needed to make the performance of its tasks successful. Where appropriate, this also results in a large degree of independence in making agreements or setting conditions that are necessary for successful performance of tasks. However, it should be emphasized once again that the scope of the COHO to initiate projects and measures is in principle limited by the aim of its institution (Article 3) and by the agreements between the Netherlands and Curaçao in the national package (Article 5, first member). In this way, it must be guaranteed that the COHO does not engage in autonomous policy areas if such action has not been democratically sanctioned beforehand. For example, the COHO would not be allowed to urge the minister responsible for care to cooperate in setting up an abortion clinic, without explicitly providing scope for such a project in the care section of the national package. The basic principle of the system that is created with this legislative proposal and the national package is that it must be predictable at a fundamental level to which the national bodies and public companies of Curaçao can be asked to use their powers. Curaçao is an autonomous country within the Kingdom and has its own state regulation that must be observed. The deployment of tasks and powers by the COHO must be adequately related to this.
If, in incidental cases, the COHO nevertheless falls outside its legal boundaries, it is in the first instance up to the minister to rectify this. The Minister has a number of instruments at his disposal for this purpose (Article 22 of the ZBO Framework Act; Articles 23 and 28 of this proposal). For the Curaçao government bodies that are affected by a violation of the COHO’s powers, in principle they cannot be expected to cooperate in a project or measure in such a situation (Article 20). In view of the proper functioning of the aforementioned legal system and the consequences that can be attached to a refusal to cooperate (see below, section 3.7), it is recommended, however, that the relevant government bodies focus in such a case at an early stage. to the COHO and / or the minister and refrain from taking unilateral action as much as possible. Depending on the task it performs, the COHO can give substance to its independence in various ways. For the development and implementation of a project or a measure, as referred to in Article 4, first paragraph, under a, the COHO, after consultation with the relevant government bodies and public companies of Curaçao, can proceed to draw up an action plan. . However, it is not mandatory to draw up an action plan for each project and each measure. The aim of the action plan is to provide as transparent and structured insight as possible into what the goal of a project or measure is, what the timeframe is, how high the costs will be, who the parties involved are, and the like. With this, a specific project or measure can be made concrete and made measurable. Article 22 stipulates which subjects an action plan must in any case contain.
With regard to the projects as referred to in Article 4, first paragraph, under b, of the proposal, no specific provision has been included for drawing up action plans. Such projects are located in a more private-law spectrum and therefore lack the administrative law framework provided with regard to the task referred to in Article 4, first paragraph, under a. This does not mean that the preparation of action plans is in this context excluded. Anywayapplies that in principle the COHO will not start or otherwise participate in a project on this basis, without first having consulted with our Ministers who are concerned by Curaçao (Article 26). They must have already agreed in broad terms with such a project (Article 4, first paragraph, under b), but will, if a project affects public interests, also want to have a say in its implementation. If, for example, the COHO is approached from the market to facilitate a solar park, the system just described means that, first of all, there is a clear starting point for such a project at the level of the national package (principle of legality) and secondly that the ministers that concern Curaçao are correctly consulted about its implementation (adversarial process).
With regard to the task described in Article 4, first paragraph, under c, of the proposal, it is also primarily up to the COHO to determine which conditions the granting of the subsidy as referred to in that part of the article must meet, or under which conditions. circumstances it is willing to participate in the share capital of companies. Since the imposition of these conditions already arises from these administrative and private law powers, it does not need to be made explicit in the legal text.
§ 3.6 Resources
As already discussed in § 1.2, the aim of the COHO will be to be able to steer the implementation of the conditions that are directly or indirectly imposed on the provision of liquidity support. To this end, the tasks described in § 3.4 have been created, which entail the creation of a number of new / additional financial flows with the establishment of the COHO. The financial flows are broadly subdivided as follows:
a) All financial resources provided to Curaçao by means of cash loans for the purpose of the ongoing service (liquidity support);
b) All financial investments and / or guarantees that go through or from the COHO;
c) In addition to the aforementioned financial flows that run via the COHO, the existing or non-existing financial flows from Dutch departmental budgets will continue to exist and may be supplemented if necessary.
Re a) Liquidity support
The liquidity support is granted to Curaçao on the basis of decision-making in the Council of Ministers on the basis of a Cft advice to that effect. This liquidity support is provided through the COHO. It is expected that a substantial amount of budget support will be lent to Curaçao before the end of 2020. How the level of this amount will develop in the coming years is difficult to estimate at the moment and is highly dependent on further developments, including the course of the corona crisis and the extent to which the economy is recovering.
Ad b) Investments
In addition to providing liquidity support, COHO has the power to make investments that contribute to the intended reforms. It is difficult to estimate in advance what the nature and size of such investments will be. When drawing up the action plans, further research is carried out by – or on behalf of – the COHO if necessary. However, the current estimate is that the investments will be substantial. This is generally due to the lack of investment in recent years, its geographic location and the need for large-scale reforms. In addition, a number of more specific situations also influence this.
Curaçao is dependent on the airport, seaport and tourism, the main source of income. Now that this source of income has disappeared, it is important to investigate in which other areas opportunities can be created that create a future-proof, different economy in which Curaçao is less dependent on tourism. The realization of this is also the objective of the desired and required investments. Finally, Curaçao will have to intensify mutual cooperation with the other countries of the Kingdom in other areas, such as in the field of (specialist) care.
Re c) Departmental financing flow
In this situation, the financial flow does not go through the COHO, but goes directly from a Dutch departmental budget to Curaçao. In Curaçao, for example, there are issues within law enforcement that require (very) large investments that will not go through the COHO.
The size and scope of the various issues will influence the COHO’s working method and budgeting. It is conceivable that the focus of the COHO in the first period will mainly be on research to kTo conduct the necessary auditing of government and public companies, drawing up reform agendas and drawing up action plans, while in a later period the focus will often be on the implementation thereof and compliance with the agreements made.
§ 3.7 Supervision and consequences of non-compliance with obligations
The bill contains obligations for Curaçao and its bodies in various places. It follows from the nature of the matter that most of these obligations are related to the tasks referred to in Article 4, paragraph 1, under a and d. After all, in the performance of these tasks, the COHO is in the domain of the government. This is different in the performance of the duties referred to in Article 4, first paragraph, under b and c. In the context of the latter two tasks, COHO focuses primarily on private parties, although it is certainly not inconceivable that the government could also manifest itself here, for example in the form of a public company.
Below is explained how the COHO and other bodies designated in the proposal can supervise the range of obligations arising from this Act and the National Package, as well as obligations that may still arise on the basis of actions taken by – in particular – the COHO. under this proposal. First of all, ample attention is paid to the supervisory powers built into the proposal with regard to obligations on Curaçao and its bodies. Subsequently, a brief discussion is given of the supervisory instruments that the COHO is at its disposal in the performance of its tasks, referred to in Article 4, paragraph 1, under b and c. In a general sense, it should be noted in advance that the relevant powers are not aimed at the COHO or other bodies taking over existing national powers temporarily. Rather, the powers are oriented on the financial and other support that Curaçao will receive in the coming years. They thus form a derivative of one of the fundamental principles of this proposal: namely, that the Netherlands will provide Curaçao with financial support for several years in exchange for the promise that they will implement a series of reforms and measures to strengthen society and the economy.
§ 3.7.1 Supervision of obligations on Curaçao and its bodies
With regard to obligations for Curaçao and its bodies, the proposal contains in six articles procedures and mechanisms with the help of which compliance with these can be monitored and the consequences can be attached to failure to do so. It goes without saying that these powers must be applied with due care, taking into account the interests involved. As will be seen below, with regard to a number of these powers, a certain degree of proportionality is also implied in the way in which they can be used.
