Eng.Translation 61 PDF Pages: Investigation “Follow-up KPCN Recommendations For The Dutch Caribbean Police Force & The Council for Law Enforcement

Posted on March 30, 2021 by admin

“Follow-up of KPCN recommendations”
ORIGINAL 61 PDF DOCUMENTS IN DUTCH: https://www.facebook.com/SXMLATESTNEWS/
The Council for Law Enforcement wants to use the recommendations in its reports to contribute to improving the quality of the performance of tasks of the judicial organizations. This report is about the follow-up of recommendations from four reports about the KPCN. The Board notes that most of these recommendations have been followed up and compliments the force and the force manager for this. It can be concluded that the reports and the recommendations are well received and that the intended results are achieved.
In its State for Law Enforcement 2016, the Council noted that the KPCN had lagged behind in terms of development with partners from the judicial chain. This investigation has shown that the force is actively catching up. That deserves appreciation. The Council is confident that the force will continue this line.

This investigation by the Board also shows that parts of the necessary reinforcement of the control room have suffered considerable delays. The force manager should have been more focused on the control room project. The Council hopes that this project can be completed in 2021 due to the recent measures taken by the force manager.

For this investigation, the Board interviewed sixteen former employees of the KPCN and the Ministry of Justice and Security. The Board would like to thank those involved for the pleasant and open discussions and for their constructive contribution to this research.

THE LAW ENFORCEMENT COUNCIL

Mr. L.M. Virginia (chairman)
Mr. Th.P.L. Bone
Mr. M.R. Clarinda

Summary and recommendations

1 Introduction
The Law Enforcement Council has been in dive over the past decaderse reports made recommendations in the field of the Dutch Caribbean Police Force (KPCN). These recommendations are intended to improve the quality of the performance of tasks by the force. In 2020, the Board examined the extent to which the recommendations from four reports on the KPCN have been followed up. In doing so, the Board has explicitly taken into account the management question: to what extent and by whom was this succession steered.
This investigation is part of a research program of the Board that is aimed at gaining and maintaining insight into the follow-up of all recommendations of the Board (monitor).
2 Scope
This first investigation by the Council in the Caribbean Netherlands for the monitor concerns the recommendations from the following four reports:
1) Complaint handling (2016)
2) Shooting incident Bonaire (2017)
3) Basic Police Care (2018)
4) Victim Support (2018)

As police force manager, the Minister of Justice and Security must ensure, among other things, the quality of the performance of its duties. That is why this investigation is aimed at both the force and the force manager.
The central research question is as follows:
To what extent do the KPCN and the police force manager follow up on the recommendations of the Council and to what extent and by whom are they steered?
3 Approach
For this investigation, the Board requested relevant documents from the force and the force manager. This investigation mainly consisted of a study and analysis of those documents and in-depth interviews with representatives of the force manager and of the force. Due to the COVID-19 measures, the Board conducted most of the interviews by telephone. For the same reason, he was unable to carry out a file investigation.
4 Development of KPCN and local context
In order to put the follow-up of the recommendations in the correct perspective, the Board first briefly discusses the development of the KPCN and the context in which the force operates. When the corps was set up in 2010 – after the breakup of the country of the Netherlands Antilles – there was a considerable backlog, in terms of knowledge and capacity, among other things. In the first years, efforts were mainly aimed at getting the basics in order by, among other things, investing in training and better equipment. This has resulted in professional basic police care. Since 2017, investments have been made in strengthening and changing internal management and in professionalizing business operations. Communication between the teams on Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba has also improved.
The KPCN is an independent force on the basis of the Police Act. However, in terms of capacity and material, it is designed to perform basic police tasks. As a result, the force cannot be completely self-sufficient. Due to its small scale, cooperation with the various organizations responsible for law enforcement in the Caribbean region is necessary. The force manager and the force have been investing in strengthening this regional cooperation for several years now.

5 Follow-up of recommendations

5.1 Complaint handling
In its 2016 report, the Board made recommendations on the following points:
• active provision of information about the right to complain;
• questioning the complainants after informal complaint handling;
• use of expiration messages;
• filing;
• replacement complaints handler.

State of affairs 2020
With regard to the active provision of information, the force has developed various useful activities, both internally and externally. Much profit can still be made with the adaptation of the KPCN website.
On the basis of the information obtained, the Board assumes that the complainants will be asked as standard after an informal conversation whether they are satisfied and that the force will still start the formal procedure if they receive a negative answer.
In view of the information from the force, the Board is equally confident that the complaint files are now in order.
During the investigation, the force did not work systematically with expiration reports. The police chief has promised that this recommendation will be followed up after all. The Board considers it important that the handling of every complaint is carefully completed in this way. The replacement of the complaints handler was realized during the investigation of the Board.
With effect from 1 February 2021, a colleague will work for 50% of his time for the Internal Affairs Office (BIZ) – where complaints are handled. The Council is pleased that the force has opted for this structural solution. According to the Board, it is preferable to record this in the redevelopment plan and / or the OenF report.
Conclusion
The Board concludes that the complaint handling process by the force has improved after 2016. The recommendations of the Board have been fully or partially followed up. Where succession has not yet been realized, there is in any case an impulse to do soto give.
5.2 Shooting incident on Bonaire
In its 2017 report, the JenV Inspectorate made the recommendations to strengthen the KPCN control room by means of:
• training of new and further training of sitting dispatchers;
• the presence of executive personnel in the control room;
• improvement of the technical equipment and supplies of the control room;
• technical measures to improve the connections between control room and patrols.

State of affairs 2020
The KPCN has followed the recommendations with regard to training and further training of dispatchers. In the Council’s opinion, the systematic promotion and refresh of knowledge is an important precondition.
The KPCN and the force manager have translated the deployment of executive personnel in the control room and traineeship of dispatchers at the BPZ into measures, but have not yet implemented those measures. In view of the capacity problem at the BPZ department, the Board understands that executive personnel are not yet deployed in the control room. But according to the Council, the interns
hips at the BPZ could have been carried out.
The Board notes that the control of BPZ employees by the control room is still a point for attention. The exchange of BPZs and dispatchers is, in the Board’s opinion, important for strengthening and further development of the control room and for mutual understanding.
The Board notes that the KPCN has taken measures to improve accessibility on Bonaire, St. Eustatius and Saba. This has led to improvements in terms of both mobile accessibility and port and mobile phone traffic.

The Justice and Security Inspectorate (hereinafter: IJenV) determined in 2017 that the equipment was more than seven years old and needed to be replaced. In both the policy response to the report of the Inspectorate and in other letters to Parliament from 2018, the minister indicated that the tender for the replacement of the equipment would start in 2018. The Board finds that this has not been achieved. The aim of the force manager, mentioned later, to start tenders in the second quarter of 2020, also turned out not to be feasible. The equipment referred to has still not been replaced. As a result, the control room is still insufficiently in order on this part.
The replacement of control room equipment, one of the recommendations from the IJenV report, is part of a broader process for modernizing the control room. To this end, the force manager set up a project structure in 2018. It is not only about the renewal of the technical facilities, but also about the way in which the control room function must be set up per island, including the associated work processes and a new contract to be concluded for the network infrastructure. This is a complex project involving several partners. The force manager has chosen to appoint a project leader from the Ministry of Justice and Security for this project, who started in February 2019. The Board notes that soon after his start, this project leader ran into a lack of operational knowledge of control room processes. In addition, the physical distance between The Hague and the CN was a hindrance. The Council has established that in 2019 and in the first half of 2020 the force manager did not intervene on recurring and clear signals from the KPCN about the lack of progress in the project. In the Council’s opinion, the force manager has adhered to the European-Dutch project structure for too long. As a result, it often remained with patient paper and there was a lack of actual progress.

Conclusion
The recommendation to strengthen the control room in the short term has been partly followed up. Dispatchers have been trained and have done an internship at other control rooms. The exchange of BPZs and dispatchers has not been realized.
The guiding role of the control room towards the units of the BPZ is still a serious point of attention.
The technical supply and equipment of the control room has been improved in parts. Walkie-talkie traffic and mobile accessibility have been improved and the GIS system is operational again.

Replacing the control room equipment is part of a broader project to modernize the control room. The Board concludes that this project has been significantly delayed. He thinks that the force manager should have better steered towards the progress of the project. The Council notes that the force manager has now taken firm measures to complete the project in 2021.

5.3 Victim Support
In its 2016 report, the Board made recommendations on the following points:
• registration process;
• knowledge level of employees of the Victim Support Office (BSH);
• accident insurance and mileage allowance for the voluntary employees of BSH;
• positioning BSH;
• cooperation of BSH with Victim Support Netherlands.

State of affairs 2020
The process has since been completed
improved. According to the Board, it would still be good if the text in the box about victim support was brought into line with the correct questioning of victims during a subsequent adjustment of the ActPol business process system.
The level of knowledge of BSH employees has been increased through training from the Violent Crimes Compensation Fund. It is important that the KPCN continues to invest in these employees by means of periodic training and / or courses.
The recommendation about arranging accident insurance and a kilometer allowance for the voluntary employees of BSH has been followed up with regard to the allowance. Due to a misunderstanding, the insurance has still not been arranged. This point was taken up again during the investigation by the Board.
The KPCN has now made serious progress with regard to the active provision of information to victims. This required the Council’s “Second follow-up investigation of the Declaration Process” (2019). In response to the recommendations of the Board in that report, the force has arranged by means of a work instruction that declarants of cases that come under investigation at the Investigation Department are also adequately informed. Feedback is still done manually via lists. The Council believes it is important that this is automated as quickly as possible.
With regard to the positioning of BSH, the Board has established that the KPCN has maintained this office as part of the force, in accordance with its recommendation. According to those directly involved, there is no longer any need for a more independent profile of BSH, given the improved image of the force, according to them.
Finally, it turned out that the cooperation between BSH and Victim Support Netherlands in ad hoc situations runs as desired. Nevertheless, BSH intends to take the initiative to conclude a cooperation agreement with SHN.

In its 2018 report, the Board made recommendations on the following points:
• nine aspects that deserve attention in the decision-making about the restructuring of the force;
• connection between the BPZ and Investigation departments;
• schedules;
• performance goals;
• management information.

State of affairs 2020
This investigation has shown that all nine aspects mentioned by the Council are involved in the development of the redevelopment plan for the force. Most of them have even been explicitly incorporated into it. Most striking is the expansion of the staffing of the BPZ department by fifteen FTEs. The Council has noted with approval the manner in which the force has acted on this recommendation in consultation with the force manager.
The Board notes that the force has taken various measures in recent years to improve the connection between the BPZ and Investigation departments. Bottlenecks are still the strong dependence on the coordinator of the VVC unit, the support of that unit from the BPZ and the guarantee of replacement of the VVC coordinator.
The force has taken a serious look at the roster issues and has tried to implement improvements in all kinds of ways. But there are still bottlenecks. The Board hopes that the proposed expansion of the BPZ department will lead to a further decrease in the work schedule.
Finally, the investigation showed that the force has now started working for the BPZ department with concrete performance targets and that the force is actually making an effort to make better management information available.
Conclusion
The force has taken the recommendations from the report on the BPZ department seriously. In doing so, the force has taken important steps towards a better functioning and further professionalization of this department, and thus of the force. The final adoption of the redevelopment plan and the accompanying OenF report will mark a new phase in the life of the force.

6 Control
In a general sense, the Board has in
vestigated the extent to which the force manager and the force itself manage the follow-up of recommendations in the area of the force. As far as management is concerned, the force manager exercises the competent authority over the KPCN. He is responsible for the quality of the performance of tasks, the results and the management of the KPCN. That is why the force manager also has a responsibility in steering the realization of the follow-up of the recommendations of the Board.
Steering by the force manager
The Board has established that the force manager is managing the follow-up of recommendations by the KPCN te involvement in the policy responses to reports from the Council and by discussing the follow-up of the recommendations in the regular consultations with the force. However, the latter is not done systematically. The force manager does not monitor this follow-up, which means that there is a risk that certain recommendations, about which the minister has made commitments to the House of Representatives, may become obscured. That is why the Council is positive about the proposal of the force manager to set up a process together with the force to maintain a central view of the implementation of the Council’s recommendations.

The organization of the police force manager runs up against a lack of knowledge of executive police work in the implementation and management of a number of management tasks with regard to operational police processes. After all, DGPenV is not a police organization. This hinders the KPCN in its performance of tasks. He therefore embraces the steps that the force manager and the KPCN will take in 2021 to see whether and – if so – how (certain) management tasks can be transferred to the national police. After all, it is expected that the national police will be better and faster able to implement management issues related to operational police work. The Board is of the opinion that the KPCN should remain an independent force. Not only to maintain its unique identity, but also because of the regional cooperation with the other forces, the RST and the KMar. However, this does not stand in the way of strengthening the relationship with the national police. The Council is of the opinion that, regardless of the dependence of the KPCN in management, the force management and the force manager should continue to discuss the scope that the force is given to settle (certain) management issues directly with the national authorities from the point of view of efficiency. Police.
Steering by the KPCN
As indicated above, the force manager involves the KPCN in the preparation of the policy responses from the minister to the House of Representatives. Insofar as these responses contain commitments about the follow-up of recommendations, the force is therefore bound by them. The force has not set up a specific steering process for the follow-up of recommendations. The KPCN chooses – depending on the content of the recommendation – to include these in annual plans and / or projects, or to invest the follow-up directly with the relevant portfolio holder. By means of the A3 method, the police force’s management team directs the actual implementation of those recommendations. The Board notes that internal management within the KPCN has improved significantly in recent years. The A3 method is being embraced throughout the corps and applied in practice within the various sections of the corps. The four aspects (core concepts) of governance (management, management, internal supervision and accountability) are part of this form of management.

Conclusion
The force manager and the KPCN manage the follow-up of recommendations. At the moment there is still a lack of checks and balances by the force manager regarding the actual follow-up. The proposal of the force manager to set up a process together with the force to maintain a central view of the implementation of recommendations can be an effective step and contribute to good governance.
The Board has established that the organization of the force manager in the performance of a number of management tasks with regard to operational police processes of the KPCN runs into a lack of knowledge of executive police work. This hinders the KPCN in its task performance

7 Main conclusion
The Board has reached the following main conclusion and thus answers the central question in this investigation:
The KPCN and the force manager have followed up on the majority of the recommendations from the four examined reports. A number of recommendations are still being followed up. Both the force manager and the force management ensure that recommendations are followed up. The Council notes two bottlenecks in the control of the force manager, namely the physical distance between the Caribbean Netherlands and The Hague and a lack of knowledge of operational police work on the part of the force manager. In certain areas, this hinders the performance of management by the force manager, including steering based on recommendations, and thus the performance of tasks by the KPCN. The force manager has already taken measures and plans to take other measures to resolve these two bottlenecks.

The Board has incorporated the state of affairs with regard to the follow-up of recommendations in a table that is appended to this summary (p. 16).
In a general sense, the Board notes – in conclusion – that the force is catching up. The fact that the force can thus perform its tasks better also means strengthening the judicial chain as such. This serves law enforcement in the Caribbean Netherlands.The Board is positive about the way in which the force has followed up on the recommendations and about the way in which the force is developing. This is the joint merit of the force and of the force manager.

8 Recommendations
Based on the results of this investigation, the Council has made the following ten recommendations:

Theme Recommendation

Complaint handling With regard to the police force management
1. Process the increase in the capacity for BIZ (0.5 FTE) in the redevelopment plan and / or the OenF report.
Reinforcement of control room With regard to the police force management
2. Analyze the bottlenecks in the control of the BPZ by the control room.
3. Organize the exchange of BPZs and dispatchers.
4. Guarantee the cyclical process of training and retraining operators in the personnel and training plan.
With regard to the force manager
5. Pay more explicit attention to the management of the control room project.
Victim support With regard to the police force management
6. Organize that ActPol:
a) is adapted with regard to the question to victims;
b) provides automated feedback to reporters / victims.
BPZ / VVC With regard to the force management
7. Arrange adequate replacement of the VVC affairs coordinator within the BPZ department.
Control With regard to the force manager and force leadership
8. Involve other themes to be implemented by the KPCN in the management process to be set up regarding the follow-up of recommendations.
With regard to the force manager
9. In 2021, explore, together with the KPCN and the national police, the desirability and possibility of a role for the national police in the implementation of (parts of) the management of the KPCN. Depending on the results of this exploration, draw up a plan for this.
10. Make agreements with the force about the scope that the force will be given by the force manager to arrange matters directly with the national police in the implementation of certain management issues.

RECOMMENDATIONS JUDGMENT
Complaint handling (2016)
1. Invest in active provision of information about the right to complain. Followed
2. In the case of informal complaint handling, ask the complainant concerned whether he is satisfied with the handling and start a formal procedure if the answer to that question is negative. Followed

3. Also in the case of informal complaint handling, send the complainant concerned an outcome message. Partly f
ollowed up
4. Provide complete complaint files. Followed
5. Organize adequate replacement for the position of complaints coordinator / complaint handler. Followed

Shooting incident Bonaire (2017)
The control room of the KPCN is insufficiently in order with regard to training, further training and equipment. The Inspectorate regards this as a risk to the performance of the KPCN’s tasks. She is of the opinion that the control room must be strengthened in the short term and recommends that the force manager and the police chief take this up with due diligence. In the opinion of the Inspectorate, this could include matters such as:

1. Training new dispatchers by the Police Academy, as soon as possible after they enter service, and also investing in additional training of incumbent dispatchers by organizing and guaranteeing refresher courses, internships at other emergency rooms and internships within the basic police care. Followed
2. The (temporary) presence of an executive colleague in the control room in order to allow the civilian centralists to develop a greater sense of the executive work process through the transfer of knowledge. In addition, the supervisor and the deputy supervisor of the control room can also make an explicit contribution by being present in person at the control room with great regularity – and in particular in the event of calamities. Partly followed up
3. Improving or renewing the technical supplies and equipment of the control room and taking technical measures to improve the connections (walkie-talkie traffic and mobile telephony) between the control room and the patrols. Partly followed up

Victim Support (2018)
1. Improve the registration process of victims at the BSH in the short term. In any case, include the question posed by the police to victims as well as the possibility of adjusting ActPol
Followed
2. Provide sufficient knowledge in specific legal fields within the BSH. Followed
3. Take out accident insurance as well as an arrangement for a kilometer allowance for the voluntary employees of the BSH. Partly followed up
4. Draw up guidelines for the active provision of information to victims. Followed
5. For the time being, maintain the BSH as part of the KPCN, but allow it to profile itself more as an independent organization without direct reference to the KPCN.
* Although not followed up with regard to profiling, the reason for this recommendation is no longer on the orde. Hence “green”. Followed*
6. Consider the possibility of closer cooperation, for example by means of a cooperation agreement, between the BSH and Victim Support Netherlands. Partly followed up

BPZ 2018
1. When deciding on the restructuring of the force, pay attention to the following aspects: a) size of BPZ teams;
b) description of the position of aliens supervision officer;
c) description of the position of employee (senior) VVC affairs;
d) job content and job weight on the windward winds;
e) management of the teams on the windward winds;
f) availability of a bario director for each bario;
g) availability of at least one senior for each BPZ team;
h) ratio between the number of all-round employees and BPZ employees as well as the possibility of further growth;
i) possibility of exchanging BPZ employees between the teams on Bonaire, St. Eustatius and Saba. Followed

2. Provide a better connection between the BPZ and Opsporing Opstrad departments
3. Invest in the creation of better schedules. Followed
4. Consider the possibility of formulating concrete performance goals for the different processes. Followed
5. Ensure the availability of relevant management information. Followed
1 Introduction

1.1 Reason for the investigation
The Law Enforcement Council (hereinafter: the Council) has made recommendations to the responsible ministers in various inspection reports over the past ten years. As far as the Caribbean Netherlands is concerned, a considerable part of these recommendations lies in the field of the Dutch Caribbean Police Force (hereinafter: KPCN). These recommendations are intended to improve the quality of the performance of tasks by the force.
In its Annual Plan 2020, the Board announced that it will set up a monitor to gain and maintain a broad overview of the follow-up of its recommendations. A format (database) has been developed for this. In this database, the progress of the follow-up of the recommendations per study is tracked and monitored per country. This monitor generates an overview and insight (and management information) into the elaboration of the improvement measures in the field. The monitor also provides input for the Annual State of Law Enforcement. Finally, monitoring the follow-up of recommendations can contribute to so-called risk-based supervision. This is because identified bottlenecks can lead to a review or new thematic studies.
This first investigation by the Council in the Caribbean Netherlands for the monitor concerns the follow-up of the recommendations in four reports concerning the KPCN. From various (review) investigations and discussions that the Council conducted in recent years with representatives of the judicial organizations in the Caribbean Netherlands, the Council concludes that the degree and manner of steering are important factors in the realization of recommendations in practice. In the case of the KPCN, this concerns both guidance by the force management, supervisors or other designated persons within the force, as well as guidance by the force manager. In this study into the follow-up of recommendations, the Board paid explicit attention to the management question.

The Board will process the results of this investigation into the database in which all investigations and recommendations are included. The Council intends to conduct similar inspection investigations in the future at the other judicial organizations in the Caribbean Netherlands.
1.2 Objective and research question
This research has a twofold objective. In the first place, the Board wanted to use this investigation to chart the extent to which its recommendations in the field of the KPCN have been followed up. This concerns measures that have been announced in response to the recommendations, concrete actions that have been taken and the result thereof.
In the second place, the Board wanted to map out to what extent, by whom and how the follow-up of those recommendations has been and is being managed.
The central research question is as follows:
To what extent do the KPCN and the police force manager follow up on the recommendations of the Council and to what extent and by whom are they steered?
In order to answer the central research question, the Board has formulated the following sub-questions:
1. To what extent have Council recommendations been converted into measures (design)?
2. To what extent have these measures been introduced (exist)?
3. To what extent are these measures implemented (effect)?
4. To what extent, by whom and in what way is this (ad 1, 2 and 3) managed?
5. Which bottlenecks may arise in the follow-up and / or management?

1.3 Scope

1.3.1 Four reports

For this first investigation in the context of the monitor, the Board has four
research reports selectedin respect of which the minister has indicated in his policy responses that he will follow up on the recommendations contained therein. This concerns recommendations in which it is primarily the responsibility of the KPCN as the implementing organization, and not the minister.
The Board has opted for investigations that were carried out a few years ago. The specific recommendations in those studies could reasonably have been followed up in terms of timeframe. In doing so, the Council takes into account the absorption capacity of the force to implement and implement measures.
This study concerns the following four studies:
1) Complaint handling (2016)
2) Shooting incident Bonaire (2017)
3) Basic Police Care (2018)
4
) Victim Support (2018)

1.3.2 Police force and force manager

This investigation focuses on the KPCN and the force manager. As far as management is concerned, the Minister of Justice and Security exercises the competent authority over the KPCN and is responsible for the quality of the performance of tasks, the results and the management of the police force. On the basis of the Mandate regulations for police force management and fire service BES 2012, a mandate or sub-mandate has been granted respectively. With regard to the KPCN, a sub-mandate has been given to the Director-General of Police and Security Regions (DGPenV; formerly DGPol) of the Ministry of Justice and Security.

1.4 Assessment framework
Because the Board has examined in this investigation how a number of recommendations have been followed up, these recommendations form part of the assessment framework for this investigation.
As indicated above, the Board has also investigated the extent to which the actual follow-up of recommendations is being managed. The degree to which goals are achieved is a coherent process within organizations and is referred to as governance. The Board therefore also uses aspects of governance as an assessment framework.
The usual definition of governance is: safeguarding the mutual coherence of the way of managing, managing and supervising organizations, aimed at the efficient and effective realization of objectives, as well as communicating about this in an open manner and giving accountability for the benefit of stakeholders.
In this investigation, the Board used the following four
core concepts: directing, controlling, internal supervision and accountability. These terms are summarized as follows:
9 Steering: giving direction to the realization of organizational goals.
9 Control: implementing measures and procedures to ensure that the organization is heading in the right direction.
9 Internal supervision: determining whether targets are being achieved.
9 Accountability: reporting on results.

1.5 Approach to the investigation
In the first phase of the investigation, an orientation took place on the basis of the four selected reports and the response of the Minister to them.
Subsequently, the Council requested relevant documents from the KPCN and the force manager. The focus of the investigation was the interviews with (employees of) the force manager and the KPCN. These are in September and October
2020 decreased. Due to the measures taken in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic, the Board conducted video conference interviews with members of the force management and employees of the force.
The intention was also to conduct file research at the KPCN for the investigation into the follow-up of the recommendations from the Complaint Handling report. In view of the applicable travel restrictions, the Council has had to renounce this.