It concerns successively:
1) the authority of the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, in agreement with the Council of Ministers of the Netherlands, to suspend or discontinue the provision of financial resources to the COHO in whole or in part (Article 18, paragraphs 4 and 5 );
2) the authority of the COHO to suspend all or part of the support to Curaçao, granted under Article 21 of the proposal, if a
government body of Curaçao remains in default with regard to the obligations arising from
Curaçao rest within the framework of Article 4, first paragraph, under a (Article 24, first paragraph);
3) the authority of the COHO to advise the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom to make provision under the Charter (Article 25);
4) the authority of the COHO and, if a compelling interest so requires, of the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, in accordance with the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom, to impose stricter financial supervision on expenses of Curaçao (Article 35, first and second paragraph);
5) the authority of the COHO to suspend all or part of the assistance to Curaçao, granted under Article 21 of the proposal, if a
government body of Curaçao remains in default with regard to the obligations arising from
Curaçao rest within the framework of Article 4, first paragraph, under d (Article 40, first paragraph);
6) the authority of the COHO to assess Curaçao’s intention to attract a loan, with the possible consequence that this loan cannot be attracted through the current registration of the Dutch State (Article 43, first and second paragraph).
As appears from the above summary, some powers in the sphere of supervision are related to a specific task or assignment (Article 24, first paragraph; Article 25; Article 40, first paragraph; Article 43, first and second paragraph). Others addOn the other hand, viewing powers have a broader scope and cover the full breadth of the obligations of Curaçao (Article 35, first and second paragraph; Article 18, fourth and fifth paragraph). As stated, the proposal does not always explicitly state that the exercise of a particular supervisory power can only take place after another supervisory power has been exercised. In some cases, however, this is mandatory from the structure of the proposal (with regard to Article 24, first paragraph, and Article 25, as well as with regard to Article 35, first and second paragraph, and Article 40, first paragraph). In other cases, because of the proportionality cited above, it is logical that a certain supervisory power is exercised earlier than another (Article 24, first paragraph, and Article 35, first and second paragraph, on the one hand, and Article 18, fourth and fifth paragraphs, on the other. ).
Most of the powers mentioned above belong to the COHO. In some cases, however, supervision is transferred elsewhere or exercised jointly with another body. In the following, we will first consider the supervisory powers of the COHO and then highlight a crucial power of the Dutch Council of Ministers.
Supervision by the COHO
To begin with, the COHO monitors compliance by the Curaçao government bodies and public companies with the projects, programs and measures that have been agreed with the Netherlands in the country package to be implemented in the coming years. This monitoring is provided for in Article 24 of the proposal and focuses specifically on three categories of obligations: a) the obligation to implement a project, program or measure in a timely manner; b) the obligation to implement a project, program or measure in the manner agreed in the national package or further detailed in an action plan; and c) the obligation to provide data and information and otherwise cooperate at the request of the COHO. If a public body or company involved in the development of a project, program or measure fails to comply with one of these obligations, the COHO is authorized to grant the aid as defined in Article 21 of the proposal – for example, a financial injection for the benefit of a – to suspend all or part of the reform of education or the provision of labor market expertise. Negligence on the part of one government body or public company can therefore, provided this is proportionate, cause the COHO to stop all aid to a country.
Please note, the suspension power laid down in Article 24 only covers the part of the support that the COHO can deploy for the performance of its task, as referred to in Article 4, first paragraph, under a. It does not cover the financial resources it can use in the context of investments (Article 4, first paragraph, under b) and subsidies (Article 4, first paragraph, under c). Moreover, a possible suspension on this basis has no immediate consequences for the liquidity support that the Netherlands provides to Curaçao via the COHO.
The COHO can only apply the power to suspend the granting of aid if the relevant government body or public company has been given the opportunity to express its views. By embedding an opinion procedure, it is possible for a government body or public company to indicate whether or not it agrees with the intended decision. The view expressed by the government body involves the COHO in the final decision-making. This fulfills the requirement of a careful procedure in deciding whether or not to suspend aid. It is not determined how the view should be given, which implies that this can be done orally as well as in writing.
The authority to fully or partially suspend assistance to Curaçao, as described in Article 21, is also granted to the COHO in Article 38 of the proposal. However, what the supervision is aimed at in article 40 differs from article 24 and relates to the regime of stricter financial supervision that can be established by the COHO or the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations on the basis of article 35 of the proposal. . The establishment of this regime is described as an independent task in Article 4, first paragraph, under d of the proposal and is therefore discussed separately below in paragraph 3.8. It should be noted here that the grounds for establishing stricter financial supervision in Article 35, first paragraph, are broader than for the other supervisory powers, in the sense that, in addition to the provisions laid down by or pursuant to this bill, they also extend to the regulations in the Finance Actl supervision.
Apart from the powers mentioned above, the proposal has two more powers in the sphere of supervision with regard to obligations of Curaçao and its bodies. This concerns, first of all, the power, referred to in Article 25, to advise the Council of Ministers to make a provision on the basis of a power already vested in the Council of Ministers by virtue of the Statute. This advisory competence only comes into the picture if a decision to suspend support, in whole or in part, as referred to in Article 24, has not resulted in the government body concerned taking a cooperative approach. As is the case with the procedures to which an opinion pursuant to Article 25 refers, it is the intention that the COHO will be reticent with regard to this advisory power. After all, a provision by the Kingdom on the basis of the Statute interferes with the Curaçao autonomy. That said, such a provision can be a suitable and proportionate means to rectify a violation of this Kingdom Act. For example, if the Curaçao government takes a decision that is in conflict with an agreement between Curaçao and the Netherlands agreed on the basis of this Kingdom Act, the COHO may see this as reason to advise the Kingdom Council of Ministers to annul this National Decree by Royal Decree on the basis of Article 50 of the Statute. . This advisory power of the COHO does not interfere with the authority of the Governor of Curaçao, on the basis of Article 21 Governor Regulations, to assess whether or not a national decree or national ordinance proposed to them is in conflict with Kingdom law. Rather, it complements this.
Furthermore, the COHO has supervisory powers relating to the subject of loans. It would be undesirable if the board of Curaçao could attract money loans that are at odds with the reforms and investments agreed in the context of this proposal. For that reason, Article 43 paves the way for a power to assess whether an intention of Curaçao to attract a loan for the capital service fits within the system of the Kingdom Act and the national package. This power of the COHO touches on the power of the Financial Supervision Council under the Financial Supervision Act to advise on certain aspects of such a plan on the basis of Article 16 of that Act. It is important that both powers do not collide. That is why it has been determined that the Financial Supervision Council will immediately send an advice as referred to in Article 16 of the Financial Supervision Act to the COHO. In the event that the COHO judges that the intention of the board of Curaçao to attract a loan is not in accordance with the provisions of this proposal and the national package, the legal consequence of this is that the current registration of the Dutch State, in deviation from article 16 Financial Supervision Act, is not open to raising this loan. The ministers concerned cannot then make use of the favorable loan conditions that are available through this registration.
Supervision by the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations
A crucial provision with regard to the supervision of compliance with the obligations of Curaçao is Article 18 of the proposal. While articles 24 and 40 of the proposal refer to the use of a specific part of the support by the COHO to Curaçao, article 18 relates to all financial resources that the Netherlands, from the budget of
The Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, made available to the COHO, in order to subsequently find a way to Curaçao in the form of support for reforms, investments, subsidies or liquidity support. The provision of these financial resources is not without obligation. It takes place under the general condition that Curaçao makes every effort to fulfill its various obligations under the Kingdom Act and the Land Package. If Curaçao does not make this effort and obligations are structurally not met, the Netherlands must have an emergency brake to suspend or even stop the provision of financial resources.
Such a decision should not be taken lightly. Arbitrary action on the part of the Netherlands must be ruled out. The starting point, laid down in the fourth paragraph of article 18, is therefore that the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, in agreement with the Council of Ministers of the Netherlands, may only decide to do so on the basis of instructions from the COHO. If the latter reports, either in an annual report or in an implementation report, that Curaçao has underperformed and falls short over a longer period of time with regard to several obligations, this may be a reason for the Council of Ministers to issue thefully or partially suspend or even discontinue financial resources (related to Curaçao) to the COHO. An exception to this principle is formulated in the fifth paragraph of article 18. By way of derogation from the fourth paragraph, the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, in accordance with the Dutch Council of Ministers, may, on the basis of this provision, proceed to suspend or discontinue financial resources without a recommendation to that effect from the COHO, if a compelling interest requires this. . This compelling interest cannot only be formed by a purely Dutch interest, but must also be prompted by the circumstances within Curaçao or within the Kingdom in a broader sense.
§ 3.7.2 Supervision of obligations of citizens and businesses
In addition to the obligations of Curaçao and its bodies, the COHO can also supervise the obligations of citizens and companies in the context of the tasks referred to in Article 4, first paragraph, under b and c. This supervision has not or only indirectly been given a place in the proposal itself. With regard to the first of these two tasks, this can be explained by the fact that COHO will operate primarily in a civil law sense in this context. Regulations on the consequences of non-compliance will therefore mainly be implemented in agreements that the COHO concludes with parties from the market.
Incidentally, it is possible that the implementation of a project or program under Article 4, first paragraph, under b, also has or acquires a public law dimension. For the realization of such a project or program, it may be necessary, for example, to issue a specific permit. Since Curaçao will also have committed itself to projects and programs within the meaning of Article 4, first paragraph, under b, via the national package, in such a situation the relevant government body is expected to cooperate in the issue of a permit. If this is not the case, the COHO may decide on the basis of Article 24 in conjunction with Article 20 of the proposal to suspend the granting of aid as described in Article 21. A condition for such action is that the requested cooperation can be deduced to a predictable extent from the national package.
The supervision in the context of the task referred to in Article 4, first paragraph, under c, is of an administrative nature. Article 29, first paragraph, of the proposal gives the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations the power to lay down rules with regard to various aspects of the granting of subsidies, including conditions that may be attached to this. The COHO can also draw up policy rules with regard to these aspects, insofar as these subjects have not yet been elaborated by ministerial regulation. Title 4.2 of the General Administrative Law Act applies mutatis mutandis to the granting of subsidies.
§ 3.8 Enhanced financial supervision
According to Article 4, first paragraph, under d of this bill, the COHO may decide to institute stricter financial supervision. This supervision is further regulated in Articles 35 et seq. Institution of stricter financial supervision leads to an approval regime with regard to all or part of the expenditure incurred by Curaçao. Expenditure in respect of which stricter financial supervision has been instituted can only be made if approved. If these are nevertheless done, this can lead to suspension of the granting of aid to Curaçao (Article 40).
The decision to institute this supervision is not taken lightly and must at all times be proportional in nature in the light of the violation of the standards referred to in Article 35 that gives rise to this. For example, it is difficult to imagine that the COHO would take such a decision because of the mere observation that a Curaçao minister does not cooperate sufficiently on a particular reform dossier or in the event that the Curaçao administration occasionally fails to comply with a budget agreement. Enhanced financial supervision is a burdensome instrument and can therefore only be established in response to a serious violation of the legal framework referred to in Article 35. At the same time, it is not possible to give an exhaustive list of the situations in which this supervision is recommended. It is especially important that this supervision is necessary to prevent Curaçao from incurring expenditure that makes it structurally or seriously difficult to comply with obligations imposed on them by or pursuant to this Act. For example, this supervision can be used if Curaçao makes ineffective or unlawful expenditure, in particular expenditure that has not been budgeted and expenditure that is not compatible with plans of action or other agreements.and and conditions that have been made and / or applied in the pursuit of the objectives envisaged in this Kingdom Act. are posed. The lack of an unqualified auditor’s report on the annual accounts or the late adoption of the financial statements may also be reasons for this.
Normally, stricter supervision will only be required if there is a pattern of systematic action in the situations described above. At the same time, it cannot be ruled out that even a single case of unlawful or ineffective financial actions may lead to the imposition of stricter financial supervision. This may be the case when an expenditure is of such a size that it is associated with significant financial impact and / or it can reasonably be concluded from facts and circumstances that it was made in bad faith. Although the decision to institute stricter financial supervision can only be taken on the basis of experience already gained with expenditures of Curaçao, the exercise of the actual power of approval only pertains to future expenditures. This can refer to expenditure in connection with one or more projects, programs or measures or to all expenditure and everything in between.
The introduction of stricter supervision is the ultimate remedy. For this reason, various safeguards have been built into the decision-making procedure in this regard. A distinction must be made here between the situation in which the decision to institute stricter supervision is taken by the COHO (Article 35, first paragraph) and the situation in which the decision to institute stricter supervision is taken by the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations ( Article 35, second paragraph). In the first case, the COHO can only decide to institute stricter supervision after the Financial Supervision Council has been heard and has obtained the approval of the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom to do so. In the second case, the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations will only be able to decide on stricter financial supervision in accordance with the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom and after the COHO and the Financial Supervision Council have been heard about this and, moreover, only if a compelling interest requires this. . Before stricter financial supervision is instituted, the Minister of General Affairs of Curaçao must be given the opportunity to express his views on the intended decision. For the establishment of supervision by the COHO, this possibility is regulated in the proposal (Article 35, third paragraph). Such a regulation is not necessary for the establishment of such supervision by the Reich Council of Ministers, since the principle of adversarial process has already been incorporated into the proceedings of the Reich Council of Ministers. Finally, the Minister of General Affairs can appeal against a decision to institute stricter financial supervision, regardless of who originated this decision, with the Council of State of the Kingdom in crown appeal proceedings (Article 42). For more information on this procedure, see Chapter 4 of these explanatory notes.
If instituted, stricter financial supervision is carried out by the Financial Supervision Council. The reason for this is mainly a practical one. The Financial Supervision Council already exercises financial supervision over the (budget of) Curaçao. The insight into the finances of Curaçao required for preventive supervision is already (partly) available at the Board.
In any case, the Board already has powers in the area of preventive supervision. This budget supervision ensures that Curaçao submits its (draft) budget and budget changes to the Financial Supervision Council (in advance and mandatory) for assessment in advance, after which the Financial Supervision Council issues an advice on the changes to be applied. Curaçao must also periodically (quarterly) submit an implementation report to the Financial Supervision Council.
The stricter financial supervision that has been instituted can be terminated (Article 41) if the Financial Supervision Council is of the opinion that the expenditure is again long-term efficient and lawful. The Municipal Executive will issue advice on this matter to – depending on who has instituted supervision – the COHO or the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, who may decide to discontinue the intensified supervision. To this end, at least for the period referred to in Article 41, it will not be necessary to propose expenditure that is not lawful or efficient. Whether this is the case is at the discretion of the Financial Supervision Council, in consultation with the COHO.
4. Legal protection
On the basis of the present law, the COHO acquires a number of tasks and powers that directly affect citizens and private companies, wwhere it is possible that mutual disputes arise. It is therefore logical to create a form of legal protection for this. It has been decided to open up the possibility of bringing a direct appeal against the decision to grant a subsidy and a decision to determine the subsidy and within six weeks after the day on which the decision was taken, to appeal directly to the Court of First Instance of the Joint Court of Justice of Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten and of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba. The General Court may declare the appeal well-founded if it is of the opinion that the decision is contrary to the law or is not reasonably justified when weighing up all the interests involved. Subsequently, an appeal can be lodged against the decision of the Court of First Instance with the Common Court of Justice of Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten and Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba. It has been decided to link up with the various Curaçao national ordinances on administrative jurisdiction (Article 33, fourth paragraph).