On the basis of all the information gathered, the Board drew up a draft report, which it submitted to the minister / police force manager and the police chief in December 2020, in accordance with Article 30 of the Law Enforcement Council Act. After processing the response, the Board adopted the report.

1.6 Reading guide
Chapter 2 deals with the actual follow-up of the recommendations. In order to place the research findings in the correct perspective, the Council first provides a brief description in that chapter of the development of the KPCN and of the context in which this force operates. Subsequently, the Board deals with the follow-up of the recommendations separately per report. After a presentation of the recommendations, the policy response always follows, a description of the state of affairs as it emerged from this investigation and finally the assessment thereof by the Board. In a number of cases, the assessment contains one or more recommendations.
In chapter 3, the Board discusses the management of recommendations by the force manager and the force. This chapter concludes with the assessment of that direction by the Board.
Chapter 4 contains the overall picture. First, the Board answers the sub-questions of the research and then the central research question.
Appendix 1 to this report contains an overview of the fuofficials interviewed by the Board for this investigation. Appendix 2 shows the A3 annual plan KPCN 2020 by way of illustration.

2 Follow-up of recommendations

In this chapter the Board describes the follow-up to the recommendations for each investigation. To this end, the Council first describes the development of the KPCN and the local context. This background is important for the way in which the KPCN implements the performance of its tasks, including the follow-up of recommendations.

2.1 Development of KPCN / local context
Due to the old constellation of the former Netherlands Antilles, when the KPCN was established in 2010, there was a considerable backlog, including in knowledge. Together with the force manager, the KPCN has put the base of the force in order by investing in training and better equipment (buildings and equipment), among other things. This has resulted in full and professional basic police care, said the interviewees. In the discussions with the Board, they indicate that since 2017, partly as a result of the inspection reports of the Board and the report by Mr Bouman, the further development of the force has started. This included, among other things, the reinforcement and change of management within the force and the professionalization of operational management. Until 2017, the police force management consisted of the police chief, the head of operations and the heads of the basic police care departments (hereinafter: BPZ), Investigation and Intake, Information and Operational Support (hereinafter: IIOO). The force management now consists of the police chief, the head of operations / deputy chief of police and the head of operations, and focuses on the strategic tasks of the force. The heads of the BPZ, Investigation and IIOO departments are responsible for tactical management. Communication between the teams on Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba has improved since 2017. The management on Bonaire is paying more attention to the teams on the windward islands, including in the management and organization of personnel support if necessary, according to the interviewees. The Board will return to this in section 2.5 (follow-up on recommendations from BPZ report). Finally, the staffing of the KPCN has been made possible and incorporated in the redevelopment plan that provides the basis for further development from 2020.
Pursuant to the Police Act, the KPCN is an independent police force. However, in terms of capacity and equipment, it is designed to perform basic police tasks, with a necessarily limited form of specialization. This small scale is not only characteristic of the KPCN, but also of other implementation organizations in the Caribbean Netherlands. The idea that the force can be completely self-sufficient was therefore explicitly abandoned in 2016. The force manager and the KPCN have strengthened regional cooperation with the various organizations responsible for law enforcement in the Caribbean part of the Kingdom. For example, in 2019 the capacity of the Criminal Investigation Collaboration Team (RST) was added to the Investigation department of the KPCN. Agreements have also been made with the forces of Curaçao, Aruba and Sint Maarten about the exchange of scarce specialisms. The KPCN will mainly focus on financial investigations.
2.2 Complaint handling

preface
In 2016, the Council, in collaboration with the National Ombudsman, investigated the way in which judicial organizations in the Caribbean Netherlands (CN) deal with complaints from citizens. In the report that the Council published on this in September 2016, the Council stated that complaint handling can be seen as the final piece of the legal protection of citizens against the government. The Council report contains some general recommendations that apply to all judicial organi
zations in the CN as well as specific recommendations for the KPCN.

2.2.1 Recommendations 2016

Familiarity with the right to complain
Previous research has shown that residents of the CN often have insufficient knowledge of their rights. Because, according to the Council, the right to complain can only function properly when citizens are sufficiently aware of the possibilities that this right offers, the Council made the following general recommendation:
Invest in active provision of information about the right to complain.

Formal complaints procedure
The previous investigation by the Board has shown that the judicial organizations in the CN to which the right of complaint of the General Administrative Law Act (hereinafter: Awb) applies in practice usually try to deal with complaints informally. In principle, the Council endorses such an approach. However, it is important that the organization asks the complainant in question as standard if he is satisfied with the informal handling and that a formal complaint handling procedure is started in the event of a negative answer. In this regard, the Council made the following general recommendation:
Request standard for informal complaint handlingthe complainant concerned whether he is satisfied with the handling and starts a formal procedure if the answer to that question is negative.

Expiration message
After handling a complaint, the organization would do well to always send the complainant an outcome message to prevent misunderstandings, also in the case of informal handling. In this regard, the Council made the following general recommendation:
Also in the case of informal complaint handling, send the complainant concerned an outcome message.
Function of complaints handler
Within the KPCN, the Internal Affairs Office (BIZ) is responsible, among other things, for the coordination and handling of complaints. Conducting internal and integrity investigations is another task of the BIZ. In accordance with the organization plan for the force, the BIZ consists of only one employee. During the survey in 2016, no permanent replacement was provided for or a colleague who could assist in the event of increased work pressure. The Council therefore made the following recommendation:
Organize adequate replacement for the position of complaints coordinator / complaint handler.

File creation
In 2016, the Board conducted a file investigation at the BIZ and established that the complaint files were incomplete and that essential documents were often missing. The Council made the following recommendation in this regard:
Provide complete complaint files.

2.2.2 Policy response
In his response to this report, the minister noted that he would ensure that “this subject has the appropriate attention of the police chief, in any case to adequate recording of the file and follow-up of the complaint”.

2.2.3 Status in 2020
Discussions with the mandated force manager (hereinafter: Royal Decree) and the relevant policy coordinator of the Ministry of JenV show that they regard the follow-up of these recommendations primarily as an operational matter for which the force management is primarily responsible. They are generally aware of the state of affairs, but they are referred to the force for more detailed information. The following description of the state of affairs for each recommendation is mainly based on the information that the force provided to the Council in the context of this investigation.
Active provision of information about the right to complain
The Chief of Police (hereinafter: KC) announced that after the publication of the Council report, the force has invested in providing information about the right to complain, both within the force and to the “outside world”. He gave several examples of this. For example, the new complaints handler, who succeeded his predecessor at the BIZ on 1 January 2019, regularly informs colleagues about the right to complain during briefings and work meetings. This complaints handler also organized an information meeting at the secondary school in 2019; he also informed the students about the possibilities in case of dissatisfaction with the police action. The force also uses Facebook and press releases to inform citizens about, for example, the handling of a specific complaint. Leaflets are available at the police stations on all three islands, in
four languages, with information about the right to complain. In addition, reporting officers are expected to point out the right to complain when filing a report. According to the KC, the reporting officers do the same in practice. The force is working on renewing and improving its website. According to the KC, the adjustment will offer possibilities for better information provision about the right to complain and for submitting complaints by means of a digital complaint form. At the time of the Board’s investigation, the KPCN website contained no information about the right to complain.

Question after informal complaint handling and possible start of formal procedure All complainants who submit their complaint in writing receive a confirmation of receipt and an invitation for an interview. On behalf of the police force, the complaints handler conducts the conversation with the person concerned, sometimes the KC takes part in that conversation. The complaints handler stated that he will ask the complainant after the interview whether the case has been settled as far as he is concerned. If this is not the case, the force will start the formal complaints procedure. In practice, according to the complaints handler, this is usually not necessary. People especially want to tell their story and the explanation from the police force satisfies them in most cases.

Standard sending of an expiration notice
The force does work with expiration reports, but this has not happened in all cases in recent years. The KC and the complaints handler stated in the context of the investigation by the Board that this will be done consistently in all new settlements.
They pointed out that the result of each complaint handling is recorded internally.

File creation
The KC indicated that the complaints handler keeps a list in an internal file with all steps and decisionsssings per complaint. This provides a complete overview. Every week, the KC consults with the complaints handler about this. According to the KC, all files are accurately constructed and complete. The Board has received the complaints overview for 2019 in anonymous form from the force (see the last part of this section).

Replacement complaints coordinator / complaint handler
In order to implement this recommendation, the police force management has appointed an employee in 2020 to work for BIZ for 50% of his time. This employee started this on 1 February 2021. In this regard, the KC also announced that it would act as a replacement for the BIZ employee if necessary. The redevelopment plan for the force is based on one FTE for BIZ.

And last but not least
Article 16 of the BES Security Act stipulates that further rules are to be laid down by ministerial regulation regarding the handling of complaints about the conduct of police officers. These rules must provide, among other things, for the establishment of an independent complaints advisory committee, for registration of complaints and decisions taken on them, and for an annual publication thereof. That publication should also indicate the extent to which complaints indicate structural shortcomings in the functioning of the police and, if necessary, give attention to the means of remedying these shortcomings. In its 2016 report, the Board noted that the aforementioned ministerial regulation had not yet been concluded. During the execution of this investigation, it appeared that the Ministry of Justice and Security was now busy drawing up such a complaints procedure. That scheme had not yet entered into force at the end of 2020. In anticipation of its entry into force, the force sought affiliation with
the RCN’s Complaints Committee for undesirable behavior in 2020.
It can be concluded from the annual reports of the KPCN for the years 2017, 2018 and 2019 that in those years 20, 7 and 35 complaints were filed successively. At the request of the Board, the force provided a further explanation of the complaints from those years. This shows that an overview was made for the first time for 2019 with information about the individual complaints. The force sent this overview (in Excel) to the Council in an anonymous form. The overview includes a column stating in keywords what the complaint was about and a column stating whether the complaint has been settled. The Board cannot conclude from the overview how the complaint was handled and to what extent it was justified.

2.2.4 Assessment

Follow-up recommendations
This inspection investigation has revealed the follow-up of the recommendations
2016 the following picture emerged. To the point of active
providing information, the force has developed various useful activities, both internally and externally. The information provision at secondary school is a good example of this. Much profit can still be made with the adaptation of the KPCN website. Due to the COVID-19 measures, the Board was unable to carry out a file investigation itself. On the basis of the information from the KC and the complaints handler, he nevertheless assumes that after an informal conversation, the complainants will be asked if they are satisfied and that the force will start the formal Awb procedure in the event of a negative answer. In view of the information from the force, the Board is equally confident that the complaint files are now in order.
During the investigation, the force did not work systematically with expiration reports. The KC indicated during the investigation that it intends to do this. The Board is confident that this recommendation will be followed up. The Board considers it important that the handling of every complaint is carefully completed in this way. It can prevent misunderstandings and it makes the complaint process transparent.
The replacement of the complaints handler has been realized. The Council is pleased that the force has opted for a structural solution. According to the Board, it is preferable to record this in the redevelopment plan and / or the OenF report. After all, the available capacity for the position of BIZ employee will de facto be increased from 1.0 FTE to 1.5 FTE.

Other aspects
For the sake of completeness, the Board will briefly consider a few other aspects.
The Board has established that for the year 2019, BIZ has drawn up an overview in Excel for the first time of all complaints received in that year, including information about the nature of the complaints. The Council believes this is a good development. Such an overview not only provides insight into the handling of individual cases, but can also provide valuable management information. According to the Board, the addition of several columns with information on various other aspects could give this overview even more value. Think of aspects as the nature of the complaint, method of handling and justification of the complaint. Such information can be used for analysis of complaint patterns and for possible adjustments of work processes and working methods (complaint management). During this investigation, the Ministry of Justice and Security worked on a ministerial regulation for the handling of complaints about the conduct of police officers, as referred to in the BES Security Act. The Board is of the opinion that for the KPCN, its entry into force does not necessarily mean that every complaint enters the formal complaints procedure as standard from that moment. After all, an informal approach is often preferred. The ministerial regulation will contain further rules about the registration of complaints and the annual publication thereof. The BIZ Excel overviews can serve as a basis for that publication.
Conclusion
The complaint handling process by the force has improved after 2016. The recommendations of the Board have been fully or partially followed up. Where follow-up has not yet been realized, an impetus has been given to do so.
Recommendation

With regard to the force management:
• Process the increase in the capacity for BIZ (0.5 FTE) in the refurbishment and / or OenF report.

2.3 Shooting incident on Bonaire

preface
On August 17, 2016, a KPCN police officer died in a shooting incident on Bonaire. At the request of the police force manager (KB), the Justice and Security Inspectorate (hereinafter: the IJenV) has launched an investigation into the events surrounding this shooting incident. The aim of this investigation was to answer a number of questions from the KB regarding the fatal shooting incident and to formulate any points for improvement in response to the incident. The IJenV published a report on this incident in November 2017 and found, among other things, that the KPCN control room was insufficiently in order in various respects.

2.3.1 Recommendations 2017
The IJenV argues in its report for strengthening the control room of the KPCN. She stated the following in this regard:

The control room of the KPCN is insufficiently in order with regard to training, further training and equipment. The Inspectorate regards this as a risk to the performance of the KPCN’s tasks. She is of the opinion that the control room must be strengthened in the short term and recommends that the force manager and the police chief take this up with due diligence.
In the opinion of the Inspectorate, this could include matters such as:
1. Training new dispatchers by the Police Academy, as soon as possible after they enter service, and also investing in additional training of incumbent dispatchers by organizing and guaranteeing refresher courses, internships at other emergency rooms and internships within the basic police care.
2. The (temporary) presence of an executive colleague in the control room in order to allow the civilian centralists to develop a greater sense of the executive work process through the transfer of knowledge. In addition, the supervisor and the deputy supervisor of the control room can also make an explicit contribution by being present in person at the control room with great regularity – and in particular in the event of calamities.
3. Improving or renewing the technical supplies and equipment of the control room and taking technical measures to improve the connections (walkie-talkie traffic and mobile telephony) between the control room and the patrols.

2.3.2 Policy response
The minister gave the following response to the IJenV report:
I endorse the recommendations of the IJenV in this area and see it as confirmation and support for the improvement process that I have already started with regard to the functioning of the control room, you will be informed about this in a letter to parliament of 20 September 2017.
In recent years, the KPCN has invested a lot in building the quantity and quality of its staff, as well as in the associated equipment. As a rule, there is very close cooperation with the Dutch police and with the Police Academy.
The Chief of Police has already focused on improving and renewing the control room and peripheral equipment, for example, 30 walkie-talkies have been purchased for KPCN. European tendering processes have also been launched (to replace all walkie-talkies and mobile radios) and will be launched in the short term (in 2018 for the replacement of the control room equipment and network infrastructure).
In response to the recommendations of the IJenV in the field of training, I asked the police chief to start professionalizing the dispatchers in the short term. Temporary extra deployment of executive expertise in the control room, in anticipation of the training courses planned in the first quarter of 2018, is an important part of this. In consultation with the forces in the region and the Dutch police, we are examining how to give substance to int
ernship opportunities.

2.3.3 Stooth of affairs 2020
The investigation shows that the force has partly set to work independently with the follow-up of the three recommendations. This concerns the following aspects: training and refresher courses for dispatchers, the presence of executive personnel in the control room and the technical connections. The latter is part of the recommendation on the equipment and supplies of the control room. The Board first describes the findings on these aspects.

Based on a specifically designed project structure, the KB has a guiding role in renewing the control room equipment and the network infrastructure. This is also part of the control room’s supplies and equipment. The Council describes the findings on this comprehensive part separately and last.

Training and retraining dispatchers
In the 2018 annual plan, the KPCN has designated the professionalization of the emergency room employees as action to be taken. Interviewees indicate that eleven of the twelve dispatchers of the control room of the KPCN were trained by the Police Academy for both the police and the firefighter-specific modules. One operator was unable to attend during the last training and has not yet completed the fire brigade module. In 2019 he did an internship at the control room on Sint Maarten and successfully completed a practical test for the basic police module. He is registered for advanced training. The Board has received an overview from the KPCN about the training courses followed by the operators.

The force management has indicated that it intends to organize further training for the dispatchers in 2021. The planning for this had not yet been made at the time of the investigation. She also indicates that it is a challenge to get teachers from the Police Academy on Bonaire in good time to provide that training. That is why one operator took part in the training on Sint Maarten.

All dispatchers did an internship in 2018 and 2019 at the control rooms of Curaçao and Sint Maarten. Interviewees indicate that the internships at those busier control rooms had added value for the dispatchers. The traineeships of dispatchers at the BPZ have not been realized. Interviewees from both the control room and the BPZ indicated that it would be good for the connection between these parts of the force to be realized.

Executive personnel in the emergency room
The IJenV noted in 2017 that the control room partly fulfills its guiding role towards the units of basic police care because some executive colleagues of basic police care have difficulty being directed by civilian police officers with little knowledge of operational police work. This creates friction between the BPZs and the dispatchers. At the time of the Inspectorate’s investigation, an executive colleague was added to the control room as deputy chief, among other things to allow the dispatchers to develop a greater sense of the executive working process of the basic police care. The investigation shows that this colleague was placed elsewhere in 2018. The current investigation shows that the current head of the control room is regularly present at the control room. Interviewees also indicate that a number of seniors from the BPZ in their role as watch commander – more than before – regularly show their faces in the emergency room. The police force manager stated in the framework letter dated 14 May 2020 that additional deployment of executive personnel in the control room must be realized in the first quarter of 2020. In the 2019 annual plan, the KPCN has named “the reciprocal exchange between BPZ and control room” as action to be taken. During the talks with the Council, the police force management indicated that they have not succeeded in this because the current available capacity within the BPZ is not sufficient for this. As soon as the capacity within the BPZ has been expanded in accordance with the reorganization plan of the force, it will decide how to realize this.

Interviewees indicate that the BPZ and the emergency room staff have come together somewhat more since 2017 and that there is less friction between the dispatchers and the BPZs. At the same time, they indicate that a number of BPZ employees still do not always accept that they are controlled by the dispatchers and that the controlling role of the control room is still a point of attention. During the investigation by the Board, the KPCN set up a working group for an emergency room – basic police care to further improve the connection between the two departments. They also indicated that the work processes in the control room should be updated in consultation with the basic police care and investigation departments.

Technical connections
In the policy response to the report, the minister stated that thirty walkie-talkies had already been purchased in 2017 and that European tendering processes are being used to replace all walkie-talkies and two-way radios.estart. Interviewees from the force indicate that these tendering processes are generally difficult to realize in the region because there are often no suitable parties available in the region to supply police-specific cases in accordance with the European standard. According to them, the earlier tendering for walkie-talkies and two-way radios was also difficult. The force was eventually able to take part in the tender from the national police, so that the required 100 two-way radios became available after one year. The police force manager indicates that agreements have now been made with the national police that the KPCN can from now on take part in the tenders of the national police for police-specific materials. This also happened with the weapons, the safety vests and the uniform, said interviewees. The research shows that BPZ employees still need to receive training on the effective use of the mobile phone. During this training they should also learn how the mobile phone in the patrol cars can be used as a kind of transmission station to amplify the transmission signal for the walkie-talkies. The training has been postponed each time as a result of the COVID-19 measures.

With the geographic information system (GIS) of the control room, dispatchers can see where employees are on the street because the walkie-talkies are linked to the GIS. The IJenV established in its report in 2017 that this system did not work. The investigation shows that technical measures have been taken to make the system operational again and that this has been successful. However, it does not yet work with all walkie-talkies. A number of them have not yet been properly adjusted by the supplier. Interviewees also indicate that this system is outdated and will be replaced.
With regard to the technical connections between the control room and the units on the street, the network infrastructure, interviewees note that the KPCN has taken measures to improve this. They indicate that the quality of the connections has improved somewhat because the supplier (C3) regularly checks and adjusts the transmission frequencies. One interviewee says about this: “We had problems every week in 2017, and now and then. To really solve it properly, transmission towers need to be added. “

Finally, the KPCN, together with the force manager and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy, has taken technical measures to improve mobile accessibility on Bonaire, Saba and St. Eustatius. Technicians have made software adjustments on the islands in collaboration with the mobile providers, which have improved accessibility. The KPCN has also purchased special telephones for Saba and Sint Eustatius that use two SIM cards (and therefore two providers) and also function as walkie-talkies. Quite progress, according to the interviewees.

Renewal of control room equipment and network infrastructure: part of a broader project
In the policy response to the report of the Inspectorate, the Minister of Justice and Security indicates that a tendering process will be started in 2018 for the replacement of the control room equ
ipment and the network infrastructure. The Council has established that the minister is repeating this in other letters to Parliament from 2018, which also indicate that a reorientation of the control room function on the various islands in the Caribbean Netherlands will be started simultaneously. The study shows that the renewal of the control room equipment and the network infrastructure (for the benefit of the connections between the control room and the patrols) is part of a broader process for the modernization of the control room function on Bonaire, St. Eustatius and Saba. In this section, the Board describes the developments in this area.

Developments 2018-2019
The force manager wrote a starting memorandum in 2018 for the start of the aforementioned emergency room process. He opts for a project-based approach with a steering group chaired by the force manager and the deployment of a project leader.

The force management indicates that in 2018 they had in mind a project leader of the national police, who had experience with control room processes, who could and would like to pull this project locally from Bonaire. She proposed to the force manager to deploy this project leader. In conversations with the Board, the police force manager indicates that in 2018 he initially found a local person willing to lead the project. However, this person moved to another employer. It then took a long time before a new project leader was found because no suitable candidate was available in the region, according to the force manager. He indicated that the organization of the control room function is not only a police matter, but also that of the fire brigade, ambulance and public bodies. Due to the desired neutrality, the force manager did not appoint ingagreed with the aforementioned KPCN proposal, but opted for an ‘own’ project leader from the Ministry of Justice and Security who operated from The Hague.27 This project leader started in February 2019 and wrote a design proposal and a draft action plan . This formulates basic principles for the organization of the control room function per island. The steering committee reviewed the plan and design proposal in December 2019. It concluded that the proposal was still too theoretical and that a new proposal should involve and describe current practice more closely.

Various interviewees indicate that hardly any actual progress was made in the project in 2018 and 2019. For example, the tendering processes for the equipment and infrastructure, which would start in 2018 in accordance with the letters to Parliament, have not been realized; neither in 2018, nor in 2019. On Saba and St. Eustatius, there were also other types of problems that caused delays. For example, these islands had initially indicated that they wanted their own control room. The partners involved also had different views on the implementation of the fall-back scenarios in the event of calamities, such as hurricanes. There were also problems with mobile accessibility on Saba and St. Eustatius, which meant that someone who called 911 was also connected to the emergency room of another country (such as St. Kitts). The infrastructure was also dependent on that on Sint Maarten, so that once a license there had expired, the frequency was unusable. They also indicate that the project leader had insufficient knowledge of operational control room processes and quickly encountered this. He was therefore very dependent on the knowledge and input of locally involved partners.
Interviewees indicate that from the chosen European-Dutch project structure – at a physical distance – the project leader asked many “open questions” to those partners about the desirable design of the control room. This way of working did not fit in well with the way in which the local partners work, so it remained very abstract on paper. They indicate that – in view of the local context – there was a need for a project leader who could translate it into practice locally and include the services involved. Finally, they believe that there was a lack of guidance from the steering group. In 2019, the KPCN repeatedly expressed its concerns to the force manager about the lack of actual progress. The force management has repeatedly urged the force manager to deploy a project leader who has more knowledge of operational control room processes and who coordinates and drives the project locally, from Bonaire. Interviewees from the organization of the force manager indicate that the force manager did not put enough pressure on the progress of the project in 2018 and 2019, whereby the chosen project structure may have been adhered to for too long. “Looking back, you may have to conclude that the steering was not enough,” said one interviewee.

Developments 2020
The police force manager indicates in the framework letter 2020-2023 that the further development of the control room is aimed at the establishment of a properly functioning control room function per island. The aim is to start tenders in the second quarter of 2020 and to have the project completed by the end of 2020.
The investigation shows that in the first half of 2020 – as in 2019 – the KPCN made its concerns known to the force manager at several times about the lack of progress in the project.31 At the time of the investigation of the Council decided that another project leader, with knowledge of control room processes, will continue the project locally – from Bonaire. This project leader must also be able to make the (technical) translation of the design plan into a concrete program of requirements with regard to the required control room equipment. The choice fell on a project leader from the national police. This started on Bonaire in October 2020 and must rewrite the plan of action according to current insights and wishes. The steering group must then approve this plan. The KPCN indicates that a second specialist from the national police will also support the KPCN on Bonaire for the implementation of the work processes, including the commissioning of the new control room equipment. The police force expects it to start on Bonaire in the first quarter of 2021.