Article 42 regulates the crown appeal against decisions to institute stricter financial supervision on part or all of a country’s financial expenditure (Article 35, first and second paragraph). The provision is modeled on Article 26 of the Financial Supervision Act. The Crown appeal must be submitted within fourteen days after the decision has been sent. Subsequently, the Council of State of the Kingdom is charged with preparing the draft decision on the decision on the appeal. Before coming to a draft decision, the Council of State of the Kingdom will in any case give the Minister of General Affairs the opportunity to be heard. After that, the Council of State of the Kingdom issues the draft decision and the decision is taken on appeal. The decision on the appeal will be published.
A draft decision of the Council of State of the Kingdom can be based on grounds of lawfulness and efficiency. As is the case in Article 26 of the Financial Supervision Act, the Kingdom Government cannot deviate from (part of the) draft decree that is based on grounds of lawfulness. Where a draft decision is based on grounds for efficiency, it can only do so if there are compelling reasons to do so, related to the system of supervision in the Kingdom Act. Contrary to what is the case in Article 26 of the Financial Supervision Act, this proposal does not include the option for the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations to submit objections to a draft Council decision. The delay and uncertainty that may result from this are not considered desirable for the proper functioning of the stricter financial supervision regime.
In order to prevent the administrative judge in Curaçao or in the Netherlands from declaring itself competent in an appeal against the decision on the Crown appeal, it has been determined that decisions based on this Act are not subject to appeal to the administrative judge.
II BY ARTICLE
CHAPTER 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 1 (definitions)
Article 1 contains the definitions of important terms that are used in several places in the Caribbean Body for Reform and Development Act.
CHAPTER 2 THE CARIBBEAN REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT BODY
§ 2.1 Institution and tasks
Article 2 (Caribbean Body for Reform and Development)
In this article, the COHO is established and it has legal personality under Dutch law. Article 1, second paragraph, of Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code provides that bodies other than the State, the provinces, the water boards and the other bodies to which regulatory power has been granted under the Constitution only have legal personality if that by or pursuant to the law. By granting legal personality, the COHO can participate in its own right – that is to say separately from the State of the Netherlands – in civil legal transactions. Participation in legal transactions under civil law is necessary in order to be able, among other things, to initiate economic activities as referred to in Article 4, first paragraph, under b, of this Act.
The second paragraph stipulates that the COHO will be located in The Hague. In addition to this head office, it is expected that a branch office will be opened in Curaçao.
Finally, in the fourth and last paragraph of this article, a large number of provisions from the Framework Act on independent administrative bodies have been declared applicable to the COHO. The Autonomous Administrative Bodies Framework Act contains provisions on the design of, the provision of information from, and the management and supervision of independent administrative bodies such as the COHO.
For a more detailed explanation of the
The usefulness and necessity for setting up the COHO see paragraphs 1.1 and 1.2 of the general part of this explanatory memorandum. For a substantiation of the choice to set up the COHO as an administrative body with independent tasks and powers, please refer to section 2.1 of the general part of this explanatory memorandum.
Article 3 (purpose)
This article describes the goal COHO pursues, namely to provide support in Curaçao in implementing reforms of an administrative nature, to achieve sustainable and sustainable public finances and to strengthen the resilience of the economy. For a further explanation of this, please refer to chapter 1 of the general part of this explanatory memorandum.
Article 4 (tasks)
The first paragraph of this article describes the tasks with which the COHO is charged. Offering and providing both financial and non-financial support and supervision in various ways is aimed at promoting the implementation of reforms of an administrative nature, realizing sustainable and sustainable public finances and strengthening the resilience of the Curaçao economy. . The second paragraph contains the declaratory provision in the light of the constitutional autonomy of Curaçao in a certain sense that the COHO cannot exercise any powers in the performance of its duties, as referred to in the fourth paragraph, which, on the basis of the land law of Curaçao from the land. This therefore applies to all four tasks listed in Article 4. The provisions of the second paragraph do not apply to powers as referred to in this Act. Curaçao cannot therefore itself create the powers included in this Act during the term of this Act, in order to make it impossible to exercise the powers assigned to the COHO and other bodies in this proposal. For a further explanation of article 4, see paragraph 3.4 of the general part of this explanatory memorandum.
Article 5 (land parcels)
In Article 4 it becomes clear that in the performance of the tasks referred to in Article 4, first paragraph, under a and b, an indispensable role is reserved for the national package. Article 5 elaborates on what a national package consists of, what the nature of the instrument is and how the COHO relates to this:
First member
The first paragraph of Article 5 provides a definition of the instrument of the national package and lists (in a non-exhaustive manner) the subjects to which a national package relates. The core of the country package is that it shows in a coherent manner the reforms and investments that the Netherlands and Curaçao have agreed upon. The subjects included in the first paragraph are related to the purpose of the COHO, as referred to in Article 3 of the proposal.
Second member
The second paragraph of this article provides that the subjects included in the first paragraph and any other subjects that, with due observance of the purpose in article, are added to a national package, are outlined in this national package. This also applies to the projects, programs and measures that the countries agree on to flesh out these subjects. In broad terms, this means that in the elaboration of the national package (see the explanation below for articles 6, 22 and 26), it is possible to fall back on the agreements made between the countries to a sufficient degree, without at the same time undermining the independent position of the COHO. In this way, the second paragraph of article 5 tries to find a balance between a number of important constitutional interests that underlie the proposal: legality and democracy on the one hand and independent expert governance on the other.
Fourth paragraph
The fourth paragraph of this article provides that by or pursuant to a country package it can also be stipulated that the development and implementation of certain projects, programs and measures will take place without the support and / or supervision by the COHO. This is the case, for example, if another body of the government is better equipped or already has the legal basis to support and supervise a project or program. This includes existing or new cooperation on the basis of judicial consensus government legislation, mutual regulations, protocols and covenants.
This includes, for example, the Criminal Investigation Cooperation Team (RST), a collaboration between the four countries within the Kingdom based on the Protocol on Investigation Cooperation and the Police Act, aimed at combating serious, cross-border crime. In the context of the rule of law, one of the subjects in the national package, it is important that the RST is active in all countries of the Kingdom and that it has the necessary powers. The implementation of the measureHowever, the RST is monitored directly by the Ministry of Justice and Security and the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.
For a more detailed explanation of the national package, see section 3.1 of the general part of this explanatory memorandum.
Article 6 (implementation agenda)
A country package has further elaboration. This elaboration takes place on two levels. Most concretely, this is the case in action plans and other instruments that the COHO draws up or uses with a view to a project or program in the context of its duties under Article 4, under a and b, after consultation with the relevant government bodies. For a more detailed explanation of this elaboration level, see sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 as well as the article-by-article commentary on articles 22 and 26. However, for a successful implementation of the subjects, projects and measures included in the national package, it is desirable that a the national package is looked at in a more integrated manner. To this end, this proposal establishes the implementation agenda tool. This agenda is jointly drawn up by the COHO and the Minister of General Affairs of Curaçao. An implementation agenda contains in any case the projects, programs and measures that are required to achieve the strategic policy goals, stated in a country package, and mentions the prioritization, performance indicators, critical success factors and financing method.
Article 7 (cooperation)
First member
The first paragraph of this article provides that, in the context of the performance of the tasks set out in article 4, first paragraph, the COHO may enter into partnerships with various institutions and bodies of institutions that are already charged with a development task, financing task, supervisory task. or general administrative task. This includes not only institutions and bodies of institutions from the Netherlands, Aruba, Curaçao or Sint Maarten, but also institutions and bodies with institutions of the European Union and other international law organizations. Certainly in the latter case, it is recommended that the COHO consults in advance with the government of Curaçao. In many cases, the latter already maintains relationships with such organizations. It is important that these relationships are not thwarted in an undesirable way.