New measure: representative of the police force manager in the region
In conversations with the Board, the police force manager indicates that the modernization of the control room will take much longer than he anticipated in 2018 and that it is an extremely complicated job. He also indicates that he now realizes that a complex control room project is not good from The Hague, at a distance of 8000 kilometers
can be controlled.

“If you try to arrange all matters from The Hague, you will soon see that it is just a matter of periodic talking and that not much is actually happening and things get stuck. You need people in the region itself. “

He indicates that – in addition to the deployment of a local project leader of the national police – he has decided to place a strategic manager on Bonaire, as a local representative of the force manager. As chairman of the steering group, this manager must nominate the control room process at strategic level on behalf of the force manager
steering and intervening if there is a delay. In addition to the control room project, the manager will also contribute to other strategic objectives. Interviewees within the force and within the organization of the force manager indicate that they now have confidence that the project will be tackled energetically. This planning for the completion of the project will be included in the plan of action to be rewritten. Interviewees within the force indicate in the discussions with the Board that it is expected that the control room function on the three islands will be set up in the second half of 2021, including the replacement of the control room equipment and network infrastructure.

2.3.4 Review
The Board notes that the KPCN has translated the recommendations with regard to training and further training of dispatchers into measures that have been introduced and implemented. All dispatchers were trained, whereby one
operator still had to follow the fire brigade module during the investigation by the Board. In addition, they did an internship at the control rooms of Curaçao and Sint Maarten. This has contributed to strengthening the control room. After all, training plays an important role in the development, expertise and resilience of dispatchers. In the Board’s opinion, the systematic promotion and refresh of knowledge in the future is a precondition for this.

The Board has established that the KPCN and the force manager have translated the deployment of executive personnel in the control room and traineeships of dispatchers at the BPZ into measures in the annual plan and the framework letter. Both measures were not implemented in 2019 and 2020. The Council understands the failure to implement the first measure. The current capacity within the BPZ simply does not allow this. However, the internships at the BPZ could have been carried out.

The Board has established that the control of basic police care by the control room is still a point for attention. This worries the Council. After all, it is a vital work process. The results of the working group set up by the KPCN for this purpose and the new work processes to be set up and implemented for the control room must be awaited. In the Board’s opinion, the exchange of BPZs and dispatchers is important for strengthening and further development of the control room and for mutual understanding.

Undisturbed communication between the control room and the units via the network infrastructure is essential for the safe and effective functioning of the police. The Board notes that the KPCN has taken measures to improve accessibility on Bonaire, St. Eustatius and Saba. This has led to improvements, both with regard to mobile accessibility and with regard to walkie-talkie and mobile phone traffic.

Well-functioning equipment is a precondition for good communication between the control room and the units on the street. The IJenV determined in 2017 that the equipment was more than seven years old and needed to be replaced. In both the policy response to the report of the Inspectorate and in other letters to Parliament from 2018, the minister indicated that the tender for the replacement of the equipment would start in 2018. The Board finds that this has not been achieved. The aim of the force manager, mentioned later, to start tenders in the second quarter of 2020, also turned out not to be feasible. The Board notes that this equipment has not yet been replaced – more than three years later. As a result, the control room is still insufficiently in order on this part.

Control room project
The Board has established that the replacement of control room equipment, as one of the recommendations from the IJenV report, is part of a broader process for modernizing the control room for which the force manager set up a project structure in 2018. It is not only about the renewal of the technical facilities, but also about the way in which the control room function must be set up per island, including the associated work processes and a new contract to be concluded for the network infrastructure.
The Board is well aware that this project – and with it the follow-up of the Inspectorate’s recommendation on this part – is a complex process. Several partners were involved who initially also had different insights about de way in which the control room function had to be set up on the three islands. The Council understands in itself the choice of the force manager to deploy his own project leader as of February 2019 and not a project leader from the police organization. After all, the modernization of the emergency room is not just a police matter. Soon after his start, this project leader ran into a lack of operational knowledge of control room processes. Moreover, it turned out that the physical distance between The Hague and CN was an obstacle to the steps to be realized in the project. The Council has established that in 2019 and in the first half of 2020 the force manager did not intervene on recurring and clear signals from the KPCN about the lack of progress in the project. In his opinion, the force manager has adhered to the European-Dutch project structure for too long. As a result, it often remained with patient paper and there was a lack of actual progress, for example with regard to the start of the tenders. In the Council’s opinion, the force manager should have steered more firmly on the progress of the project. The Council notes that the force manager only took the necessary and appropriate measures in the second half of 2020 to bring the much-needed acceleration in the project. The results of this must be awaited.

The technical supply and equipment of the control room has been improved in parts. Walkie-talkie traffic and mobile accessibility have been improved and the GIS system is operational again.
The replacement of the control room equipment is part of a broader project to modernize the control room. The Board concludes that this project has been significantly delayed. He thinks that the force manager should have better steered towards the progress of the project. The Council notes that the force manager has now taken firm measures to complete the project in 2021. The Council hopes that this will succeed.

Recommendations

With regard to the force management:
• analyze the bottlenecks in the control of the BPZ by the control room;
• organize the exchange of BPZs and dispatchers;
• safeguard the cyclical process of training and retraining operators in the personnel and training plan.

With regard to the force manager:
• pay more explicit attention to steering the control room project.
2.4 Victim Support

preface
One of the first investigations carried out by the Council in the Caribbean Netherlands (CN) concerned the assistance to victims of crime. The Board published a report on this in December 2012. An important bottleneck appeared to be the process of reporting victims to the Victim Support Office (BSH). This BSH is part of the KPCN. In early 2018, the Board conducted a follow-up investigation into this theme. In it he involved the follow-up of his 2012 recommendations as well as the way in which the police and the public prosecution service inform victims (victim care). This aspect of active information provision was neglected in the 2012 survey.
In May 2018, the Board reported on the results of this follow-up investigation. In its report, the Board noted, among other things, that criminal law is no longer exclusively about getting the perpetrators convicted, but that there is now also the necessary attention for victims. This is also evident from the “Directive establishing minimum standards for the rights, support and protection of victims of crime” of the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. This guideline was implemented in (European) Dutch legislation in 2017. In its report of May 2018, the Board noted that CN has a BSH with enthusiastic employees. At the same time, the Council established that victims in the CN have fewer rights than victims in the European Netherlands. The Council argued for harmonization of those rights. In this report, the Board made seven recommendations in the field of the KPCN.
2.4.1 Recommendations 2018

Registration process
In 2012, the Board already recommended improving the procedure for reporting victims to BSH. Despite the Minister’s announcement in 2013 that a procedure had been set up whereby in principle every victim was reported to BSH, this registration process still turned out to be a bottleneck in 2018. According to the Council, a different question by the police to victims (no
t whether they need victim support but instead whether they object to the provision of their contact details to BSH) and automatic reporting via ActPol can make important contributions to the solution of this problem. To this end, the Council made the following recommendation:
Improve the registration process of victims at the BSH in the short term. In any case, include the question posed by the police to victims as well as the possibility of adjusting ActPol.

Legal knowledge within BSH
The BSH largely runs on voluntary employees. The Board noted that BSH is increasingly in need of specific legal knowledge, and that this knowledge is lacking among the voluntary employees. So he made the following recommendation:
Provide sufficient knowledge in specific legal areas within the BSH.
Insurance and compensation for voluntary employees
Following the 2012 recommendation of the Council to regulate the legal position of the voluntary employees of BSH, the BSH has started working with
volunteer agreements. This includes an annual expense allowance. During the 2018 investigation, it appeared that accident insurance and a mileage allowance had not yet been arranged. This led to the following recommendation:
Take out accident insurance as well as a mileage allowance scheme for the voluntary employees of the BSH.

Active provision of information
It is important that victims are actively informed about, among other things, their rights and about current developments in the criminal investigation. The investigation in 2018 showed that the KPCN informs victims when they request it themselves. Active information provision was, however, mainly dependent on the individual police officer, and was not guaranteed in work processes. In two previous investigations by the Board into the reporting process (2012 and 2014), the Board had already established that the feedback provided by the police to reporters (often the victims) was seriously unsatisfactory. His previous recommendations to improve this feedback had not yet led to structural improvements in 2018. That is why the Council made the following recommendation in its report of May 2018:
Draw up guidelines for the active provision of information to victims.

Profiling BSH
During the investigation in 2018, there was a proposal to make the BSH independent. The main argument was that the direct association with the police would create a high barrier for victims to seek help from BSH. However, the Board saw risks in this proposed privatization because the BSH, with only two paid employees, would become particularly vulnerable. In order to reduce the disadvantage of the aforementioned negative association with the police, the Council made the following recommendation:
For the time being, maintain the BSH as part of the KPCN, but allow it to profile itself more as an independent organization without direct reference to the KPCN.

Collaboration with Victim Support Netherlands
In the European Netherlands, the Dutch Victim Support Foundation (hereinafter: SHN) is responsible for helping victims. According to the Council, it would be good if more cooperation were established between the BSH and SHN:
Consider the possibility of closer cooperation, for example by means of a cooperation agreement, between the BSH and Victim Support Netherlands.

2.4.2 Policy response
The Minister for Legal Protection stated in his response to the report that he subscribed to the recommendations of the Council.
Regarding the notification process, he noted that he had asked the KC to ensure that the notification process is updated at short notice, asking all victims if they object to their data being provided to BSH. In addition, the police force would consider the possibilities of adapting ActPol in order to facilitate and monitor the notification process. With regard to the recommendation on improving the provision of information, the minister stated that KPCN and BSH were already working hard to update the victim process.
In response to the recommendation about accident insurance for the voluntary employees of BSH, the minister noted that he had been in contact with the management of the KPCN about this and that a purchasing process had meanwhile started. The recommendation on the kilometer allowance would be substantiated by an increase in the annual volunteer allowance.
The minister also announced that he had asked the force management and BSH to advise him on the possibilities of a more independent profiling of BSH.
2.4.3 Status in 2020
From discussions with the mandated force manager and the relevant policy coordinator
The ministry of Justice and Security states that, as with the subject of complaint handling, they regard the follow-up of these recommendations of the Council primarily as an implementation issue for which the force is primarily responsible. The following description ofthe state of affairs for each recommendation is therefore mainly based on the information that the force provided to the Council in the context of this investigation.
Registration process for victims
Following the report of the Board, the Royal Conservatoire informed all employees by means of an announcement on 24 July 2018 that the questions posed to victims must be adjusted, in accordance with the recommendation of the Board. This announcement does not apply to victims who are registered with the Youth and Sex Affairs Bureau (JZZ). The contact details of victims who are registered with JZZ are only passed on to BSH when the victim indicates that they need support, according to this announcement. In June 2019, the business process system ActPol was adapted in the sense that employees must tick in the system whether or not a victim wants victim support. In addition, the two paid BSH employees have both had access to ActPol to a certain level since June 2019. Some time after an incident, they contact the victim to indicate what BSH could possibly do. This approach is partly prompted by the experience that victims often state immediately after an incident that they do not want victim assistance. In practice, it regularly turns out that they still need it later.

Employees of JZZ (part of the Investigation department) always contact BSH when a new case arises. Other employees of that department do not always do that, according to BSH. BSH employees do not have access via ActPol to cases being handled by the Investigation Department. But because they do have access to other parts of ActPol, they can often deduce from mutations that there is a case with a victim at the Investigation Department. In such a case, BSH will contact Investigation to determine what is desirable in terms of victim support. Both the KC and the coordinator of BSH were satisfied with the current working method. According to them, BSH can now do its job well.

Knowledge level of BSH employees
In December 2018, all BSH employees, both paid and voluntary, participated in a training course provided by the Violent Crimes Compensation Fund. This training was organized in connection with the expansion of the operation of the compensation fund to the Caribbean Netherlands. In that regard, a cooperation agreement was also signed with the damage fund in March 2019. On this basis, BSH employees can turn to the compensation fund for legal advice.
According to the coordinator of BSH, the contact with the lawyers of the compensation fund is going well. As a result, the level of knowledge has improved at BSH. This coordinator does indicate that refresher and deepening courses are important to stay “up-to-date”.
Accident insurance and mileage allowance
Accident insurance for voluntary employees of BSH had not yet been arranged during the conduct of this investigation. In the policy response of 28 August 2018, the minister indicated that a purchasing process had been started to arrive at such an insurance. The investigation shows that this had not yet been realized due to miscommunication between force manager and KPCN. The force manager announced that this is still being addres
sed by the KPCN. As of January 1, 2020, the annual expense allowance for the voluntary employees of BSH has been increased. The kilometer allowance is discounted in this amount.
Active provision of information
In 2019, the Board conducted a second follow-up investigation into the declaration process in the Caribbean Netherlands. One of the sub-questions concerned feedback to citizens who report the crime. The investigation showed that they, mostly victims of a crime, have a predominantly negative opinion about the feedback from the police force. They often did not hear from the police force after they had reported it. The Board therefore concluded in its report of October 2019 that, despite the recommendations in previous Council reports on the reporting process and on victim support, the force had taken too little action on this point of feedback. The Board made an urgent appeal to the force to organize the feedback to declarants properly in the short term.

Partly as a result of this latest investigation into the declaration process, the force has taken various measures. For example, in 2019 the KPCN appointed a data manager who has the secondary task of checking whether in individual cases the declarant has been informed of the outcome of his case. In the cases closed from 2017 in which this had not been done, this data controller ensured that those involved received an expiration notice. This only concerns cases in which it was decided immediately upon receipt of the case not to initiate further investigations due to the lack of an investigation indication. Through the efforts of this data controller wAs of mid-2019, the backlog in feedback in these matters has been made up. In the meantime, the ActPol system provides that the declarant is automatically sent a standard letter if there is no investigation indication in his case.
In order to improve the process of providing information to declarants, the head of the Investigation department published the work instruction “Feedback declaration” on 20 August 2020. This instruction contains mandatory instructions for feedback to declarants whose declaration has been submitted to the Investigation Department. The principal must be contacted within two weeks of arrival at the Investigation Department, and if the investigation takes longer, this must be done again after one month. At the end of the investigation, the declarant must be informed in writing of the final result. This instruction came into effect on 1 September 2020 and applies to all employees of the Investigation Department. The Head of Investigation sees this work instruction as a short-term solution. In the somewhat longer term, the aim is to make a technical adjustment to ActPol. According to the head of Investigation, the intention is that the contact moments with the declarant are automatically incorporated and that the system then issues a signal when action is required towards the declarant. At the time of the investigation, it was not yet known when this will be adjusted in ActPol.
The team chief on St. Eustatius said that, as far as he is aware, there is no joint process description from the police and the Public Prosecution Service, describing per process step who has which task to inform a victim. He thinks it would be good if there were such a process description. According to the team leader, the police on St. Eustatius uses a broad interpretation of the concept of victim care and does much more than bring victims into contact with BSH.

On Saba, the team works in accordance with the head of Investigation work instruction because, according to the team leader, the ActPol system still needs to be adjusted. The system does not automatically send out a signal that a victim should receive information. The employees keep an Excel list that is checked every four days by the police chief. In a number of cases, the BSH coordinator has established that investigators have applied the work instructions of the head of Investigation: the victims concerned had been kept informed of their case by the police.
Positioning BSH
In accordance with the Council’s recommendation, it has been decided to allow BSH to remain part of the KPCN. The Council’s recommendation to profile BSH more as an independent organization was prompted by the repeated comment that the fact that BSH is part of the force is a high barrier for some victims. According to various officials with whom the Board spoke, this is no longer the case because the image of the force has improved. According to those involved, there is therefore no longer any reason for a more independent profile of BSH.
Closer cooperation between BSH-SHN
The KC and the coordinator of BSH both announced that it is still the intention to conclude a cooperation agreement with SHN. The coordinator will approach SHN for this purpose. Incidentally, BSH and SHN also know how to find each other without a covenant, for example in situations of emigration of a victim from the CN to the European Netherlands or vice versa, according to the coordinator of BSH.
2.4.4 Assessment
This research has shown that the registration process, which has been a persistent problem for many years, has improved considerably. The force has taken measures to ensure that employees ask victims the right question and the ActPol system now contains a mandatory field on victim support. In addition, BSH’s paid employees have (limited) access to ActPol. BSH is satisfied with the current registration process. The Board has established that the force is also implementing these measures and has therefore acted on its recommendation to improve the notification process. According to the Council, it would still be good if the text in the box about victim support was brought into line with the correct question, so instead of ‘victim support needed’, the text: ‘objection to data provision to BSH’ during a subsequent amendment to ActPol .
The level of knowledge of BSH employees has been increased through training from the Violent Crimes Compensation Fund. This recommendation has therefore also been followed up. It is important that the KPCN continues to invest in these employees by means of periodic training and / or courses.
The recommendation about arranging accident insurance and a kilometer allowance for the voluntary employees of BSH has been followed up with regard to the allowance, albeit only as of January 1, 2020. The insurance has still not been arranged. About how this should be done and who would do it, iApparently a misunderstanding has arisen between the force and the ministry. This point was only taken up again during the Council’s investigation.
In the area of active information to victims, another persistent problem, the KPCN has now made serious progress. This required the Council’s “Second follow-up investigation of the Declaration Process” (2019). In response to the recommendations of the Board in that report, it has now been arranged that declarants of cases that come under investigation at the Investigation Department are also adequately informed. It is up to the management of the Investigation department to ensure that employees in practice also act in accordance with the new work instructions. Feedback is still done manually via lists. The Council believes it is important that this is automated as quickly as possible.
With regard to the positioning of BSH, the Board has established that the KPCN has maintained this office as part of the force, in accordance with its recommendation. In doing so, the force has also acted on this recommendation. According to those directly involved, there is no longer any need for a more independent profiling of BSH because, according to them, the image of the force has improved.
Finally, it turned out that the cooperation between BSH and SHN runs smoothly in ad hoc situations. Nevertheless, BSH intends to take the initiative to conclude a cooperation agreement with SHN.

Conclusion
The force has now followed most of the recommendations on victim support. The preconditions for BSH to perform its work properly have the
refore been greatly improved. The Board is particularly pleased that the KPCN has arranged the registration process and the feedback to reporters / victims.
Recommendation
With regard to the force management:
• organize that ActPol:
a) is adapted with regard to the question to victims;
b) provides automated feedback to reporters / victims.

2.5 Basic police care (BPZ)

preface
The Basic Police Care (BPZ) department of the KPCN is primarily charged with the implementation of the main processes “emergency aid” and “supervision and enforcement”. And as “blue on the street”, the BPZ is the face of the police. In 2018, the Board investigated the organization and functioning of the BPZ department. The survey produced a positive picture overall, but the Board made a number of comments about the organization and the functioning of that department. In connection with this, the Board made recommendations on various aspects.

2.5.1 Recommendations 2018

Redesign of the corps
The force was set up on the basis of a design plan from 2009. In 2016, the Board recommended, in its review report on the investigation process, to determine whether the design plan for the KPCN should be based on current data and insights. 38 In recent years, the force has worked on an update
layout plan. During the investigation into the BPZ department, the Board identified various bottlenecks that could be tackled in the context of the redesign. To this end, he made the following recommendation:
When deciding on the restructuring of the force, pay attention to the following aspects:
• size of BPZ teams;
• description of the position of aliens supervision officer;
• description of the position of employee (senior) VVC affairs39;
• job content and weight on the windward winds;
• management of the teams on the windward winds;
• availability of a bario director for each bario40;
• availability of at least one senior for each BPZ team;
• ratio between the number of all-round employees and BPZ employees as well as the possibility of further growth;
• possibility of exchanging BPZ employees between the teams on Bonaire, St. Eustatius and Saba.
Connection BPZ – Investigation
The 2009 design plan assumes that the BPZ will make a structural contribution to the investigation by deploying three FTEs from the BPZ to the Investigation department. In the

38 Report “Review of investigation of criminal investigation process on Bonaire, St. Eustatius and Saba”, 2 May 2016.
39 VVC: common crime.
40 A “bario” is a neighborhood, a bario director can be compared to a neighborhood police officer.
in practice it never happened. It took until 2017 for the BPZ to make a substantial contribution to the investigation. The force management has achieved this by setting up a VVC affairs unit within the BPZ department. An experienced detective is the linchpin of this unit. The Board called the design of that unit a good step, but in 2018 saw it mainly as an advanced post of the Investigation department. The Board also established that this unit is vulnerable because it is too dependent on itbelongs to that one official. According to the Board, the cooperation between the BPZ and Investigation departments could generally be improved. Therefore, the Council made the following recommendation:
Provide a better connection between the BPZ and Investigation departments.
Grids
The study in 2018 showed that the interpretation of
employment conditions and due to the roster system used, it is difficult to adjust the BPZ deployment to the expected workload when drawing up the rosters. The Council made the following recommendation to this finding:
Invest in the creation of better schedules.
Formulation of performance goals
In 2018, the Board concluded that the force hardly works with pre-formulated objectives. So he made the following recommendation:
Consider the possibility of formulating concrete performance goals for the different processes.

Management information
Finally, the Board noted that in general few hard figures are available on the results achieved within the force. This makes it difficult to make statements about the performance delivered. In any case, the Board considered that it is important to substantiate the performance figures because it can serve as management information on the basis of which the force management can (re) steer. The Council made the following recommendation in this regard:
Ensure the availability of relevant management information.

2.5.2 Policy response
In his response to this report on the BPZ, the Minister of JenV informed the President of the House of Representatives that he could agree with the Council’s recommendations. He saw in those recommendations a confirmation of the developments that had already been set in motion. The aspects mentioned by the Council in its recommendation on the decision-making about the redevelopment plan were, according to the minister, already part of the discussions between his ministry, the KPCN, the three authorities and the public prosecution service.
In the new layout plan, attention would be paid to the continuation of the working method with a VVC office within the BPZ department.
With regard to the recommendation on the timetable problem, the Minister stated that he had meanwhile requested the Chief of Police to devote attention to this within his organization. Following the Board’s recommendations on performance targets and
management information, the minister noted that both subjects were still under development within the KPCN. A number of performance targets have already been formulated in the 2018 annual plan. The new design plan provides for a reinforcement of the information provision, which will improve the availability of management information in the long term, according to the minister.

2.5.3 Status in 2020

Redesign of the corps
In consultation with the Ministry of Justice and Security, the KPCN has been working on a redevelopment plan for the force in recent years. In November 2020, the force manager (KB) consulted with the KPCN about a number of changes to the plan. The force still needs to draw up an organization and formation report, including a job description and evaluation for new positions at the KPCN. After approval by the KB and approval of the participation council of the force, discussions can take place in the sector consultation (director of the RCN and trade unions). The ministry expects this to happen in the first half of 2021.
The (draft) redesign plan provides, among other things, for an expansion of the BPZ department by fifteen FTEs (from 68 to 83). In November 2020, a new group of aspirants started training for this. Because the Ministry of Justice and Security has already arranged the financing of the consequences of the redevelopment, the force does not have to wait for final approval. For example, the force can already start recruiting personnel for crucial positions. The KB sees the redesign of the force as the next phase. The first phase was aimed at “getting the basics in order”, now it is about “further development and improvement”. The redevelopment plan therefore contains the subtitle: “The next step in the area of organization and personnel”.
In drawing up the redevelopment plan, the force has taken into account the various aspects mentioned by the Council in its first recommendation. For example, the expansion of the staffing of the BPZ department by fifteen FTEs makes it possible to increase the size of the BPZ teams to eight employees. The redevelopment plan stipulates that there will be room for three extra senior BPZ employees. One of the senior employees is responsible for the coordination of the VVC unit. That task is not regarded as a separate function but as a task focus. The redevelopment plan also provides that the BPZ department has two employees of Immigration Supervision.
The Corps also has
the other aspects that the Council has mentioned in itn recommendation involved in the discussion about the redesign. The force has specifically looked at the workload on St. Eustatius and Saba. In connection with this, the plan stipulates, among other things, that quality-enhancing measures will be taken (training courses). And during events on the Leeward Islands, extra employees will come to support from Bonaire. The management of the teams on St. Eustatius and Saba from the management on Bonaire has been intensified. According to the head of BPZ, it helps that the teams now have a KPCN as their chief, while previously these were always employees of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (KMar).
The number of eight bario directors in the redevelopment plan corresponds to the number of barios and because this plan provides for three additional senior employees, the availability of at least one senior for each BPZ team is better guaranteed. The ratio between the number of all-round BPZ employees and BPZ employees has changed from 17/26 to 23/30, and it is no longer necessary to have a vacancy for progression to an all-round employee. Every BPZ employee can become an all-round employee if he meets the job requirements.
The redevelopment plan also pays attention to the last aspect, that of the possibility of exchanging BPZ employees between the teams on the three islands. In the plan, this rotation is related to the phasing out of support by the KMar on St. Eustatius and Saba. In practice, this has already been implemented by, among other things, the exchange of a workplace for six months between a BPZer from Bonaire and a colleague from St. Eustatius. A future starting point will be employment at the KPCN without a fixed location and with a rotation obligation.