If the COHO enters into a collaboration with an institution or a body of an institution, a cooperation protocol can be drawn up if desired. Such a protocol can, for example, specify on which fronts cooperation takes place, how cooperation and information exchange is organized and how and with what frequency mutual consultation is conducted.
Second member
In order to prevent the COHO and the Financial Supervision Council from getting into each other’s waters in such a way that this hinders an effective and efficient performance of tasks, rather than being reinforced, it is stipulated in the second paragraph of this article that the COHO and the Commission establish a cooperation protocol. They do this in agreement with the minister. Various matters can be addressed in this cooperation protocol. Examples include the possibilities for mutual information exchange.
§ 2.2 Design and composition
Article 8 (composition, appointment and decision-making)
First, second and third paragraph
The COHO has its own legal personality. In such a case, it is desirable – compare Instructions for the regulations 5.11 – that a clear distinction is made between the administrative body and the legal person of which the administrative body forms part. The first paragraph of this article therefore stipulates that the COHO, the legal entity, has a board. In addition to the provisions of Chapter 2 of the Independent Administrative Bodies Framework Act, this article also sets a number of requirements for the design of the COHO. For example, the second paragraph provides that the reform entity consists of three members, including the chairman. The chairman represents the COHO in and out of court.
Fourth and fifth paragraphs
The fourth paragraph provides that the members of the COHO are appointed on the basis of the expertise required for the performance of the duties of the COHO and on the basis of social knowledge and experience. They will therefore in any case need to have sufficient expertise of the administrative environment in which the COHO is located. Furthermore, the fourth paragraph, as already explained in sections 2.1 and 2.3, prescribes that at least one of the members has demonstrable affinity with the Caribbean part of the Kingdom.
The above applies in addition to the requirement set out in Article 13 of the Independent Administrative Bodies Framework Act that a member of an independent administrative body under public law must not beis allowed to perform functions that are undesirable with a view to the proper performance of his position or the maintenance of his independence or confidence in it. Although the performance of other positions by members is not by definition undesirable, it must be avoided that a different (additional) position held at the same time obstructs proper performance at the COHO. Having or accepting such positions must therefore also be reported to the Minister, so that the public nature of ancillary positions can be complied with. The fifth paragraph of this article provides that the members of the board of the COHO are in principle appointed for a period of three years. At the end of this period, members can be reappointed once for a further three years.
Pursuant to Article 12 of the Independent Administrative Bodies Framework Act, the minister is the person who appoints the members. With regard to the criteria set for a member to be appointed, this proposal sets the additional condition that the minister consults with the Minister of General Affairs. In this way it can be guaranteed that the profile for a vacancy at the COHO matches as much as possible what is necessary for the successful functioning of the COHO in Curaçao. Although not expressly provided for in the proposal, it is also important for the proper functioning of the COHO in Curaçao that the minister contacts the Minister of General Affairs about a proposed appointment. Since the members of the board of the COHO will have to work closely with this minister and other Curaçao officials and civil servants in many areas, it is desirable that such an appointment can count on support.
If it turns out that a member of the board of the COHO is, on closer inspection, unsuitable or incompetent for the position he or she fulfills or if there are other compelling reasons in the person of the person concerned, then it is also up to the minister to notify this person. suspend or dismiss.
Sixth paragraph
The sixth paragraph provides that the members of the board of the COHO decide by a majority of votes. If the result of the vote is undecided, the vote of the chairman is decisive. Because the COHO board consists of an odd number of members, votes can only be tied if not all members are present at the vote.
Seventh paragraph
The COHO has independent tasks and powers and is hierarchically not subordinate to the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. In connection with this, the seventh paragraph stipulates that the members of the board of the COHO perform their duties without instructions or consultation.
Article 9 (incompatibilities)
In view of the tasks of the COHO, it is of great importance that the members do not hold any additional positions or other positions that could affect their independence or hinder their proper performance. In addition to what has already been regulated in Article 13 of the Independent Administrative Bodies Framework Act regarding the performance of ancillary positions and the prohibition in Article 9 of that Act that prevents a civil servant who is subordinate to the Minister from being a member of an independent administrative body, In this article a number of positions are listed that should in any case not be filled by one of the members of the COHO.
Article 10 (board regulations)
First member
The first paragraph of this article provides that the COHO establishes administrative regulations. Further rules may be set in the board regulations about the manner of decision-making, the division of tasks between the members, and so on. The administrative regulations adopted by the reform entity must be approved by the minister on the basis of Article 11 of the Framework Act on independent administrative bodies. The reason for this is that the minister bears general responsibility for the performance of duties by the independent administrative body. The management regulations contain rules on the day-to-day functioning of the administrative body and can therefore influence the performance of tasks. Pursuant to Article 11, paragraph 2, of the Independent Administrative Bodies Framework Act, the minister will only withhold approval if there is a conflict with the law or if, in the minister’s opinion, the administrative regulations may impede the proper performance of duties by the COHO.
Second member
As soon as they have been approved by the minister, the administrative regulations will be published in the official journals of Curaçao and the Netherlands. In the Netherlands it concerns the Government Gazette and in Curaçao it concerns the Curaçao National Gazette.
Article 11 (policy rules)
In Article 21, paragraph 1, of the Autonomous Administrative Bodies Framework Act, the Minister is empowered to establish policy rules on the performance of duties by an independent administrative body. If the minister makes use of the power to make policy noTo establish hedgehogs, they will be published in the Government Gazette on the basis of Article 21, second paragraph, of the Framework Act on independent administrative bodies. Because the COHO will operate in Curaçao, broader publication is necessary. This article regulates broader disclosure of policies.
§ 2.3 Official service
Article 13 (incompatibilities)
Although the secretary and the employees of the civil service are not allowed to be members of the COHO under the first paragraph of this article and the civil service is not formally part of the administrative body, the efforts of the secretary and the employees of the civil service does not insignificantly contribute to the day-to-day functioning of the reform entity. In view of this, it is important that the independence of the secretary and the employees is also safeguarded. That is why the second paragraph of this article stipulates that the secretary and the employees of the civil service may not hold ancillary positions that are undesirable with a view to the proper performance of their functions or to maintain their independence or confidence in them. The third paragraph stipulates that the secretary and the employees must notify the COHO of their intention to accept an ancillary position.
§ 2.4 Admission
Article 14 (admission)
For the fulfillment of their functions, it is necessary that the members of the COHO and the general secretary and employees of the official service that supports the COHO have free access to the Curaçao territory that they are allowed to work there. This regulation also applies to any spouses, registered partners and minor children of the members of the COHO, the general secretary of the civil service and the employees of the civil service.
§ 2.5 Financing COHO
Article 15 (remuneration and other administrative expenses)
This article provides that the remuneration of the members of the COHO and the general secretary and employees of the civil service are charged to the budget of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. In addition, all personnel expenses and material expenses of both the primary and the supporting processes are charged to this budget.
§ 2.6 COHO annual report
Article 16 (annual report)
Pursuant to Article 18, paragraph 1, of the Independent Administrative Authorities Framework Act – which has been declared to apply mutatis mutandis in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the proposal – the COHO is obliged to prepare an annual report before 15 March each year. In an annual report, the COHO gives its own representation of the performance of the past year for reform and recovery. From this, a picture can be obtained of the policy pursued and the activities carried out. Although the COHO may in principle design an annual report at its own discretion, it cannot ignore Article 19, third paragraph, of the Framework Act on independent administrative bodies when drawing up the annual report. This stipulates that an annual report must in any case report on the efforts made by the COHO with a view to the timely preparation and implementation, the quality of the procedures used, the careful treatment of persons and institutions who work with the administrative body. contact, the careful handling of notices of objection and complaints that are received and the facilitation of the possibility for those who come into contact with the COHO to make proposals for improvements to the working methods and procedures.