Relationship BPZ Investigation
Managers of the KPCN indicate that the connection between the Investigation departments and BPZ at management level is excellent. At an executive level, they believe it would be good if the employees of those two departments could get to know each other better and gain a better understanding of each other’s work processes.
To improve the relationship between the two departments, since the end of 2019, employees of the Investigation department have taken part in the daily briefing of the BPZ department as standard. Head of Investigation connects once a week. During the briefings, employees of the Investigation department inform their BPZ colleagues about, among other things, the follow-up of concrete cases. In addition, the VVC coordinator participates in the daily “9-hour consultation” about the new matters with the Public Prosecution Service BES, an employee of the IIOO department and a Chief Investigation. Furthermore, employees of the Investigation department work closely with BPZ employees in the catering team and in the motorcycle brigade.
To increase their background knowledge and to gain insight into follow-up processes, new employees (who usually start at the BPZ department) undergo an internship period at the Investigation department during their training.
The redevelopment plan states that the coordination of the activities of the VVC unit rests with one of the senior BPZ employees and that the number of BPZ employees added to the VVC unit varies, depending on the work available. With a large number of jobs, this plan states that support will be provided from the Investigation department.
In practice, the VVC unit has so far usually consisted of two employees, including the coordinator, while there is usually work for three people. In the first years after the establishment of the VVC unit in 2017, the coordinator had two candidates available for a longer period of time. Both candidates moved on to the Investigation Department. Since mid-2019, the coordinator has been supported by a BPZer who was unable to perform regular BPZ work for personal reasons. This colleague, who was not fully deployable, so that the coordinator was regularly on his own, left the force in November 2020.
Employees of the BPZ department offer assistance to the VVC unit on an ad hoc basis, for example by conducting a witness interview or by conducting a neighborhood investigation. The coordinator hopes that as soon as the expansion of the BPZ department has been realized, in accordance with the redesign plan, there will be room to deploy two BPZ employees on a rotation basis for the VVC unit for a longer period of time. With regard to the tasks of the VVC unit, the Corps is considering, among other things, having that unit also handle domestic violence cases. In deciding the type of cases that the VVC unit can handle, a factor in the fact that BPZ employees – unlike their colleagues from the Investigation department – are not screened for access to classified information. The coordinator of the VVC unit has been the constant factor since its inception. For example, if he is absent due to vacation, a senior employee of the Investigation department “keeps an eye on things”.
To avoid arrears (plankz aken), the teams on St. Eustatius and Saba have received long-term support from investigators from the Investigation Department. Due to all the corona measures, there are no longer any detectives on these two windward islands. The Investigation department does offer support from Bonaire. In addition, two employees of the Sint Eustatius team have successfully completed the RIMOZ training. The team leaders of the two windward islands were positive about the cooperation with the Investigation department. One of them noted that this collaboration has really improved since 2018.
Scheduling issues
Following the recommendation of the Council, the force has invested in tackling the timetable problem. For example, a roster committee has been set up at the police force and a planner from the national police has made an analysis. With regard to the team on Saba, which receives support from KMar employees, a better timetable has been realized in consultation with the KMar planner on Sint Maarten. The team on St. Eustatius still has to contend with the limited deployability of a number of employees.
Several interviewees from the force indicate that there are now better schedules with more moments of rest, but that the problems are far from being resolved. According to some, this requires the introduction of a 36-hour working week for the force.
Performance goals
Since 2018, concrete performance targets have been set in the annual plans of the KPCN. If necessary, these are worked out in the pads. An example is the enforcement calendar 2020. The KPCN describes in concrete terms the number and type of inspections it will carry out in 2020. Another example is that every BPZ employee must submit a certain number of fines and official reports per month. The BPZ supervisors monitor the results and steer them in their planning discussions with the employees.
Management information
With regard to the availability of good management information, the problem was mainly due to the lack of operational information. In recent years, the force has invested in correct registrations in ActPol. The head and chiefs of BPZ will be responsible for this together with the data manager appointed in 2019. In the periodic planning discussions between supervisors and employees, this is a regular topic of discussion, according to the interviewees. The data manager checks the registrations in ActPol and feeds incorrectly mutated matters back to the responsible BPZ supervisor. The employee concerned will then receive a work assignment to correct the registration in ActPol. For example, the better filling of ActPol has made it possible to analyze domestic burglaries together with the IIOO department. At the same time, the interviewees indicate that there are still possibilities for improvement in the quality of the information recorded by the employees.
2.5.4 Review

More than ten years after the establishment of the KPCN, there is a redevelopment plan for the force. With this, the force is taking an important step in the field of organization and personnel.
With regard to the largest department of the force, the BPZ department, the Board made a number of recommendations in 2018. The first recommendation concerned a number of specific aspects that, according to the Council, deserved attention when deciding on the redevelopment. This investigation has shown that these aspects are all involved in the development of the redevelopment plan. Most of them have even been explicitly incorporated into it. Most striking is the expansion of the staffing of the BPZ department by fifteen FTEs. The Board has taken note with approval of the way in which the force has acted on this first recommendation in consultation with the force manager.
The Board notes that the force has taken various measures in recent years to improve the connection between the BPZ and Investigation departments. Several examples show that real progress has been made. However, the Council is concerned that the VVC unit, which forms an important link between the two departments, is still very dependent on the VVC coordinator. The support of this coordinator from the BPZ department has not really got off the ground in recent years. The Board is confident that the force will organize this better as soon as the expansion of the BPZ department has been realized. The Board is also of the opinion that the force has not sufficiently guaranteed the replacement of the coordinator. This is currently being provided by having a head of the Investigation Department ‘keep an eye on’. Although this is a practical solution, it is not an adequate replacement within VVC. In addition, he is of the opinion that it is preferable to organize a replacement of the coordinator within the BPZ department.
The Board notes that the force is seriously looking at the timetable problemmatiek and tried to make improvements in all sorts of ways. This does not alter the fact that there are still bottlenecks in this respect. The Board hopes that the planned expansion of the workforce will give the BPZ department more scope and that the roster pressure can decrease further as a result.
The investigation has shown that the force for the BPZ department has now started working with concrete performance targets. Both the 2020 annual plan and the enforcement calendar contain such targets. The Board thinks this is a good development, partly because it considerably increases the possibility to focus on performance.
Finally, the Board has agreed with approval that the force is actually making an effort to make better management information available. The appointment of a data controller was a good move in that regard. In combination with the management by managers of adequate registration in ActPol, this will lead to more self-evidence for BPZ employees to record things correctly. In the past this has proved to be a persistent bottleneck. It is precisely for this reason that these recent developments on this point satisfy the Council.
Conclusion
The force has taken the recommendations from the report on the BPZ department seriously. In doing so, the force has taken important steps towards a better functioning and further professionalization of this department, and thus of the force. The final adoption of the redevelopment plan and the accompanying OenF report will mark a new phase in the life of the force.

Recommendation
With regard to the force management:
• arrange adequate replacement of the VVC affairs coordinator within the BPZ department.

3 Control

In this chapter, the Council discusses in general terms the management of the follow-up of recommendations by the force manager and the KPCN. The Council already described in chapter 1 (introduction) that the police force manager exercises the competent authority over the KPCN with regard to management. He is responsible for the quality of the performance of tasks, the results and the management of the KPCN. That is why the force manager also has a responsibility in steering the realization of the follow-up of the recommendations of the Board.
The specific direction by the force manager on the recommendation regarding the reinforcement of the control room has already been discussed in sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4. The Board chose to describe both the actual state of affairs and the management there, because this is a specific project with a specifically designed management system.
3.1 Control by force manager
The investigation shows that the force manager involves the KPCN in drawing up a policy response in response to an inspection report from the Board. In addition, coordination also takes place on the feasibility and feasibility of recommendations from the Council. Interviewees from the organization of the police force manager indicate that the KPCN, with the approval of the policy response, is committed to the content and the follow-up of recommendations. In the discussions with the Board, they also indicate that, from their position and responsibility, they have a global view of the state of affairs regarding the follow-up of the recommendations of the Board. Many recommendations look up
implementation issues in the field where the force manager does not always have a detailed picture of the state of affairs on the basis of his responsibility and role. The force manager sometimes chooses to include (more complex) recommendations in the framework letters. For example, the 2020-2023 framework letter incorporates recommendations with regard to strengthening the control room. The force management indicates that it is clear to her who should do what with the recommendations.
The reports of the Council can be discussed in regular meetings between the force and the force manager about the annual plans and framework letters, but this is not done systematically. An interviewee puts this as follows: “The real checks and balances have not been set up. This would have added value because it would make matters explicit, so that it is clear to all parties what the state of affairs is. “During a meeting between the police chief and police force manager in 2017, the discussion of recommendations was identified as a separate item on the agenda. This agenda item will not be included in the subsequent reports of the meetings. The investigation shows that this was intended to be a recurring agenda item, but that this has not been realized in practice. During the investigation, the Board learned from the force manager that he wants to set up a process with the KPCN for following up on recommendations and monitoring them. According to the force manager, it is also necessary – if necessary – to translate recommendations into control measures. That is, measures are identified and implemented to ensure that the recommendations also be performed.

The police force has indicated that it is open to setting up such a process. She indicates that this process should also be a choice process because the force is regularly confronted with various implementation issues that – often at the same time – have to be realized. During the discussions with the Council, various examples are mentioned: recommendations from the Council and the National Ombudsman, the implementation of the Road Traffic Regulation, the introduction of juvenile criminal law, the role of the auxiliary officer in domestic violence, the approach to undermining and money laundering and the use of body cams. This is not always feasible for a small force with only one policy officer, which is why choices have to be made. In the process to be set up, according to the force management, finally – partly in the light of the multitude of themes to be implemented – attention should be paid to operational support to the force for the implementation of certain themes.

Interviewees from the organization of the force manager indicate in the discussions with the Board that they experience a bottleneck in the care and control of the quality of the performance of the duties of the KPCN from the point of view of management responsibility. Because of that responsibility, they are also confronted with operational police issues, while
as a policy directorate they are not a police organization and there is a limit to what a policy directorate can do in management. In the discussions with the Council regarding the implementation of the management, the force management indicates that the force needs more and faster police-oriented support for the operations. For example, with regard to the rapid availability of material (such as walkie-talkies) or personnel based on requests for assistance, or the availability of training courses. She indicates that these kinds of matters often go smoothly and therefore hinder the corps in its task performance. Various examples are mentioned here, such as the delay in the purchase of walkie-talkies and other materials. Obtaining crucial temporary support in the form of capacity / expertise from the national police is also often difficult. At the same time, the force management indicates that it has the impression that the force manager and his support are trying to support the force with the best of intentions, but are not always able to do so.

The investigation shows that for the further development of the KPCN, the force manager wants to focus on further strengthening the relationship with the national police.

One option for this is to transfer the implementation of parts of the management to the national police. In this context, the Board notes that both the Bouman report from 2016 and the IJenV report from 2017 already proposed to entrust the operational management of the KPCN to the national police. Interviewees indicate that the national police was not yet ready to take on this task in 2017. During the Board’s investigation, the force manager indicated that in 2021, in close consultation with KPCN, he will make a strategic exploration of the possibility and desirability of transferring (parts of) the implementation of management. A decision on this has not yet been taken. In the meantime, steps have already been taken in that direction. The KPCN can, for example, in certain
tendering processes link up with those of the national police, such as the purchase of the new service weapon and the new uniform.
In various conversations with the Board, interviewees unanimously indicate that KPCN has its own Caribbean identity. That is why they think it is very important that the KPCN remains an independent force, and that the minister remains the force manager in accordance with the Police Act. Although the KPCN is comparable in size to a base team of the national police, the same is by no means true of the responsibilities of the force and the challenges it faces.
Finally, in the discussions with the Council, the KPCN indicated that it needed more space from the force manager to arrange certain management matters himself under the adage “accountability afterwards instead of prior permission”. In this context, the force manager indicates that the force will never become self-sufficient and that therefore there will always be a dependency in the implementation of management to a greater or lesser extent.

3.2 Steering by the KPCN
The force management indicates that reports and recommendations from the Council can be found in the annual plans of the force and / or framework letters from the force manager. For example, the 2018 annual plan incorporates the professionalisation of the control room employees. The Council already established in the previous chapter that its recommendations on basic police care are involved in the process surrounding the redevelopment plan. Some recommendations, such as the recommendations on slEight-sacrifice assistance and complaint handling, which are immediately feasible, are discussed directly by the force management with the person responsible at operational level. These are then discussed one-on-one with the coordinator BSH or complaint handler.

Interviewees indicate that recommendations from the Board have increasingly become a topic of discussion in the Corps Management Team in recent years and are better received in the Corps. “The reports from the Council also help the force, the force has only benefited from it, for example as a basis for the availability of materials and more capacity,” said one of the interviewees.

The investigation shows that the implementation of the recommendations by the force is part of the line and that control and accountability are carried out via the so-called A3 method. The force uses the A3 method for its annual plans. This is a method for drawing up, realizing and monitoring an annual plan in A3 format. Based on the mission and vision of the force, the annual plan connects “success-determining factors” to performance goals. The Board notes in this regard that it had included basic police care as a recommendation in the report to consider the possibilities of formulating concrete performance targets. For example, “information-driven police” has been identified as such a factor and subsequently linked to the performance target “use of systems by employees”.

The survey shows that the heads and their supervisors make the performance targets from the A3 annual plan concrete in the so-called underlays. For example, the BPZ department has concretized goals with regard to the “feeling of safety of residents and visitors” for Bonaire, St. Eustatius and Saba. An enforcement calendar for Bonaire was then drawn up on the basis of this. In it, targets are set about the type and numbers of checks based on traffic regulations. These checks are stored in the BPZ teams and the supervisors monitor the results via the business process system. They steer this in the planning discussions with the employees.

The heads render account in the pads for the results with regard to objectives from the annual plan. These underpinnings are discussed in the fortnightly Corps Management Team (KMT), consisting of the corps management and the heads. Once every three months, the individual heads report to the police force on the results of their department. In the discussions with the Board, the heads indicate that the management that takes place in this way in the KMT also takes place at operational level. This is because the heads discuss the pads with their supervisors once a week, whereby the supervisors are accountable for the operational results. The BPZ chiefs of Saba and St. Eustatius take part in these consultations via video conference, which take place on a structural basis. Interviewees indicate that management by the management on Bonaire has greatly improved on all three islands. One interviewee describes this as follows: “Meanwhile, the organization, KPCN, is one entity in which the cooperation between the three islands has greatly improved compared to before”.

All interviewees within the force indicate in the discussions with the Board that they are positive about the A3 method. They point out that the annual plan is really leading in this way. The implementation of the annual plan is structurally managed at the various levels.

3.3 Assessment

Steering by the force manager
The Board has established that the force manager involves the KPCN in drawing up a policy response in response to an inspection report from the Board. The feasibility and feasibility of recommendations are also discussed.

The Board has established that the follow-up of recommendations is discussed in the regular consultations between the force and the force manager. However, this is not done systematically. There is no monitoring by the force manager of the follow-up of recommendations, which means that there is a risk that certain recommendations, about which the minister has made commitments to the House of Representatives, may become obscured. At the same time, the Board notes that the KPCN has taken up and is implementing most of the recommendations examined by the Board in this investigation. The Board is of the opinion that the proposal of the force manager to set up a process together with the force to maintain a central view of the implementation of recommendations contributes to good governance (steering, management,
internal supervision and accountability). This process should not involve a choice of whether or not to follow Council recommendations. After all, the minister has already made that choice in the policy response to the report. In the Council’s opinion, it is obvious to include other implementation issues with which the force is confronted in the process. The KPCN is and will remain a corps of limited size with ditto basessupport. The Council already described in section 2.1 that this is the local context in which the force must perform its tasks. That is why it is necessary to carefully consider how the KPCN – in view of its absorption capacity – can reasonably implement measures. In the Council’s opinion, the force manager could play a facilitating role in this respect, for example with regard to the temporary provision of extra capacity or expertise.

The Council has established that the organization of the police force manager in the implementation and management of a number of management tasks with regard to operational police processes runs up against a lack of knowledge of executive police work. This hinders the KPCN in its performance of tasks. He therefore embraces the steps that the force manager and the KPCN will take in 2021 to see whether and – if so – how (certain) management tasks can be transferred to the national police. After all, it is expected that the national police will be better and faster able to implement management issues related to operational police work. The Board is of the opinion that the KPCN should remain an independent force. Not only to maintain its unique identity, but also because of the regional cooperation with the other forces, the RST and the KMar. However, this does not stand in the way of strengthening the relationship with the national police.
The Council is of the opinion that, regardless of the dependence of the KPCN in management, the force management and the force manager should continue to discuss the scope that the force is given to settle (certain) management issues directly with the national authorities from the point of view of efficiency. Police.
Steering by the KPCN
The KPCN, through its involvement in drawing up the minister’s response to the House of Representatives, is committed to following up on recommendations. The Board has established that no specific steering process has been set up within the force for the follow-up of recommendations. On the other hand, the KPCN chooses – depending on the content of the recommendation – to include these in annual plans and / or projects, or to invest the follow-up directly with the relevant portfolio holder. The actual implementation is controlled by the KMT by means of the A3 method.
The Board notes that internal management within the KPCN has improved significantly in recent years. The A3 method is being embraced throughout the corps and applied in practice within the various sections of the corps. The four aspects (core concepts) of governance (management, management, internal supervision and accountability) are part of this form of management. In the Board’s opinion, the KPCN has taken great and great steps in this regard.

Conclusion
The force manager and the KPCN manage the follow-up of recommendations. At the moment there is still a lack of checks and balances by the force manager regarding the actual follow-up.
The proposal of the force manager to set up a process together with the force to maintain a central view of the implementation of the Council’s recommendations can therefore be an effective step and contribute to good governance.
The Board has established that the organization of the force manager in the performance of a number of management tasks with regard to operational police processes of the KPCN runs into a lack of knowledge of executive police work. This hinders the KPCN in its performance of tasks.
Recommendations

With regard to the force manager and force leadership:
• In the management process to be set up regarding the follow-up of recommendations, also involve other themes to be implemented by the KPCN.

With regard to the force manager:
• In 2021, explore, together with the KPCN and the national police, the desirability and possibility of a role for the national police in the implementation of (parts of) the management of the KPCN. Depending on the results of this exploration, draw up a plan for this;
• make agreements with the force about the space the force will give the force manager to arrange matters directly with the national police in the implementation of certain management issues.
4 Overall picture

In this investigation, the Board examined to what extent the KPCN and the force manager have followed up on the recommendations of the Board and the JenV Inspectorate, as included in four reports on the KPCN, and to what extent and by whom it is directed. The Board described the findings and their assessment in the previous chapters.
In this concluding chapter, the Board describes the overall picture and answers the sub-questions and the central research question.

4.1 Conversion of recommendations into measures and implementation thereof
(structure and existence): answer sub-questions 1 and 2
The investigation showed that the force manager and the KPCN converted the recommendations into measures and that they were subsequently implemented. Soimportant measures have been incorporated into policy responses, framework letters, annual plans, internal work instructions and / or projects. Such as measures with regard to the control room and basic police care. Other recommendations, the follow-up of which is less complicated in practice, have led to measures that the force management has communicated and assigned directly within the force. Such as measures regarding complaint handling and victim support. The stage of implementation is not the same for all recommendations. For most, the implementation has been completed, but for some there is talk of “work in progress”, such as with some measures regarding the reinforcement of the control room.
4.2 Implementation of measures (operation): answer sub-question 3
The Board notes that the KPCN has implemented and is carrying out most of the recommendations from the four reports. The force manager and the force are still following up on a recommendation regarding the reinforcement of the control room. Some recommendations in the field of complaint handling and victim support have not yet resulted in measures being implemented.

4.3 Focus on recommendations: answers sub-questions 4 and 5
The KPCN is an implementing organization. Not only the force management, but also the Minister of Justice and Security, as force manager, is responsible for steering the implementation of adequate follow-up of recommendations in the field of that force. Pursuant to the Police Act, he exercises the competent authority over the KPCN with regard to management and is responsible for the quality of the performance of tasks, the results and the management of the force. This investigation has shown that the force manager is steering towards the follow-up of recommendations by informing the House of Representatives in his (policy) reactions to the inspection reports whether and, if so, how he is following up on recommendations. In addition, the force manager discusses the recommendations with the force management during regular meetings. However, this is not done systematically. The KPCN and the force manager have not set up a specific steering process for the follow-up of recommendations from the Board. The force manager does intend to do so. The Council embraces such a governance process in which, in its opinion, the implementation of other themes that the KPCN must implement can also be involved. In addition, in this way the force manager has a better overview of the results of the force for which he is (ultimately) responsible in accordance with the Kingdom Act.
The KPCN internally focuses on performance targets from the annual plan by means of the so-called A3 method. De
pending on the content, recommendations from the Board can form part of those performance targets. The Council notes that the A3 method, as a form of steering, is applied with great enthusiasm in practice by all sections of the force. He is of the opinion that the force has taken great steps forward with the introduction and implementation of this management model.
The investigation revealed two bottlenecks in the control of the force manager on the follow-up of recommendations.
Firstly, the physical distance between The Hague – where the force manager is based – and the Caribbean Netherlands. This makes it difficult to oversee progress from the ministry in The Hague, particularly in more complex processes, such as the control room project. This hinders the possibility of effective management. Partly because of this, the control room project has been delayed. The force manager is aware of this. During the investigation of the Board, he chose to place a manager with mandate on Bonaire. On behalf of the force manager, this employee will be responsible for, among other things, steering the completion of the control room project. The Board is of the opinion that in this direction – more emphatically than before in the project – attention should be paid to management, internal supervision and accountability (core concepts of governance).
In addition, there is a bottleneck in the performance of a number of management tasks by the force manager with regard to operational police processes. There is insufficient police knowledge within DGPenV to always facilitate the KPCN quickly and effectively in this area. The transfer of the implementation of parts of the management from DGPenV to the national police contributes, in the opinion of the Council, to the further development of the KPCN.

4.4 Answering the central research question / main conclusion
In view of the foregoing, the Board has reached the following main conclusion and thus answers the central question in this investigation.
The KPCN and the force manager have followed up on the majority of the recommendations from the four examined reports. A number of recommendations are still being followed up. Both the force manager and the force management manage the follow-up van recommendations. The Council notes two bottlenecks in the control of the force manager, namely the physical distance between the Caribbean Netherlands and The Hague and a lack of knowledge of operational police work on the part of the force manager. In certain areas, this hinders the performance of management by the force manager, including steering based on recommendations, and thus the performance of tasks by the KPCN. The force manager has already taken measures and plans to take other measures to resolve these two bottlenecks.

4.5 In conclusion
Nice performance
The foregoing shows that the force has not only converted most of the recommendations into concrete measures, but has also implemented and actually implemented them. Partly in view of the local context in which the force must carry out its police duties and the phase of development of the force, the Council considers this a great achievement. The force and force manager can be proud of this.

Profit for the chain
In an earlier inspection report and in its State of Law Enforcement Caribbean Netherlands 2016, the Board noted that the development of the force was lagging behind that of its (judicial) chain partners. Looking at the way in which the force has developed in recent years, the Council concludes that the force is in the process of catching up. This not only means that there is now a force that can perform its tasks better, but also strengthens the judicial chain as such. Law enforcement in the Caribbean Netherlands is thus served.
The Council is confident that the force will continue to develop and improve with the support of the force manager. This is also necessary with a view to the future. The redevelopment plan and the greater involvement of the national police in the implementation of the management of the KPCN offer good opportunities for this further development.

Appendix 1: overview of interviewed officials

Ministry of Justice and Security
• mandated force manager / deputy. DG, DGPenV
• Coordinator Caribbean Affairs ICA-DGPenV
• (former) head of ICA-DGPenV
• PPAC project manager
KPCN
• police chief
• Deputy Chief of Police
• head of Operations
• policy officer
• head of BPZ
• head of Investigation
• team leader Sint Eustatius
• team leader Saba
• head of the emergency room
• coordinator VVC affairs
• coordinator BSH
• BIZ employee / complaint handler

Appendix 2: Annual Plan 2020 KPCN

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Eng.Translation 61 PDF Pages: Investigation “Follow-up KPCN Recommendations For The Dutch Caribbean Police Force & The Council for Law Enforcement

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