The COHO will send the annual report (including the annual accounts and the auditor’s report) to the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations for the account of the activities carried out and the financial resources involved. The minister will then share the report with the other ministers concerned. In addition, the annual report will be sent by the COHO to both houses of the States General and the Council of Ministers of Curaçao. Before this happens, the COHO will, however, in the context of both sides of the argument, give the Minister of General Affairs of Curaçao the opportunity to express his views on the annual report. This possibility is all the more important since the content of an annual report normally forms the basis for the application of the power of the Dutch Council of Ministers under Article 18 to suspend or stop the provision of financial resources in whole or in part. put.
In order to gain insight into the costs in good time, the COHO sends the minister a draft budget each year before 1 March and the budget for the following year before 1 May each year. Given the diversity of the reform programs to be implemented by Curaçao (government and finance, economic reforms, care and education, strengthening the rule of law)t) the funding of the financial resources will not only run via the budget of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, but depending on a specific reform program, will be allocated to a specific ministry that is related to the reform programs.
Article 17 (implementation report)
This article provides that the COHO reports every six months or at the request of our ministers in a so-called implementation report to the minister on the progress of the implementation of the obligations imposed on the countries by or pursuant to this Act. This particularly concerns the obligations arising from the agreements made in the national package and their further elaboration in action plans as referred to in Article 22 of this Act. As is the case with an annual report, the Minister of General Affairs is given the opportunity to express his views on an implementation report in the context of both sides of the argument.
CHAPTER 3 RESOURCES AND AID
Article 18 (resources available to the COHO)
This article regulates the purposes for which the financial resources made available to COHO by the Netherlands can be spent (paragraph 1), how these resources and spending can be specified in more detail (paragraphs 2 and 3) and about what options The Netherlands has the option to suspend or terminate the posting (paragraphs 4 and 5). The article is therefore a central provision in the proposal.
First member
In the first paragraph it becomes clear that, from a material point of view, there are a total of four money flows that run from the Netherlands to the COHO. Three of these flows are linked to the first three tasks of the COHO: supporting the development and implementation of projects, programs and measures by government bodies and public companies; initiating, promoting and executing economic projects and programs; and the granting of grants to citizens and private legal persons, including public undertakings, or participation in the share capital of private legal persons, including public undertakings (paragraph 1 (a)). The fourth material flow of funds concerns the liquidity support that COHO can provide on behalf of the Netherlands to cover necessary expenditure on the regular service included in the national budget. These financial resources will mainly be made available to COHO by the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.
Second and third paragraph
Where the first paragraph provides insight into the financial flows of the financial resources made available by the Netherlands, the second paragraph gives the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, after consultation with ministers from other ministries involved, the opportunity to determine which part of the said resources. should be spent on any task or liquidity support. It is obvious, especially with regard to the final destination, that all this also takes place in consultation with or at least on the basis of input and needs of the Minister of General Affairs of Curaçao. The third paragraph stipulates that the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations in this context periodically concludes agreements with Curaçao about the amount and nature of the financial resources. It can thus be agreed, among other things, whether certain financial resources will be provided in the form of a loan or in the form of a gift. When it comes to the timing of entering into an agreement within the meaning of the third paragraph, it is recommended to take the budget cycle of Curaçao into account as much as possible, in order not to unnecessarily obscure the relevant procedures and the position of Parliament to disturb. However, it cannot be ruled out in advance that it will be necessary to provide for a liquidity need outside this cycle. Flexibility is therefore also an important starting point.
Fourth and fifth paragraphs
For an explanation of these paragraphs, reference is made to paragraph 3.7.1 of the general part of this explanatory memorandum.
Sixth paragraph
In the context of the adversarial process, the Minister of the Interior and
Kingdom Relations do not decide to fully or partially suspend or discontinue the provision of financial resources to the COHO for the benefit of Curaçao, without first giving the Minister of General Affairs of Curaçao the opportunity to express his views on this intended decision. to give. If the Council of Ministers maintains its intention to take this decision, the view will be reflected in the motivation of the decision.
Article 19 (appointment of experts)
In addition to the financial resources that can be offered and allocated under Article 18kt, support can also be offered in the form of expertise. Where possible, the COHO can and will provide this other form of support itself, but if more support is needed, for example in drafting or revising legislation, the COHO can request the ministers concerned to provide one or more experts under their responsibility. set. Pursuant to this article, the ministers must appoint these experts in agreement with Our Minister. The appointed experts, insofar as they assist the COHO in the performance of its duties, will fall under its responsibility. It is also conceivable that the COHO will hire external expertise in addition to the support from the departments.
CHAPTER 4 POWERS
§ 4.1 General
Article 20 (provision of data and information and cooperation)
This article imposes the obligation on government bodies and public companies to cooperate in any form when reasonably requested by the COHO. This can therefore go beyond the mere provision of data and information.
Cooperation, data and information are required by the COHO in the context of the performance of the tasks referred to in Article 4, first paragraph, under a, b and d. The information that the COHO needs to take a subsidy decision is provided with the application.
Confidentiality is the starting point for the information exchange between COHO and Curaçao. In addition, fundamental rights, as protected in international human rights treaties to which the Kingdom is bound, may limit the possibilities of this information exchange. More in a procedural sense, there are also limits in the principles of good administration for the COHO in its actions in the context of Article 20. The COHO is an administrative body and as such is obliged to observe standards such as the principles of due care and proportionality.
Finally, as has already been discussed in section 3.5, the duty to cooperate is limited in the sense that Curaçao government bodies cannot be required to implement reforms or use regulatory powers if the COHO itself acts without authorization. This is the case if a project, program, measure or plan of action cannot be traced back to what Curaçao has agreed with the Netherlands at the level of this proposal or at the level of the national package. Since the supervision of the COHO rests with the minister, it is not the intention that a Curaçao government body in such a situation unilaterally refuses or suspends its cooperation without first entering into consultation with the COHO and / or the minister.
§ 4.2 Projects, programs and measures of government bodies and public companies
Article 21 (support for projects, programs and measures)
This article contains the powers that COHO can use to support the development and implementation of projects, programs and measures by government bodies and public companies. This concerns the direct and indirect provision of financial resources (under a); to make expertise and implementation capacity available (under b); and for the power to audit public bodies and public companies (under c).
For a more detailed explanation, please refer to section 3.4.1 of the general part of this explanatory memorandum. With regard to the authority, under c, to be able to audit government bodies and public companies, it should only be noted here that it is recommended that an audit takes place on the basis of internationally accepted standards and with due regard for the protection of confidential data.
Article 22 (action plan)
For the development and implementation of a project, program or measure, the COHO can draw up an action plan after consultation with the government bodies and public companies concerned by it. Drawing up an action plan can be helpful because it ensures transparency, concretization and structuring of the project, program or measure concerned. For example, in an action plan it can be established which goals the parties involved are trying to achieve with the implementation of the project, program or measure, which financial and non-financial resources are required for this and what timeframe the parties have in mind. These, but also other components, are listed in the second paragraph of this article as guidelines for setting up an action plan. It is important that this is a non-exhaustive list. It is therefore conceivable that other matters are also regulated in the action plan. The third paragraph of this article stipulates that if an action plan is drawn up, the COHO will send this plan to the concernedgovernment agencies. In addition, the action plan is also shared with the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the other Dutch ministers concerned. For a more detailed explanation of this article, please refer to section 3.5 of the general part of this explanatory memorandum.
Article 23 (designation)
This article includes a power of the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations to issue instructions to COHO with regard to an action plan for the development and implementation of the projects, programs and measures by government bodies. If justified, such an instruction can be given if there are indications that an action plan is being taken beyond the boundaries of the national package or if an action plan is not available, the implementation of an action plan agreed in the country package and further detailed in the implementation agenda. elaborated reform threatens to disrupt. The need to issue an instruction to the COHO may be the result of an independent assessment by the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, but may also arise from a signal sent to the Minister by the government of Curaçao. With regard to the latter, see more extensively section 3.5 of these explanatory notes.
Article 24 (suspension of aid)
First member
In this article, the COHO is authorized to suspend all or part of the support to Curaçao. A certain restraint is required in the use of this power. That is why the COHO can only suspend the granting of aid in whole or in part if a government body or public company does not implement a project, program or measure on time, given the agreements from the national package, a project, program or measure does not meet the requirements stated in the national package. agreed or detailed in the action plan or if the request for data, information or cooperation is not complied with in any other way. It is also important that the COHO may only suspend the support that is intended for the development and implementation of the projects, programs and measures of government bodies and public companies, as referred to in Article 4, first paragraph, under a, of this Act. It cannot therefore concern investments made on the basis of Article 4, first paragraph, under b, or subsidies granted on the basis of Article 4, first paragraph, under c.
Second member
The COHO can only take a decision to suspend the granting of aid after the relevant government body or public company has been given the opportunity to express its views. This article does not prescribe how the view should be given, so this can be either written or oral. The view must be included by the COHO in the balancing of interests that precedes the decision on full or partial suspension of the aid.
Third member
In the decision to suspend the support, in whole or in part, the COHO will include a period within which the relevant government body or public company can still comply with the obligation that gave rise to the decision. In short, the government body or public company will have one last chance to implement a project, program or measure in a manner agreed in the national package or elaborated in the action plan or to comply with the request for data, information or cooperation in some other way. If the government body or public company in question does not make use of this opportunity and the period has expired, the COHO will actually proceed to suspend the support in whole or in part.
Fourth paragraph
The fourth paragraph of this article provides that the government body or public company concerned must be informed of the intention of the COHO to take a decision to suspend all or part of the support. The government body or public company is also informed about the possibility to put forward an opinion in this regard. Furthermore, the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations is also informed of the fact that COHO is considering fully or partially suspending support to a government body or public company from the countries.
For a further explanation of this article, reference is made to paragraph 3.7.1 of the general part of the explanatory memorandum.
Article 25 (provision)
On the basis of this article, the COHO can advise the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom to take a measure under the Statute, if a decision has not resulted in the full or partial suspension of aid as referred to in article 24. that it involveda government body or public company still carries out a project, program or measure in the manner set out in the national package or an action plan or provides the requested cooperation. The advice of the COHO – which, as stated above, focuses on the application of powers already existing at Kingdom level – is made through the intervention of Our Minister and must be substantiated. In this statement of reasons, the COHO will have to indicate why the violation by the relevant government body or public company justifies intervention by the Kingdom and why this intervention is suitable to rectify the violation in question.
Pursuant to the Statute, the Kingdom Council of Ministers has in principle three facilities available that it can use on the advice of the COHO within the framework of Article 25. In the Statute itself, these are the powers of destruction included in Article 50 and
neglect of duties procedure included in Article 51, first paragraph. Another possibility is the designation authority of the government of the Kingdom in Article 15 Governor Regulations. It is preferable that the motivation for applying one of these instruments can be related to Article 43 of the Statute, which focuses on the principle of democratic rule of law. However, this is not necessary, since the instruments in question have a broader scope than just Article 43 of the Statute and can also be used in the event of a violation of a Kingdom Act. In that case, however, the same application criteria apply, such as the proportionality requirement and the requirement that no redress is possible in the country itself. The rigor of the criteria in this context depends on the instrument chosen. Incidentally, the criterion of redress is to a certain extent already included in the present proposal, in the sense that the country in question is expressly given the opportunity to prevent or rectify a violation.
For a further explanation of this article, reference is made to paragraph 3.7.1 of the general part of the explanatory memorandum.
§ 4.3 Projects and programs
Article 26 (project implementation)
This article elaborates on which actions COHO can undertake aimed at initiating, promoting and executing projects and programs of a (semi-) private nature.
In principle, the COHO only takes such actions after consultation about this with the Ministers concerned of Curaçao. In this way it can be prevented that the actions in question unnecessarily go against the economic policy of Curaçao. However, since projects and programs must adhere to the main points of the consensus-based country package under Article 26, this policy is not considered to deviate from this.
Reference is made to section 3.4.2 of the general part of this explanatory memorandum for a further explanation.
Article 27 (consent)
The consent requirement laid down in this article is in line with article 32 of the Autonomous Administrative Bodies Framework Act. For an explanation of these and comparable control options, reference is made to paragraph 2.1 of the general part of the explanatory memorandum.
Article 28 (designation)
As in Article 23, a power of designation has been included in Article 28. These directions relate to the initiation, promotion and implementation of economic projects and programs. This deviates from the ZBOs Framework Act. For an explanation of this, reference is made to paragraph 2.1 of the general part of the explanatory memorandum.
§ 4.4 Grants and participating interests
Article 29 (grants and participations)
An important goal of the COHO, in addition to promoting reforms of an administrative nature and realizing sustainable and sustainable public finances, is to strengthen the resilience of the Curaçao economy. In doing so, attention should not only be paid to the government, but also to citizens, companies and other legal entities under private law. Hence, on the basis of Article 4 (1) (c), the COHO has the task of providing subsidies to citizens and legal persons under private law and participating in the share capital of legal persons under private law. The first paragraph of this article stipulates that rules can be laid down by regulation of the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations regarding the provision of subsidies and participation in the share capital. This will include details of the activities for which grants can be awarded, the amount or the manner in which the amount is determined for which grants can be awarded or for which participation in the share capital and which conditions and obligations must be met. Insofar as such rules are not provided for by ministerial regulation, the COHOPursuant to the second paragraph, set policy rules on the provision of subsidies and participation in share capital. If rules are set in this regard by ministerial regulation at a later time, the policy rules will be brought into line with this or deleted.
Finally, the third paragraph declares that title 4.2 of the General Administrative Law Act applies mutatis mutandis with regard to the provision of subsidies. This title provides a uniform administrative law framework for the intended granting of subsidies, so that there is clarity about the rights and obligations and about the procedural approach. An important aspect of the approach concerns the fact that this title refers to two types of decisions, namely the decision to grant a subsidy and the decision to determine the subsidy. The reason for this distinction is that several decisions are generally required to grant a subsidy. A decision to grant a subsidy provides a provisional financial entitlement on the basis of which the activity to be subsidized can be carried out, and when the subsidy is determined, this entitlement is confirmed after it has been checked whether the conditions for subsidization have been met and the subsidy amount has been determined in accordance with the eligible costs incurred. The rules in this regard are set out in Title 4.2 of the General Administrative Law Act.
Article 30 (definitions)
Because the COHO operates in different legal systems, this article aligns the most important concepts with regard to the granting of subsidies.
Article 31 (decision period)
This article stipulates that the COHO must make a decision on an application for a decision to grant a subsidy or to determine the subsidy within eight weeks of receipt. If the COHO is unable to make a decision within the set term, the COHO will inform the applicant of this. In addition to the announcement that a decision cannot be taken within eight weeks, the COHO states that the term within which the decision can be expected is as short as possible. If no decision is taken at all within the period stated in the first paragraph or the period communicated by the COHO to the applicant on the basis of the second paragraph, this must be regarded as a negative decision.
Article 32 (deadlines in connection with Saturdays, Sundays and public holidays)
Under this law, just as under the administrative law of the Netherlands and Curaçao, if a term ends on a Saturday, Sunday or a generally recognized public holiday, it is extended up to and including the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday or public holiday. The second paragraph provides that the term “generally recognized public holiday” includes all public holidays that are referred to in the General Time Limits Act and the General Time Limits Ordinance of Curaçao.
Article 33 (legal protection)
The first paragraph of this article provides that an interested party may lodge an appeal against a decision to grant a subsidy, a decision to determine the subsidy and against the rejection thereof. If the interested party wishes to make use of this right of appeal, within six weeks after the day on which the decision was made, the interested party must apply to the Court of First Instance of the Common Court of Justice of Aruba, Curaçao, Sint Maarten and Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba. The second paragraph provides that an appeal can be lodged against the judgment of the Court of First Instance with the same
Common Court of Justice of Aruba, Curaçao, Sint Maarten and Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba. Depending on the present case, the Joint Court will apply the rules that are included in the National Ordinances of Curaçao about the administrative appeal.
§ 4.5 Transfer of participating interests
Article 34
In the context of its tasks under Article 4, paragraph 1, under b and c, the COHO may participate in the share capital of legal entities governed by private law, including public companies. Such participation can, certainly where it concerns a public company, have an impact on the Curaçao economy and the economic policy of the government of Curaçao. With a view to this, this article obliges the COHO to first offer a participation to Curaçao for acquisition, before it can be transferred to a third party. This opportunity may arise in the meantime, but will also play a role when the term of validity of this law ends and the COHO ceases to exist.
As a rule, the financial resources used to acquire share capital by the COHO will be borne by the Netherlands; that is to say, arise from resources that are made available to COHO by the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations without simultaneously, third paragraph, to be marked as a loan to Curaçao. In that case, the above explanation will suffice. Things are otherwise in the unlikely event, but also cannot be ruled out in advance, that these financial resources have been designated as a loan to Curaçao in the context of Article 18, third paragraph. In that scenario, the question may be raised whether it is even possible for COHO to dispose of a participating interest in a third party or, in the event of the expiry of this Act, to transfer it to the assets of the Dutch State. Owing to proprietary law, these options do indeed seem to exist. However, this would not be desirable or fair. Should the COHO take a participation in a company with financial means that are regarded as a loan to Curaçao in the context of Article 18, third paragraph, it is therefore important to include restrictions in this respect in the company’s articles of association. until the transferability of the participation. Where appropriate, further agreements must also be made with regard to both income and expenses of the participation, as well as the distribution of the proceeds in the event of a possible sale of the shares.
§ 4.6 Closer financial supervision of the expenditure of the countries
Article 35 (institution of stricter financial supervision)
For an explanation of the institution of stricter financial supervision, please refer to section 3.8 of the general part of this explanatory memorandum.
Article 36 (withholding approval)
Where stricter financial supervision has been instituted for (part of) the expenses of Curaçao, the approval required in the context of this stricter supervision can only be withheld due to conflict with the law or conflict with the general financial interest.
The conflict with the law primarily refers to conflict with the provisions of this Kingdom Act and the Financial Supervision Act and also to conflict with the own budget. This does not alter the fact that there may also be other legal limits against which the Financial Supervision Council can assess.
Struggle with the general financial interest refers to the financial interest of Curaçao. The use of this term is intended to be consistent with comparable regulations in Dutch legislation, such as the Municipalities Act and the Provinces Act.
The second paragraph provides that approval only takes place after consultation with the Minister of General Affairs of Curaçao has taken place. However, it is logically not linked to the approval of the board.
Article 37 (policy framework)
Article 35 provides for the establishment of a policy framework in the event of enhanced financial supervision. This is done for the effective and efficient application of this supervision. With a view to this, it can be laid down in the policy framework in which way Curaçao provides the information required for the performance of this task. Further details can also be given of the expenditure to be submitted for approval. For example, from an efficiency point of view, this may stipulate that expenditure below a certain amount does not require approval. Furthermore, the policy framework will logically specify in which cases there is an urgent urgency as referred to in Article 39.
The adoption of the policy framework does not affect the fact that Our Minister is authorized to issue policy rules on the basis of Article 11 of this bill of law jo. Article 21 of the Autonomous Administrative Bodies Framework Act. If Our Minister makes use of that power, the policy framework will have to be in accordance with it or be brought into line with it.
The procedure for establishing the policy framework is also described in this article.
Article 38 (time limits)
The period for granting approval set in this article has been deliberately kept short in order to prevent the country from experiencing undue delay in making expenditure. In addition, a lex silencio positivo is foreseen in the sense that approval is granted as soon as the set deadline has expired. In the event that the COHO needs more time to assess an expenditure, it can postpone the term once (second paragraph).
Article 39 (urgent urgency)
In cases of urgent urgency, it must be possible for Curaçao to issue an expense without approval (explicitly or by means of the expiry of the term). The policy framework as referred to in article 37 logically provides further details of this urgent urgency, including the facts and circumstances that require this urgent urgency to justify the making of an unapproved expenditure.
Article 40 (suspension of aid)
For an explanation of the power of suspension regulated in this article, reference is made to paragraphs 3.7 and 3.8 of the general part of this explanatory memorandum.ing.
Article 41 (termination of supervision)
For an explanation of the termination of the stricter supervision regulated in this article, reference is made to paragraph 3.8 of the general part of this explanatory memorandum.
Article 42 (crown appeal)
For an explanation of the crown appeal regulated in this article, reference is made to chapter 4 of the general part of this explanatory memorandum.
§ 4.7 Loans
Article 43 (loans)
This article aims to prevent Curaçao from making capital investments that do not contribute to the reform objectives. Obviously, there must be room for the country to make necessary investments. But it would be undesirable if, as a result of certain investments, Curaçao subsequently no longer has room for investments related to the reform objectives set out in the national package. The COHO must be able to monitor this. If that supervision results in a negative assessment, the legal consequence is attached in the second paragraph that the loan in question cannot be attracted through the current registration of the Dutch State, referred to in Article 16, seventh paragraph, of the Financial Act supervision. Article 43, second paragraph, therefore functions as a lex specialis with respect to the aforementioned provision of the Financial Supervision Act.
In the event of a negative assessment by the COHO with regard to the intention to attract a loan by Curaçao, Article 43, second paragraph, only blocks loans through the current registration of the Dutch State. In such a case, Curaçao is formally free to try to attract a loan abroad or on the local market. Pursuant to Article 29 of the Charter, however, the acquisition of a foreign loan takes place in agreement with the government of the Kingdom. The second paragraph of this provision in the Statute formulates as a rule that the Reich Council of Ministers associates itself with a foreign loan, unless the interests of the Kingdom oppose this. Whether the latter is the case requires an independent assessment by the Reich Council of Ministers, which is normally accompanied by the necessary restraint. As long as this Kingdom Act is in force, however, it is reasonable for the aforementioned interests of the Kingdom to be assessed against the background of its system.
CHAPTER 5 FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 44 (evaluation)
Within three years after entry into force, the Minister of the Interior will send and
Kingdom Relations an evaluation of the representatives of the Netherlands and Curaçao. This evaluation reports on the effectiveness and effects of the Kingdom Act in practice. This should be done from a broad perspective; both the Netherlands and Curaçao must be able to identify with this.
Since this bill is based on consensus, it is also important to include this principle in the composition of the committee that carries out the evaluation. This committee is composed of three independent members, all of whom are appointed by the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. However, the appointment of two of the three members, including the chairman, must be made in agreement with the Minister of General Affairs of Curaçao.
Article 45 (entry into force, expiry and termination)
The activities of the COHO are of a temporary nature. In view of this, the bill contains a sunset clause: this consensus kingdom law will expire six years after it enters into force. Renewal is possible, but only by mutual agreement and for a period of two years each time.
The premature termination of this consensus kingdom law is made possible by paragraph 3. Its regulation has been designed in such a way that none of the participating countries has a unilateral right of termination.
The State Secretary for the Interior and Kingdom Relations,
drs. R.W. Knops